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The Nordic model is the 20th-century Scandinavian recipe for combining 
stable democracies, individual freedom, economic growth and comprehensive 
systems for social security. But what happens when Sweden and Finland – two 
countries topping global indexes for competitiveness, productivity, growth, 
quality of life, prosperity and equality – start doubting themselves and their 
future? Is the Nordic model at a crossroads?
Historically, consensus, continuity, social cohesion and broad social trust 
have been hailed as key components for the success and for the self-images 
of Sweden and Finland. In the contemporary, however, political debates in 
both countries are increasingly focused on risks, threats and worry. Social 
disintegration, political polarization, geopolitical anxieties and threat of 
terrorism are often dominant themes. This book focuses on what appears 
to be a paradox: countries with low-income differences, high faith in social 
institutions and relatively high cultural homogeneity becoming fixated on the 
fear of polarization, disintegration and diminished social trust. Unpacking 
the presentist discourse of “worry” and a sense of interregnum at the face 
of geopolitical tensions, digitalization and globalization, as well as challenges 
to democracy, the chapters take steps back in time and explore the current 
conjecture through the eyes of historians and social scientists, addressing key 
aspects of and challenges to both the contemporary and the future Nordic 
model. In addition, the functioning and efficacy of the participatory democracy 
and current protocols of decision-making are debated.
This work is essential reading for students and scholars of the welfare state, 
social reforms and populism, as well as Nordic and Scandinavian studies.
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1  Always in crisis, always a 
solution?
The Nordic model as a political 
and scholarly concept
Anu Koivunen, Jari Ojala and Janne Holmén
While campaigning for the 2016 US Democratic Party presidential nomina-
tion, Senator Bernie Sanders invoked the Nordic countries as a model for 
future politics. In a debate, he declared, ‘I think we should look to countries 
like Denmark, like Sweden and Norway, and learn from what they have accom-
plished for their working people.’1 Hailing the Nordic countries, especially 
Denmark, as an example of ‘democratic socialism’,2 Sanders’s vision engen-
dered a heated debate, with political opponents critiquing the implied political 
agenda, the prime minister of Denmark protesting the idea of Denmark as a 
socialist country, and journalists and pundits presenting corrective views of the 
economic and social policies of the Nordic countries.3 The critiques notwith-
standing, the notion of the Nordic model has continued to circulate in US 
political imaginary, invoked by both left and centre Democratic politicians. For 
example, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a Democratic representative from New 
York, promotes her Green New Deal agenda with references to Nordic coun-
tries: ‘My policies most closely resemble what we see in the U.K., in Norway, 
in Finland, in Sweden.’4 In the polarised US political debate of the 21st century, 
the Nordic countries serve as an imaginary horizon for both a new kind of 
socialism and a reformed capitalism in the age of accelerated climate change.
However, the idea of the Nordic model as fuel for political imagination 
and a trope for global comparison and competition is an old one. The Nordic 
countries – especially Sweden and Denmark – have been invoked by Nordic 
and foreign actors as a social and economic model for the rest of the world in 
times of crisis dating back to the Great Depression of the 1930s.5 In particular, 
the interplay between the Nordic Social Democrats and the forces on the left 
and the centre of the US political spectrum has been a driving force behind 
establishing the idea that there is a Nordic recipe for how to alleviate the ills 
of capitalism while avoiding the pitfalls of socialism.6 In the Nordic coun-
tries, this discourse about a third way has been adopted by both right- and 
left-wing governments, and the Nordic model has come to serve as a tool in 
the global competition and regional and national branding of the 21st cen-
tury. Both policymakers and economists have rebranded the Nordic model as 
a benchmark for constant renewal and for ‘embracing globalization by sharing 
risks’.7 At the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2011, ‘the Nordic way’ was 
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touted as a recipe for ‘the new reality’ – that is, the world in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis and the Eurocrisis.8 A report, released by a think tank and 
endorsed by the five Nordic governments, paraded the virtues of countries 
that top global indexes for competitiveness, productivity, growth, quality of 
life, prosperity and equality. Rejecting the notion of the Nordic countries as a 
compromise between capitalism and socialism, it defined the Nordic model as 
a ‘combination of extreme individualism and a strong state that has shaped the 
fertile ground for an efficient market economy’. The report highlighted social 
cohesion and broad social trust as key for the Nordic way, enabling resilience 
through constant renewal.9 In 2013, The Economist termed the Nordic coun-
tries ‘the next supermodel’ for ‘reinventing their model of capitalism’ and ‘a 
blueprint’ for politicians from both the right and the left of ‘how to reform the 
public sector, making the state more efficient and responsive’.10
In these framings, the Nordic model appears to have two sides. On the one 
hand, it is a set of crisis narratives; the model is perpetually called into question 
and seen as facing daunting challenges. Furthermore, its economic foundation 
is threatened by globalisation, an ageing population and the digital revolution. 
On the other hand, the Nordic model is invoked as a recipe for dealing with 
these future challenges.11 Both as a set of policies and as self-branding, the 
Nordic model has had an institutional footing in official parliamentary and 
governmental cooperation since the 1950s. While the political relevance of 
Nordic cooperation waned after the Cold War and European integration, the 
actors involved in the many layers of transnational cooperation – parliaments, 
governments, academia and civil society – continue to invest in Nordicness.12
This book joins in this tradition by asking whether the 21st-century Scan-
dinavian recipe for combining stable democracies, individual freedom, eco-
nomic growth and comprehensive systems for social security is at a crossroads 
in the current conjuncture of the global digital economy, geopolitical ten-
sions and changes in political culture, as well as challenges to democracy. The 
chapters were written in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the 
Eurocrisis and amid a sense of accelerating global unrest (war in Syria, the Rus-
sian annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, the continuing war in Eastern 
Ukraine), threats of European disintegration (Brexit, European Union member 
states breaching the rule of law) and the intensifying political polarisation and 
disruption of party structures in many countries, but before the COVID-19 
pandemic. In this framework, this book asks how the Nordic economic, social 
and political model is currently challenged as both an idea and a practice. The 
underlying question, following German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck’s invoca-
tion of Antonio Gramsci, is whether we are living in an age of interregnum, an 
era between systemic changes. In other words, we examine whether we are in 
‘a period of tremendous insecurity in which the accustomed chains of cause 
and effect are no longer in force, and unexpected, dangerous and grotesquely 
abnormal events may occur at any moment’.13 For Streeck and many other 
commentators of a ‘democratic decline’ in the 21st century, the present reads as 
a period of dramatic, foundational changes in the global economy and political 
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systems.14 According to Streeck, interregnum is characterised by a sense of inabil-
ity to predict the future as ‘disparate lines of development run unreconciled, 
parallel to one another, resulting in unstable configurations of many kinds, and 
chains of surprising events take the place of predictable structures’.15 This book 
asks how this age affects the Nordic model as a trope of political imagination 
and a vocabulary for futurity.
This book analyses the Nordic model as an empirical, policy-based phenom-
enon and as a political idea and a trope for the imagination through the lenses 
of social scientists and historians. While exploring contemporary economic, 
social and political challenges, the emphasis is, however, on historicising the 
presentist narratives of crisis and tracing longer and diverse developments.
The emergence of the Nordic model
Although fluid as a geographical referent, Norden, as the Nordic region is called 
in Scandinavian, primarily refers to the five nation-states of Denmark, Iceland, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden, as well as the autonomous territories of the 
Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland islands. However, the Nordic identity 
has an appeal outside of this traditional core. For example, Estonian youths are 
more likely to identify as Nordic than as Baltic, and voices emphasising the 
Nordic identity of Scotland, as well as tangible Nordic-Scottish political coop-
eration, have been increasing in the last decade.16 Although the Nordic coun-
tries are often regarded as fairly homogeneous from the outside, from within, 
the notion of a single economic and social model can be called into question. 
Is there one model? Are there many models, but is the Swedish model the most 
well known? What is Nordic about the model? What does it entail? And are 
these national models simple, unique and – moreover – only associated with 
positive connotations?17
Nevertheless, the concept of the Nordic model circulates and has political 
currency internationally, as well as in the Nordic countries, where it oper-
ates as a signifier and vehicle for various political goals, a tool of transnational 
comparison – that is, to examine the policies of neighbouring countries – and 
a shared resource for regional and national self-branding.18 The model is a pro-
ductive and performative concept; it is mediated by histories and imaginaries 
and mobilised to engender policies.19
The emergence and development of the Nordic model as a concept in 
international discussion can be roughly outlined by a quantitative bibliometric 
analysis using Google Books Ngrams.20 As illustrated in Figure 1.1, there has 
been a gradual increase in the use of the term, Nordic model, in international 
discussions over the 1990s and the early 2000s.
Apparently, the Nordic model concept first surfaced in Google Books’ 
English corpus in the late 1970s. Although Google Books Ngrams presents 
many challenges, these results are in line with previous research, showing an 
increase in discussions over the Nordic and Swedish model.21 Several hype-
cycles can be traced in these discussions; after a first hype during the late 1970s 
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and the early 1980s, the Nordic model faded in discussions, but it rapidly rose 
again during the early 1990s. These hype-cycles correlate with periods of eco-
nomic crisis, strengthening the argument that the Nordic model is primarily 
referenced when there is a perceived need to find alternative ways of organising 
society and the economy. According to Google Books (Figure 1.1), the Nordic 
model concept was mentioned over 30 times more frequently in texts in the 
2000s than in the late 1970s. As these are relative shares from the whole corpus, 
the absolute increase in the use of the concept was even more dramatic.
Discussions of the Nordic model have had different emphases during dif-
ferent decades. The earliest books found by Google Books Ngrams used the 
term while discussing, for example, environmental education in the Nordic 
countries22 and macroeconomic policies on inflation, whereas afterwards the 
topic was discussed more in relation with the welfare state.23 Furthermore, the 
Nordic model has its roots in the older Swedish model concept; as can also be 
clearly seen in Figure 1.1, this concept appeared in international discussions in 
the early 1960s. The Swedish model was far more frequently discussed in the 
literature than the Nordic model throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the 
















Nordic model, left axis Swedish model, right axis
Figure 1.1  Appearance of ‘Nordic model’ (left axis) and ‘Swedish model’ (right axis) in 
Google Books Ngrams from 1960 to 2008 (Index: Nordic Model 1977 = 100).
Source: Google Books Ngrams (https://books.google.com/ngrams). Cited 15 September 2019.
Note: Google Books Ngrams traces the relative share of the concept used in the whole corpus. As these 
shares are relatively small (0.000000145% in 1977), we used an index series (Nordic model 1977=100) 
instead to show the changes in time. Google Ngrams taps all the texts using the phrases ‘Nordic Model’ 
or ‘Swedish model’; thus, they include ones that do not have a societal content. Nevertheless, the fig-
ures mostly relate to texts that are interesting from the perspective of this book. Furthermore, Ngrams 
refers in this case only to books published in English; thus, the widespread discussion in the Nordic 
languages is omitted.
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‘Swedish model’ and an increase in the use of the term ‘Nordic model’ in the 
early 2000s, Google Ngrams found six times more mentions of the Swedish 
model than the Nordic model.
Although the Nordic model concept is only a few decades old, the com-
mon traits it describes from the social models of the Nordic countries have 
much older roots. Klaus Petersen has shown that the Nordic countries began 
to synchronise their social policies in the early 1900s through regular meetings 
of public servants, covering topics such as workers’ accident insurance (from 
1907), the protection of children (from 1919), general social insurance (from 
1935) and unemployment insurance (from 1947). In the 1920s and the 1930s, 
Denmark was the leader and reference point for the other Nordic countries, a 
position that was taken over by Sweden after 1945. From 1953, Nordic social 
policy cooperation was subordinated to the newly founded Nordic Council. 
From at least the late 1940s, the Nordic countries began to describe their wel-
fare societies as a model for Western Europe. For example, Pauli Kettunen has 
shown how Nordic delegates to the International Labour Organization during 
the 1950s depicted their countries as a homogeneous area for social and eco-
nomic policies.24
Thus, the Nordic model, regardless of how it is defined, has to be seen as 
the outcome of a century-long process of voluntary cooperation.25 The Nordic 
countries have influenced each other’s policies and have learned from each oth-
er’s experiences but have been free to apply bespoke national solutions when it 
suited them. This explains why it is almost always possible to find at least one 
exception among the Nordic countries that defies any attempt to strictly define 
the Nordic model. Such a genetic view of the Nordic model is articulated by 
historians, such as Mary Hilson. She uses the Nordic model as a central concept 
in her attempt to write the history of the Nordic countries as a Geschichtsregion 
while trying to avoid a traditional national historiographical framework.26
The notion of a distinctive Nordic social model began to attract interna-
tional attention during the Great Depression of the 1930s. For several dec-
ades, it was most commonly referred to as the ‘middle way’, a term coined by 
Marquis Childs in 1936.27 As Carl Marklund describes, Sweden was particu-
larly well positioned to benefit from the goodwill bestowed upon the Nordic 
countries since it had created the American-Swedish News Exchange (ASNE), 
which actively promoted the country in the United States. High-level Swed-
ish politicians used their country’s celebrated position as a middle way in social 
policies in order to gain acceptance for their less popular middle way in foreign 
policy after the Second World War, namely their neutrality between the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet bloc. In 1949, ASNE 
published a book called Sweden – Model for a World, but, as noted earlier, the 
Swedish model concept did not come into broader use until the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s (Figure 1.1).28 A decade later, when the Nordic vision of social 
organisation was perceived to be under threat, as Bo Stråth has confirmed, the 
Nordic model concept started to spread.29 In addition, several other concepts 
have been used to describe the Nordic countries and the particularity of their 
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societies, most commonly the welfare state and the folkhem (literally people’s 
home).
It seems that the Nordic model concept had its breakthrough as a political 
battle cry at the 29th meeting of the Nordic Council in 1981. There, lead-
ing figures in the Nordic Social Democratic parties rallied around the Nordic 
model in the general debate. The president of the Norwegian Storting, Gut-
torm Hansen, initiated the debate by urging the Nordic Council to cooper-
ate in order to protect the Nordic social model, which, for the first time, was 
under threat from unemployment. The prime minister of Denmark, Anker 
Jørgensen, answered by defining the common core of the Nordic model as 
democracy, welfare state, peace, solidarity with the Third World and, despite 
the differences between the Nordic countries, a strong cultural affiliation. The 
leader of the Swedish Social Democrats, Olof Palme, then described how the 
Nordic model was under threat from war, economic crisis and conservatism. 
According to him, the model played an important role in a wider international 
context. To the list of threats, Finland’s Ulf Sundqvist added that the Nor-
dic economies were especially vulnerable to international developments and 
needed to cooperate in order to adapt to the energy crisis, increasing automa-
tion and the rise of the information society.30 Thus, leading figures of the Social 
Democratic parties in each country not only were active in proliferating the 
Nordic model concept but also detected threats that would materialise on scale 
decades later, when they would return in reinvigorated discussions about the 
crisis of the Nordic model.
Thus, the Nordic model concept was born during a period when the Nor-
dic societies saw their model threatened by an economic recession, the rising 
tensions in the Cold War and the conservative or neoliberal offensive from 
Reaganism and Thatcherism. Most of the challenges to the Nordic model 
identified by leading Social Democrats in 1981 are strikingly familiar to the 
concerns of today. However, there are also differences. In 1981, inflation was 
considered a serious threat, while immigration was not mentioned, except 
indirectly as a question of solidarity. In contrast, inflation was not considered a 
major threat to the Nordic model in the 2010s, but the impact of immigration 
was discussed as both an economic and a cultural issue.
Swedish Social Democrats began to use the Nordic model concept more 
widely during the centre-right government of 1976–1982, which was the 
first time the Social Democrats slipped into opposition since the 1930s. As 
the prime minister of Sweden in 1969–1976, Palme actively used the Swed-
ish model as a tool in his foreign policy and as an example of a middle way 
between Soviet socialism and capitalism. Being in opposition in 1981, he was 
in no position to conduct official Swedish foreign policy. However, as the 
head of the Swedish delegation to the Nordic Council, he could advocate for 
joint Nordic policies. In the process, he used the Nordic model concept as 
he had used the Swedish model concept as a minister. Therefore, the transi-
tion from the Swedish to the Nordic model might be interpreted as having 
been driven by a need to join forces to combat strong challenges, as well as 
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a pragmatic adaptation of the political vocabulary from the Swedish to the 
Nordic arena.
As the political hegemony of the Swedish Social Democrats was challenged 
by forces from the centre-right in the early 2000s, Sweden’s conservative prime 
minister in 2006–2014, Fredrik Reinfeldt, appropriated the Nordic model in 
his political rhetoric. The Social Democratic Party countered by registering 
den nordiska modellen as a commercial trademark in Sweden. Objections from 
the Nordic Council, among others, were rejected by the Swedish Patent and 
Registration Office. However, the trademark protection does not extend to 
political use.31 It can be claimed that, although Social Democratic parties have 
generally been on the retreat in the 21st century – even while leading govern-
ments in Sweden, Finland and Denmark in 2019 – their championed welfare 
state model has gained wide acceptance across the political spectrum. In fact, 
parties on the far right have embraced the basic tenets of the Nordic model. 
In their opposition to immigration and humanitarian asylum policies, right-
wing populist parties employ the rhetoric of welfare nationalism, claiming that 
immigration is the main threat against the Nordic model.32
The Nordic model in research
As evident from the Google Books Ngrams data in Figure 1.1, over the decades 
since the early 1990s, the Nordic model has gained ample attention in social 
scientific research. An analysis of the appearance of the Nordic and Swedish 
models in the Web of Science database, as depicted in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2, 
further refines this picture, capturing the evolution of the concept in different 
disciplines.33
As shown in Table 1.1, the two concepts are favoured by different disciplines. 
The notion of the Swedish model is most common in business and economics 
Table 1.1 Appearance of the Nordic and Swedish models in journal articles.
Research area Total number Number of Number of Per mil Per mil 
of articles articles on the articles on the Nordic Swedish 
Nordic model Swedish model model model
Business & Economics 961,506 265 1,206 0.28 1.25
Education & Educational 492,224 62 204 0.13 0.41
Research
International Relations 119,202 24 34 0.20 0.29
Public Administration 114,571 61 125 0.53 1.09
Social Issues 166,900 37 52 0.22 0.31
Social Work 110,268 37 82 0.34 0.74
Sociology 172,384 45 134 0.26 0.78
History 306,358 29 62 0.09 0.20
Total 2,443,413 493 1,807 0.20 0.74
Source: Web of Science. Cited 15 September 2019.
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and in public administration. In these fields, the Swedish model is mentioned 
more than once per every thousand articles published in the Web of Science. 
The Nordic model concept, in turn, is most frequently used in articles dealing 
with public administration, education and sociology. Figure 1.2 shows how the 
use of these concepts in different research areas changed over time. Only in 
public administration research do both concepts seem to have declined during 
the 2010s, while the use of these concepts increased in the 2010s in many dis-
ciplines, especially in research dealing with social work and social issues.
Most articles analysing the Nordic model in our sample (N = 493) deal with 
voluntary associations, donors interests and globalisation affecting European 
social models,34 whereas most of the cited articles analysing the Swedish model 
(N = 1,807) analyse customer behaviour in Sweden and Swedish multinational 
enterprises.35 Thus, the Swedish model is more widely used in terms of corpo-
rate strategies; this has also been noted by Michael Porter in his famous book 
on the competitive advantage of nations.36 Over time, interestingly, we can also 
see a shift wherein the Nordic model is less associated with international rela-
tions and increasingly associated with social policies. In any case, the Web of 
Science (Figure 1.2) indicates the wide and diversified currency of the concepts 
across a range of disciplines.
In the Nordic context, scholarship on the Nordic model is a vast and lively 
field  – impossible to subsume in a way that accurately mirrors its diversity 
and complexity. Scholars across disciplines have investigated the histories and 
futures of the Nordic welfare state visions and policies, participating in an 
ongoing discursive construction, de- and reconstruction of the model.
In his book of 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Gösta Esping-
Andersen identified what he termed ‘Scandinavian’ welfare system as a distinct 
model, which he characterised as social democratic.37 Also, in a more recent 
2013 account by Nikolai Brandal, Øivind Bratberg and Dag Einar Thorsen, 
the history of the Nordic welfare state reads as a narrative of Swedish, Danish 
and Norwegian social democracy. Although there are differences between the 
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Figure 1.2  Share of articles using the Nordic and Swedish models as concepts in certain 
research areas from 1990 to 2019 (per mil from all articles in different time 
cohorts).
Source: Web of Science. Cited 15 September 2019.
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policies of the different Nordic countries, Brandal, Bratberg and Thorsen argue, 
they are united by a common social democratic ambition to eradicate the evils 
of industrial capitalist society – namely, ‘want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and 
idleness’.38 The authors emphasise that centre- and right-wing parties, when 
in power after 1970, have maintained most of the social democratic policies.
According to Johannes Kananen, summarising an extensive field of welfare 
and social policy research, the history of the Nordic welfare state developed 
in three phases. Until the 1960s, increased emancipation and equality were 
achieved with the help of collectivist means. However, by then, collectivism 
had begun to be perceived as a constraint, and policies of individual emancipa-
tion were conducted in the 1970s and the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the Nordic 
welfare states have come under pressure from the international competition 
state paradigm, which places economic goals, such as competitiveness, before 
social goals, such as equality.39
In Changing Social Equality. The Nordic Welfare Model in the 21st Century 
(2012), Jon Kvist, Johan Fritzell, Bjørn Hvinden and Olli Kangas conclude that 
support for equality and welfare policies is still high in the Nordic countries, 
although it is even higher in Southern Europe. While the Nordic countries 
are still good at mitigating old social risks, such as large families and advanced 
age, they are less good at managing new risk factors for poverty, such as immi-
gration. Overall, the Nordic countries are still more economically egalitarian 
than most other countries, except the Netherlands, which is even better in this 
regard.40
Besides economic equality, gender equality has been frequently discussed 
as an important dimension of the Nordic model. However, this narrative has 
been problematised as feminist and, more recently, postcolonial scholarship has 
shown that the self-image of being equal has been a hindrance to addressing 
gender inequalities and discriminatory practices.41 As Kari Melby, Anna-Birte 
Ravn and Christina Carlsson Wetterberg conclude in Gender Equality and Wel-
fare Politics in Scandinavia: The Limits of Political Ambition? (2008), gender equal-
ity in the Scandinavian welfare model has historically often entailed equality 
based on gender difference.42 At the same time, equality politics has meant 
‘empowerment and inclusion of some women, and marginalisation and exclu-
sion of others’ as Nordic welfare states supported gender hierarchies among eth-
nic ‘others’.43 Diana Mulinari, Suvi Keskinen and other postcolonial feminist 
scholars in Complying with Colonialism: Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic 
Region (2009) and Undoing Homogeneity in the Nordic Region: Migration, Differ-
ence, and the Politics of Solidarity (2019) have questioned complacent monolithic 
accounts of gender equality as well as narratives of exceptional homogeneity 
characterising much scholarship on the Nordic model.44
The criticisms notwithstanding, the Nordic model continues to be dis-
cussed among scholars as a recipe for the future, such as for how to become 
best in class in the globalised knowledge economy. In their Learning Factories: 
The Nordic Model of Manufacturing (2018), Halvor Holtskog, Elias G. Carayan-
nis, Aris Kaloudis and Geir Ringen promote the Nordic model of the labour 
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market and work organisation as a system of wage negotiations between trade 
unions and employer federations, safety nets of health insurance, welfare ben-
efits, pensions, job mobility and career experimentation combined with job 
safety, democratic decision-making processes and high employee participation 
in the organisation of work. This model is depicted as fostering innovation 
and creativity, allowing high-cost countries to compete on the international 
market and providing key to the re-industrialisation of the Western world.45 As 
another example, Sustainable Modernity. The Nordic Model and Beyond (2018), a 
volume by scholars from the humanities, the social sciences and evolutionary 
science, rebrands the narrative of the Nordic model for the age of the climate 
crisis, presenting it as a recipe for a well-being society. In this account, Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark stand as icons of ‘socially sustainable Nordic modernity’, 
combining competition and cooperation – the familiar elements of economists’ 
accounts – with their resilience in the age of globalisation, cultural collisions, 
the digital economy, the fragmentation of the work/life division and often 
intrusive EU regulation.46
‘If the strict criteria of social research are applied, it is impossible to say that a 
Nordic Model has ever existed’, Norwegian sociologist Lars Mjøset contended 
in a 1992 seminar The Nordic Model – Does It Have a Future? Has It Ever Existed? 
held in Helsinki. However, he continued, ‘the Nordic model has and does exist 
as a pan-nationalistic idea, and in the context of a regional identity movement, 
it may gain strength in the future’.47 Indeed, the 1990s saw an emergence of 
a rich, comparative literature on the development of the Nordic welfare state, 
in both intra-Nordic and European perspectives. As Pauli Kettunen has con-
cluded, discourse of competitive state and ‘the making of a globally competi-
tive “us” ’ increased the use of the concept of the model.48 In the context of 
European integration, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the many Nordic 
research-funding bodies launched networks and research programmes examin-
ing the distinctiveness and the new challenges for the Nordic model.49 At the 
same time, historians became interested in historicising the welfare state, and 
Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth discussed the notion of ‘Nordic model’ in the 
context of culture and identity work.50 A special issue of Scandinavian Journal 
of History entitled Nordic Welfare States 1900–2000 (2001) as well as the 2005 
anthology Nordic Model of Welfare: A  Historical Reappraisal marked a turn to 
welfare history in studies of the Nordic model as long-term Nordic research 
networks introduced conceptual history, social movements, religion as well as 
gender history as interpretive frameworks.51
The broad and intense scholarly interest in the Nordic model was epit-
omised in the multidisciplinary, cross-national research project ‘The Nordic 
Welfare State – Historical Foundations and Future Challenges (NordWel)’, a 
NordForsk-funded Nordic Centre of Excellence (2007–2012), which studied 
the social security and service systems, societal patterns and normative value 
systems of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The Centre pub-
lished a range of anthologies on workfare, education, bureaucracy, migration, 
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welfare nationalism and social policies.52 In Beyond Welfare State Models: Trans-
national Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (2011), Pauli Kettunen and Klaus 
Petersen, the directors of the centre, described the comparative welfare state 
research as ‘a veritable industry’ obsessed with models.53 Questioning the use of 
models as an analytical framework for research, Kettunen and Petersen discuss 
the Nordic model as ‘a good case for discussing the analytical limits and politi-
cal meanings of model comparisons’ and a case for studying how transnational 
processes influence national policies.
Combining perspectives from the aforementioned strands of research, this 
volume continues to interrogate the Nordic model as Nordic identity work 
while making a historically rooted attempt to charter the possible futures of the 
Nordic model that might be the outcome of the present crisis.
The structure of the book
In this book, we address the Nordic model as political imagination and as 
policy practice by bringing together three topical debates: the past and future 
of the Nordic model as a social, economic and political model; the force and 
effects of populist politics on the political system; and contemporary concern 
over political instability. Although these debates are usually distinct, the key 
idea of this volume is to investigate the Nordic model at their intersection. 
Drawing from the rich interdisciplinary literature on the Nordic model and 
on the Scandinavian welfare state, we go beyond discussing its economic and 
financial foundations and detailed policies to focus instead on its democratic 
legitimacy and questions of political efficacy and social cohesion.
In Chapters  1–5 of the book, the Nordic model is discussed in terms of 
democratisation and forms of governance.54 Henrik Meinander analyses the 
challenges to the Nordic model posed by the globalised economy, geopolitical 
tensions and national political cultures. Next, in her investigation of how the 
land of bliss concept has been used in visions and nostalgic memories of the wel-
fare state, Ainur Elmgren approaches the Nordic model as a foundational yet 
changing social narrative. What used to be a progressive project of the future 
has become the lost golden age of the past. Then, while worry over the future 
of the welfare state dominates the public sphere, the question of whether the 
Nordic countries have actually experienced a regression from equality does 
not have a simple and straightforward answer, as illustrated by Petri Roikonen, 
Jari Ojala and Jari Eloranta, who compare economic data on equality with the 
debate on equality in academia and major daily newspapers. The geopoliti-
cal landscape is discussed in the light of NATO debates by Matti Roitto and 
Antero Holmila.
Chapters 6–10 of the book focus on the key developments within politics, 
the party structure and the mediated public sphere. Kjell Östberg discusses the 
development of social democracy, describing how the Nordic Social Demo-
cratic parties have experienced losses in influence and electoral support for 
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decades and how they have fundamentally reformed their old welfare policies. 
Torbjörn Nilsson analyses how Nordic conservative parties have reacted to 
the challenge from right-wing populism, comparing the threats and available 
strategies during two distinct periods in the development of the Nordic welfare 
state: the 1930s and the first decades of the new millennium. The current wave 
of populism in the Nordic countries is also analysed by Emilia Palonen and Liv 
Sunnercrantz, who trace the transformation of populist parties from oppos-
ing welfare statism to promoting an anti-immigration agenda, sometimes with 
welfare chauvinist undertones. Pasi Saukkonen discusses how cultural policies 
in different Nordic countries address the increasing ethnic and cultural diver-
sity and how neo-nationalist political ideas influence Nordic cultural policies. 
Anu Koivunen’s chapter focuses on the language of politicians and journalists 
in identifying the public debate and social media in particular as key sites and 
agents of polarisation, division and extreme opinions.
Chapters 11–13 of the book focuses on policies that envision a renegotiation 
of the Nordic model. Johanna Kantola analyses gender policies, highlighting 
the paradoxical gap between progressive gender discourses and policies in the 
Nordic countries, and, for example, their gender-polarised labour markets and 
high rates of domestic violence. She also discusses the effects of recent waves of 
neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism on Nordic gender policies. Pursu-
ing the question of Nordic distinctiveness, Heikki Hiilamo investigates how the 
Nordic societies are preparing for unemployment caused by automation, yet 
another emerging risk factor. In the final chapter, Janne Holmén analyses how 
government planning in Norway, Sweden and Finland envisions the adapta-
tion of the educational system to the challenges and possibilities posed by rapid 
technological advances.
At the threshold of the 2020s, the Nordic model is once again perceived to 
be in crisis, and once again it continues to have political currency as political 
imagination, surfacing as a reference point both in the Nordic countries and 
abroad. Beyond connoting something valuable yet threatened or something to 
be reformed and defended, it is difficult to predict where the Nordic model 
will be heading in the coming decade. It is also too early to assess the effects 
and consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the Nordic 
model embodies a political vision of a society in which consensual decision-
making engenders policies that are able to alleviate social and economic ine-
qualities. On the other hand, it highlights its inherent adaptability, underlining 
its ability to accommodate and survive change and crises.
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2  Three driving forces
Structural challenges for Nordic 
democracies in the 2010s
Henrik Meinander
‘Europa braucht die Nation’ (Europe needs the nation) wrote the German 
sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, joined by his colleagues, in a debate article in the 
weekly Die Zeit in July 2016 after Brexit became a reality. Inspired by the US 
social scientist Lawrence Summer’s recent request for ‘responsible nationalism’, 
by which he meant a combination of a sound economic and welfare policy 
with constructive cooperation with other nations, the German intellectuals 
urged the European Union (EU) to return to the monetary system that had 
existed before the introduction of the euro and limit the power of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.1
Similar academic outbursts of frustration were frequently expressed in many 
European countries in the summer and autumn of 2016. It was not only Brexit 
and the heavy debt burden of most of the European states that caused their 
articulated irritation towards the EU. Equally alarming was the massive inflow 
of refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa to Europe, which 
sparked protests from the populist movements in different parts of the conti-
nent. It also functioned as a revealing stress test of how liberal and human the 
Europeans actually were towards people in need. Within a year even the most 
generous recipient countries, Germany and Sweden, had hardened their immi-
gration regulations and the EU reached an agreement with Turkey in order to 
stop refugees from entering the EU.
By then, Streeck had also sharpened his critique of the market economy 
and banking system of the EU with his essay collection How Will Capitalism 
End? (2016), in which he demanded that the nation-states and their demo-
cratic governments regain some of the control over their economies they had 
had before the 1970s.2 Naturally, this idea of ‘de-globalizing capitalism’ awoke 
much criticism. One of the responses to Streeck’s general theory was published 
in the London Review of Books by the original British historian Adam Tooze. 
He characterised Streeck as a nostalgic and Eurocentric nationalist, who rather 
unconvincingly accused the banks and finance elites of being the cause of most 
of the structural problems in EU. The future of capitalism will be decided in 
Asia, not in Europe, claimed Tooze.3
The views may differ considerably, but in the centre of this debate is how 
the EU states and other Western countries can afford to maintain their welfare 
states and representative democracies amidst the stronger competition in the 
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global market and the geopolitical scene. Politicians are, for understandable rea-
sons, inclined to argue that these challenges can be solved on a national level. 
How could they otherwise attract votes and gain power? However, among 
academic scholars this nationally framed perspective on the development of the 
European welfare states and their democracies has gradually been replaced by 
more transnational framings and questions. The nation-states are still important 
units and actors but are increasingly forced to face the challenges of the ongo-
ing globalisation of a world economy and its ever-faster driver, the digital revo-
lution. Is the answer welfare nationalism or a new international political order?4
Contextualisation has been a growing trend in research on the develop-
ment in Nordic countries. A representative example of this has been Mary Hil-
son’s seminal study The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945 (2008), in which 
she especially highlights the economy and security issues in a wider European 
framework. And during the last decade, a large research programme on the 
historical foundations and future challenges of the Nordic Welfare State (Nord-
Wel) has delivered a number of outstanding anthologies with a systematically 
European and global angle on the matter.5
In the 2010s, the awareness of how intertwined political cultures on the national 
level are with the world economy and geopolitics has almost exploded due to the 
digital revolution, which again has uncovered and accentuated the turbulence and 
inefficiency of liberal democracies. Information technology does not determine 
the direction of societal development. But it is fundamentally quickening the 
rhythm of the discourses on the public spheres and thereby revealing how these 
driving forces interact and form Nordic welfare states and democracies.
The Swedish scholar Lennart Schön has, in his historical synthesis of the 
world economy, spotted a larger pattern behind this change of societal rhythm. 
The world economy has, since the mid-19th century, gone through two glo-
balisation waves (1850–1914 and 1970–present), and each time they have 
reached a turning point, due to technological and financial factors, crucial 
changes have concurrently taken place also in the political culture of nation-
states and geopolitical dynamics in the Western hemisphere.6
Schön identified in his An Economic History of Modern Sweden (2012) four such 
turning points in the world economy during the last 130 years: in the 1890s, 
1930s, 1970s and 2010s. Having already applied Schön’s theory in studies on 
the patterns of democratisation in Finland and Sweden in the 20th century,7 
I will discuss here how feasible it is for understanding the structural challenges 
for Nordic democracies in the 2010s. First, I outline the historical development 
of the Nordic countries, and then I analyse how the world economy, geopoli-
tics, and the traditions and trends in domestic political cultures have formed 
their democracies in the 2010s.
Patterns of democratisation
The emergence and development of representative democracies in the Nor-
dic countries has predominantly been explained as an outcome of a certain 
political culture and its deeply rooted institutions, which paved the way for the 
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implementation of a specific Nordic version of the Western European welfare 
state. There is clear evidence for this claim. Demands of political rights increased 
in all parts of Europe at the end of the 19th century. The northern periphery 
of Europe had until then lagged economically, significantly behind the more 
industrialised countries of the continent, but despite this, democratic reforms 
and other civic rights were implemented in the Nordic countries to some 
degree before they were implemented in other wealthier countries. Simultane-
ously, the Nordic countries had considerably higher economic growth than in 
the equally rural countries in the Balkan and Iberian regions.8
The American historian Mary Nolan has in her fine synthesis The Transatlan-
tic Century explained the Nordic leap as a consequence of certain societal struc-
tures: ‘A different agrarian culture, a better educational system, better transport 
opportunities, and Protestantism all contributed to Scandinavian success.’ The 
Protestant Church was a guarantee for a strong central administration and the 
rule of law, whereas the free peasantry would be the same progressive force in 
political life as the middle classes in Central Europe.9
When the democratic breakthrough took place in Europe after the First 
World War, the Nordic countries were well prepared for parliamentary pro-
cesses and compromises, which partly explains why they, at the outbreak of 
the next world war, were among the very few European countries that had 
maintained their democratic constitutions. Having escaped a Soviet occupa-
tion and thereby maintaining their democracies, the Nordic countries were 
able to construct their own type of welfare system during the post-war period. 
Social equality was promoted by offering benefits to all citizens, which secured 
middle-class support for the system and its acceptance of high progressive 
income taxation until the present day.10
However, the success of Nordic democracy and its welfare system has also 
crucially been dependent on relatively swift economic growth, which trans-
formed the Nordic people between 1890 and 1970 from poor cousins to some-
thing of lucky siblings within the European family. Nordic countries have more 
efficiently implemented recent technological innovations than most other 
European countries. One reason for this has been their small populations and 
functional state governance, which has made it easier to adjust their natural and 
human resources to the new technology.11
Equally important has been their favourable geographical position. On the 
one hand, the Nordic countries have been close enough to large markets in 
Central Europe and North America. On the other, they have been sheltered 
by the seas and in their peripheral geopolitical location. The Danish historian 
Uffe Østergård claims that the geographic site is the major structural explana-
tion to the economic and political success of what has lately become known as 
the ‘Nordic model’.12
Both Finland and Denmark have had mighty neighbours invading them for 
military reasons. But in most cases, Finns and Danes have gained considerably 
from their geographical closeness to the Russian and German markets. And 
in contrast to the Baltic States and other Eastern regions of Central Europe, 
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Finland and Denmark have at the same time been aloof enough to avoid being 
heavily squeezed between the great powers in major conflicts in Europe. The 
geographical site is naturally not the destiny, but it definitely plays a part in the 
story, even though it is easily understood as too simple an explanation.
The Second World War is a case in point. Finland was dragged into the 
war in autumn 1939 because the Soviet Union wanted to secure its defence 
of Leningrad. Denmark and Norway were again occupied by Germany in the 
spring of 1940 as a preventive measure against the plans of the Western pow-
ers to cut off the Swedish export of iron ore to the German war industry. Yet 
none of these three Nordic countries became major battlefields in the horrific 
war between the Axis and Allies, whereas both Sweden and Iceland avoided 
an involvement in the war altogether. In other words, the Nordic countries 
maintained their infrastructures and civilian populations, which put them in a 
totally different position than most of the other countries in war-torn Europe.13
World market
The beginning of the third globalisation wave is usually dated to the 1970s 
when the ground structures of the free movement of capital were laid and the 
outsourcing of Western industrial production to other continents began on a 
larger scale. After the end of the Cold War and together with the simultane-
ous liberalisation of the digital technology, the world economy grew swiftly 
between 1995 and 2008. This time it was no longer the Western hemisphere 
that was the tractor of world economy but, above all, China and India with 
their huge populations and growth potentials. The negative side of the coin was 
a rapidly growing inequality of income, whereas the positive was a considerable 
rise of the standard of living among the poorest populations of our planet.14
The Nordic countries coped well in this economic race until 2008 due to 
the outsourcing of a considerable part of their labour-intensive industry, the 
ability to adjust to new digital technology and the transformation into service 
economies. The Norwegian economy went through an even swifter growth 
thanks to the income from the state-owned energy industry. The worldwide 
financial crisis of 2008 shook the Nordic economies differently. Iceland was 
hit by a banking crisis in 2003 and touched bottom in 2006–2008 but has, 
since 2012, shown bold growth. Norway, Sweden and Denmark maintained 
their budget surplus and returned to a growth path in 2010. Finland’s economy 
withered for a number of structural reasons until 2016 and the state will there-
fore struggle with a budget deficit at least until the early 2020s.15
As a consequence, the recession in the world economy had different politi-
cal implications for each Nordic country. Due to its oil resources and income, 
Norway was much less impacted by the financial crisis. Yet the Social Demo-
cratic government that had held power for eight years lost the parliamentary 
elections in 2013 to a centre-right coalition. However, it was not due to budget 
cuts, but rather it was a typical wish for changes in domestic politics. The win-
ning populist Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) joined the government for 
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the first time and continued in it after the 2017 election, which resulted in a 
tightened immigration policy, much like the one in Denmark had begun to 
implement a decade earlier.16
As an EU country with its most important trade markets in the Union, 
Denmark was more directly affected by the turmoil in world finances and the 
European sovereign debt crisis in 2008–2011. Although Denmark had main-
tained its own currency, its financial market and banking system were closely 
intertwined with the euro-zone. Many expected that the victory of a Red-
Green Alliance in the parliamentary elections in 2011 would lead to a rollback 
of some of the austerity measures initiated by the former government led by 
the Centre Party, Venstre. This did not happen. The Red-Green government 
loosened up the stricter immigration policy implemented by the former gov-
ernment in exchange of support from the nationalistic populist party Dansk 
Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party).17
After the elections four years later (2015), a new centrist minority cabinet 
took over once again with right-wing support, including from the populist 
party. Consequently, further restrictions on the immigration and asylum policy 
were enforced at the same time as the refugee crisis reached its peak within 
the EU. This anti-immigration policy continued after the 2019 elections. The 
populist party lost a considerable part of their support to the Social Democrats, 
who after lengthy negotiations formed a minority government. One reason 
for this power shift was that the Social Democrats’ campaign had backed the 
stricter immigration requirements. Another was that the climate question got 
much more attention in election debates and consumed the support of the 
climate-skeptical populist party.18
One thing was obvious; the Danish measures in the immigration policy can-
not be seen as a reaction to increasing unemployment or other substantial dif-
ficulties in the domestic economics. Quite the contrary, the Danish ‘flexicurity’ 
with its flexibility in the labour market combined with a strong social security 
and activating labour market policy now showed its efficiency. Noticeable also 
is that this employment policy has continued since the 1990s despite regular 
shifts between Left and Centre governments.19
Denmark’s main export markets are in Germany and Sweden, both of which 
sailed through the financial crisis of 2008–2015 without any substantial prob-
lems and were actually growing throughout the 2010s. A closer look at the 
Danish export profile reveals that a substantial proportion of exports is high-
tech products and refined raw materials for niche markets is less sensitive to 
economic conjunctures.20 Denmark’s economic success in the 2010s is in this 
sense a good example of what Lennart Schön described as the positive outcome 
of the ‘transformation of development blocks’: ‘During transformation periods 
after structural crises, development blocks of major innovations have emerged, 
particularly in relation to power supply, transport and communications.’21
The Swedish reactions to the turmoil in the European financial market in 
2008–2015 were also rather moderate. The Swedes, in a 2002 referendum, 
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voted for staying out of the euro-zone, which meant that the Swedish bank-
ing system was only indirectly involved in the measures taken to rescue Greece 
from financial collapse. As in Norway and Denmark, Sweden had during the 
2010s both non-socialist (2006–2010, 2010–2014) and Left-Green govern-
ments (2014–2018, 2019–present) that, despite some distinctively diverse elec-
tion promises, have not made any radical changes in the national economic 
policy.
One reason for this solidification has been the growing support for the 
nationalistic populist party Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Democrats), which 
has had representation in the Swedish parliament since 2010. Due to its ideo-
logical roots in the radical-right movement and strong critique of Sweden’s 
generous immigration policy, the other parties refused to make political deals 
with Sverigedemokraterna. In spite of this, since the election in 2014, the party 
has held a balance of power in the parliament. The two Left-Green minority 
coalitions have therefore since 2014 been forced to rely on passive support from 
the socialist Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) and some of the other non-socialist par-
ties, which hindered the coalitions from carrying out any substantial social or 
economic reforms.22
Yet an equally important reason for this linear policy has been the stable 
recovery of the Swedish economy after the recession in 2009. As in Denmark, 
the Swedish export industry has, due to a number of technological rationalisa-
tions, efficient attraction of foreign capital, made a substantial move towards 
more service products and expanded its international markets despite problems 
in the European economy. An illustrative example of this is the production of 
Volvo cars. Since a Chinese car manufacturer bought the company in 2010, 
Volvo has rapidly regained its profitability thanks to the use of robots in pro-
duction, improved design and global market planning. A car is no longer a 
mere instrument for movement; it is increasingly an expression of taste and 
lifestyle.23
These significant improvements in the technological landscape and societal 
productivity, which, following Schön’s macro-thesis, suggest bold growth for 
Sweden at least into the 2020s and have clearly moderated the interest for radi-
cal change in economic policy. Income tax has remained high in comparison 
with other countries, but as in other Western market economies, Swedish capi-
tal tax has been considerably decreased since the 1990s. The two Left-Green 
coalitions of the 2010s have neither raised the considerably lowered capital tax 
nor reintroduced the inheritance tax abolished by the non-socialist cabinet 
of 2004. The most debated economic question is instead the rapid income 
increase of the wealthiest strata of the Swedish population.24
Finland’s economic path through the 2010s was much more troublesome. 
The deep dip in the world market in 2008–2009 and the following financial 
crisis in the EU impacted Finland and led to a number of other structural prob-
lems in its economy and competitiveness. The dramatic fall and sell-out of the 
giant mobile phone section of the Nokia company took place between 2008 
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and 2013. At the same time, the economically important forest industry went 
through a major renewal of its products, leading to a cut in export incomes. In 
addition to this, the significant export to Russia declined due to both falling 
oil prices and EU sanctions following the Russian annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula in 2014.25
This was certainly not the first time the Finnish economy was rocked much 
harder by economic conjunctures than the other Nordic countries. During 
the previous economic recession in Europe in the early 1990s, Finland had 
faced even graver problems with huge unemployment numbers and consider-
able cuts in welfare services. Such drastic decisions were not required in the 
2010s, although unemployment rates would remain high until 2016, when the 
economy finally began to grow again. But the price for maintaining the welfare 
services was a substantial increase of state debt, which put Finland in the same 
category as Iceland.26
The first bold reactions to these structural problems in the economy came in 
the parliamentary election in 2011, when the populist party Perussuomalaiset 
(True Finns) received substantial support and sharpened its anti-immigration 
demands with a strong critique of the participation of Finland in the financial 
rescue of the Greek economy. The Finnish governments had since the 1970s 
been large coalitions. The Conservatives and Social Democrats were dominant 
parties in the cabinet in 2011–2015, but they were unable to push through 
substantial economic reforms.
This paved the way for a new victory for the populist party in the election 
in 2015 and its participation in a non-socialist cabinet. Two years later, the 
governmental position caused a split within the True Finns, in which the old 
party leadership formed a new party that remained in the government, which 
was able to carry out some reforms that improved Finnish competitiveness in 
the world market. These austerity measures rather predictably led to a clear 
loss for the coalition in the 2019 election and a formation of a Left-Center 
government, which promised improvements in social welfare despite signs of a 
recession in the world economy.27
However, the foremost reason for the Finnish growth numbers since 2016 
was the recovery of the European economy. In contrast to the other Nordic 
countries, Finland has so far not been able to fully transform into an economy 
that maintains stable growth through an advanced technology and a service 
export industry with profitable niche markets.28
The Finnish economic structures are thus also substantially stiffer than the 
much smaller Icelandic economy. The financial meltdown in 2003–2007 of 
the three leading Icelandic banks was a consequence of irresponsible specula-
tion on the global financial markets and awoke large protests against plans of a 
state-funded rescue programme. The government decided, against all odds, to 
let the banks fail, which has resulted in an astonishing recovery and a thorough 
rearrangement of the political map. At the same time, the country has begun 
paying back its enormous loans early.29
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Geopolitics
As pointed out earlier, another often neglected external factor in analyses of 
the development of political cultures in the Nordic countries have been the 
turning points on the geopolitical scene and their different chain reactions. The 
end of the Cold War, the emergence of the European Union and the eastward 
expansion of the Union together with NATO had self-evident far-reaching 
consequences for the political dynamics for Northern Europe. Finland with its 
over 1,300 kilometre-long eastern border with the unstable Russia was in the 
beginning most influenced by these changes. But as new geopolitical tensions 
turned up in other parts of the world, each Nordic country would get its spe-
cific share of the friction they caused.
As NATO members Denmark and Norway took active part in the United 
States-led warfare in Afghanistan (2001–present) and Iraq (2003–2007), a num-
ber of their soldiers got killed and the military involvement sparked protests 
in the Danish-Muslim communities and among domestic pacifists. However, 
apart from Left-wing socialists, would the political party elites and leading 
media continue to support Danish participation in the wars? When in 2005 a 
Danish cartoonist drew insulting caricatures of Muhammed and caused large 
demonstrations against the Danes in different parts of the Muslim world, regrets 
were expressed, but the deed was defended by many of his compatriots in the 
name of freedom of speech.30
These experiences and controversies clearly enforced the nationalistic 
opinion in the Danish immigration debate. It explains also why the Danish 
nationalist-populist party Danske Folkparti succeeded earlier than the other 
Nordic populist parties to get their anti-immigration demands carried out. 
In exchange for this, the party has supported the two recent centre minority 
cabinets. Another consequence of the tightening attitudes towards immigration 
was that Danish scepticism towards the EU, which is essentially a deep-rooted 
popular attitude against all kinds of top-down administration, lost something 
of its edge.
Suddenly, Danish society seemed to be not so threatened by the Germans 
and Brussels but by Muslims and immigrants from the Middle East. This atti-
tude shift was even more bluntly expressed when the big wave of refugees from 
the Middle East and Africa swept over Europe in 2015. Like many other EU 
citizens, Danes demanded that the EU Commission do much more to control 
the borders and distribute the responsibility for humanitarian aid more equally 
among its member states.31
Very few commentators would point out the obvious contradiction in these 
often nationalist demands. As is so often the case with challenges of global mag-
nitude, the public discourses in the Nordic countries were unable to view the 
national consequences of the 2015 refugee crisis as chain reactions of changing 
geopolitical priorities among the great powers. The failures of US forces in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had convinced the Obama administration of the 
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necessity of a controlled retreat from the Middle East.32 This strategy, which 
Obama’s successor Trump would in practice follow, gradually led to a number 
of unpredicted constellations in many parts of the Arabic world: swiftly rising 
demands for democratic reforms through social media, large public demonstra-
tions, increasing political chaos, new but unstable regimes, and chaotic civil 
wars in Libya and Syria, which resulted in large refugee waves to Europe.33
The Swedish reaction to the refugee crisis in 2015 was noticeably different 
and altered more over time. In contrast to the Danish and Norwegian media, 
which had given diversified attention to anti-immigration opinions since the 
early 2010s, would the leading media houses in Sweden defend their govern-
ment’s generous refugee policy and either condemn or neglect the protests 
against it by the populist party Sverigedemokraterna? By the end of 2015, 
nearly 163,000 refugees had arrived in Sweden, which was many times more 
than in any other Nordic country or small EU nation.34
One reason for these differences in the public attitudes towards immigra-
tion was that Sweden had since the 1950s received a great number of labour 
immigrants and refugees from different parts of the world who had integrated 
rather well and already contributed much to their new homeland. This estab-
lished a positive attitude towards immigration and had become a crucial part of 
the Swedish self-image, which made it truly difficult to question the political 
elite and media when the inflow of refugees reached its peak. In late autumn 
2015, the Swedish government was forced to introduce similar immigration 
restrictions as the other Nordic countries. While, the Red-Green government 
gradually began to implement a more restricted immigration policy, the media 
coverage of anti-immigration opinions became more nuanced.
However, the reason for this transformation of the Swedish immigration 
policy was not only the challenges it caused for the local authorities but also 
the considerable growth of the populist party Sverigedemokraterna in the 
opinion polls from 2015 to 2017. When their popularity neared 20 per cent, 
the other parties were inclined to somehow recognise their views and even 
discuss the possibility of forming a government with support from the populist 
party.35
In this sense, the Swedish discourse would slowly turn in the same direction 
as in Denmark and Norway, although it was still dominated by the old ideal of 
clear-cut Left or Right governments. Another sign of the existing differences 
in the Nordic debate climates is that Norwegian and Danish media still often 
point out social problems and criminality in immigrant-dense Swedish suburbs 
as a warning example of a too-generous immigration policy.36
The Finnish reaction to the refugee crisis of 2015 was also quite different. 
Although Finland has had a consistently smaller immigrant population than the 
other Nordic countries (2018: 4.5 per cent), anti-immigration attitudes played 
a considerable role in Finnish politics and were given more space in the media 
than in Sweden. As a consequence, the populist party Perussuomalaiset would, 
after their second election victory in row, join a non-socialist majority coalition 
in the spring of 2015.37
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Almost as soon as the government had been formed, the flow of refugees 
reached Finland, which, following the Swedish example, first accommodated 
them as well as it could but then gradually enforced new restrictions against 
immigration. But being itself in the government, the Finnish populist party 
would, contrary to the Swedish populist party, not gain any new supporters 
during this process, especially since they at the same time had to accept Finnish 
participation in new EU loans to the bankrupt Greece. As earlier mentioned, 
in 2017 the more outspoken anti-immigration faction took over the party, 
which led to a party split and clear backlash in the polls for the two populist 
parties.
Taken together, it is hardly possible to distinguish a certain model for how 
the immigration question has been discussed and solved in the Nordic coun-
tries. In contrast to this diversity, there are clear signs that the earlier Nordic 
security policies have begun to converge and affect Swedish and Finnish politi-
cal cultures. As EU members since 1995, Sweden and Finland have in most 
questions followed the foreign policy lines drawn by the leading EU countries, 
which are all also NATO countries. At the same time, they have step by step 
synchronised their military defences with US forces. In 2014, both countries 
signed an agreement with NATO, which allows NATO forces to operate from 
their territories in case of a conflict in Northern Europe.38
This development has also stimulated inter-Nordic defence cooperation and 
led to concrete consequences after the Russian annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula in 2014 and the sharpening security atmosphere in the Baltic region. 
Nevertheless, lacking popular support, NATO membership is not a realistic 
option for Sweden or Finland in the near future. Many leading politicians 
have preferred to describe Swedish-Finnish military cooperation more as an 
alternative than as an integrated part of the expanding synchronisation with the 
NATO forces, which undoubtedly has caused much confusion in the defence 
debates in both countries.39
Political cultures
Finally, let us look more closely at how these external factors have interacted 
with and impacted the political cultures in the five Nordic countries. Even if 
they belong to the most stable democracies in the world and influenced each 
other, they have all, over the years, formed their own political cultures distinct 
from each other.
The American political scientist Pippa Norris, in her broad analyses of how 
societies and political systems develop, has often pointed out the far-reaching 
consequences of their institutional foundations and functionality: ‘Cultural 
change is path-dependent.’40 This explains also the institutional stability of the 
Nordic democracies in the 2010s. Having their roots in two Lutheran king-
doms, in which the loyalty towards the state remained strong, the rule of law 
was firmly implemented and their civic societies established a steady basis for 
democratic constitutions, the five Nordic countries were able to develop into 
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modern welfare societies, which so far have fought social inequality more effi-
ciently than other Western democracies.41
Even if these welfare reforms have predominantly been carried out by gov-
ernments with a strong social democratic representation, they have, as Mary 
Hilson has emphasised, been outcomes of larger compromises with progressive 
forces within the non-socialist blocks. Furthermore, these compromises have 
also been strongly formed by the specific conflict dimensions that have existed 
in domestic politics in each country and which differ quite a bit from each 
other.42
In a study of current trends in Swedish political life, Johannes Lindvall and 
his research group have analysed the locked situation in the national parliament 
since 2014, when the balance of power tipped to the populist party Sver-
igedemokraterna. The dominant conflict dimension in the Swedish representa-
tive democracy has, according to them, during the last decades been formed by 
a clear-cut competition between the Left and the Right party blocks. Neither 
block is therefore especially skilled or motivated to reach compromises with 
each other or to embrace support from Sverigedemokraterna.
The established parties and liberal media houses have so far shown the new-
comer the same kind of distrust the Communists faced at the beginning of 
the Cold War. Some of its ideological roots are undoubtedly in the Swedish 
right-radical movement. But as Lindvall’s research group points out, the cur-
rent party stands in both economic and defence issues closer to the Social 
Democrats than to the conservative Moderaterna. The voters are also inclined 
to see Sverigedemokraterna as a non-socialist centre party than as a right-wing 
or extreme right party.43
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris arrive at the same conclusion in a large 
comparative survey of the European populist parties in the 2010s. The Swed-
ish populists Sverigedemokraterna are, together with their Danish and Finnish 
counterparts, classified as ‘Populist-Left’ parties primarily on the basis of their 
views on social welfare and economic issues. The Norwegian parallel is for 
the same reason characterised as a ‘Populist-Right’ party; its support does not 
spring from economic insecurity but from a strong sense of threatened cultural 
values. Conservative and ultra-nationalist values are also shared by the other 
Nordic populists and, in fact, Inglehart and Norris conclude that European 
political populism should fundamentally be understood as a cultural backlash: 
populism’s ‘support can be explained as a retro reaction by once-predominant 
sectors of the population to progressive value change’.44
This mixture of populist ideas explains much of the uncertainty Sver-
igedemokraterna caused to the Left-Right conflict dimension that had previ-
ously been so manageable in Swedish politics. It is also a key to understanding 
why populist parties in the other Nordic countries have been able to communi-
cate, cooperate and even share power with the older parties in their parliaments 
and municipalities. In their countries, political cultures have been continuously 
formed by at least two or three conflict dimensions, which in shifting variations 
have divided and gathered support across the Left and Right axis.
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Finland is the most obvious example of this. Four conflict dimensions have 
formed Finnish politics since organised parties emerged in the beginning of the 
20th century: the class struggle, the language feud, the centre-periphery con-
flict and the complicated relationship to Russia. In none of these issues have the 
opinions been divided only on a Left-Right axis. Social Democrats demanded 
social and economic equality, but so did the strong Fennomanic movement 
supported by the Agrarian League, later a Centre party. Many Social Demo-
crats and Conservatives were also eager Fennomans; others saw language as a 
minor question, not least because Swedish was an important tongue in their 
own social classes. Regional interests have always been crucial for the agrarians, 
later a Centre party, and the Communists, later the Left Alliance, and even for 
the Swedish People’s Party.
And yet, none of these conflict dimensions have cut through the Left-Right 
axis as much as the attitudes towards Russia. During the Cold War, the Centre 
party and the Communist were most in favour of a flexibility towards their 
mighty neighbour, whereas the Social Democrats together with the Liberals 
and Conservatives favoured a more cautious line. The safest way to balance this 
existential dispute has therefore been large coalitions over the political cen-
tre line, which have hindered political polarisation that would have benefitted 
above all the Soviet Union and its systematic attempts to influence and direct 
Finnish domestic politics.
In such a political climate it has not been out of the question for other par-
ties to cooperate with a populist party. In 1983–1987, the predecessor of the 
current populist party was in the government and in 2015 it got a new chance 
to get a taste of power. Both times the consequences have been grave for their 
popularity. In 2017, the party was split apart, and the moderate faction contin-
ued in the government despite minimal support in the opinion polls.45
Similar overlapping conflict dimensions have formed and still have a strong 
impact on Danish and Norwegian political cultures. In both countries the 
regional question has been in the centre of the debate since the 19th century 
and is the main reason populist parties, despite their nationalistic overtones, 
have earned credibility in domestic politics. This regionalism explains also why 
the attitudes towards the EU are more dubious in Denmark and especially Nor-
way, where the citizens have twice voted against membership. In contrast to the 
officially militarily non-aligned Finns, who despite their regionalism joined the 
EU originally for security reasons, Danes and Norwegians have never had such 
expectations concerning the EU due to their NATO membership.
The Swedish populist party fits this pattern quite well and has its strong-
est support in Scania, the southern-most part of the country neighbouring 
Denmark. Although having been a part of Sweden since the 17th century, 
Scania has maintained its distinct identity and intonation.46 Another obvious 
reason for the relatively strong support for the populist party in Scania is that 
some of its urban regions have a large population of immigrants. As such, Sver-
igedemokraterna can be seen as a regional protest against the rather centralised 
political culture in Sweden.
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Another often forgotten reason for this centralism is the Swedish election 
system with the so-called long candidate lists. The party organisations decide in 
which order their election candidates are listed. The members of the Swedish 
parliament are thus more obedient to their party leaderships than, for example, 
the Finnish MPs, who are elected on the basis of the votes they have received 
personally and therefore have a stronger regional legacy to lean on.
Conclusion
All in all, Nordic political cultures have a number of specific national conflict 
dimensions, which in their own way have been influenced and formed by 
external driving forces. But if they are viewed from a larger European perspec-
tive, these differences look much less substantial. The Social Democrats play an 
important role in Nordic politics despite their gradual retreat from a dominant 
position. Other bigger parties with longer traditions are in the same situation, 
although each election brings surprises in their support.
In contrast to most other European countries where the dialogue between 
the established and populist parties still is not very rational, Nordic populist 
parties have shown attempts to mature into more responsible political forces 
during the 2010s. However, this trend will ultimately depend on how the Nor-
dic economies can adjust to a number of ongoing changes in the world market, 
which all seem to support Lennart Schön’s theory of the ‘transformation of 
development blocks’. If they succeed in this and continue to deliver growth 
and welfare, the populist parties will have to emphasise their anti-immigration 
rhetoric and regional demands as well as cultural conservatism to maintain 
political support.
The impact of mass migration and geopolitics should not be forgotten. It 
is a safe guess that the Nordic countries will receive a growing number of 
immigrants in the next few decades and that this could substantially stimulate 
their domestic economies. An efficient integration of this new population will 
nevertheless require increasing measures and many political compromises, in 
which populist opinions will be represented. And yet, each time geopolitical 
shifts and international crises occur, such agreements are difficult to maintain 
when the economies suffer and the sudden influx of refugees demand swifter 
actions.
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3  Lost land of bliss
Imagined temporalities of the 
Nordic welfare state
Ainur Elmgren
In the early modern imagination, the golden age of ancient mankind pro-
ceeded inevitably towards decadence. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, a new way of conceptualizing temporality took form. Progress would 
lead humanity and the nation towards future perfection.1 In the second half of 
the 20th century, the Scandinavian or Nordic welfare states integrated aspects 
of this faith in progress into their identities. In practice, Sweden came to sym-
bolize this aspiration, both internally and outwardly. Historian Bo Stråth has 
written about a peculiar “Swedish feeling of chosenness” in his study on the 
labour unions and the Swedish model.2 Finnish nationalism viewed Finland 
as “chosen”, too – but the Finnish rhetoric of “chosenness” has been domi-
nated by the experiences of war, suffering, and loss. Historian Jussi Kurunmäki 
notes that, while Finland has been discussed “as a survivor” in the literature 
of democratization and interwar crisis, Sweden has appeared as an example of 
“successful social democratic reformism”.3
Towards the end of the 20th century, the welfare state project’s very exist-
ence was questioned. The “end of history” and the victory of liberal democracy 
were announced during the reception of Francis Fukuyama’s famous book – 
partly simplifying its message. Two of the bastions of Nordic neutrality fell as 
Finland and Sweden joined the European Union. Today, the political arenas 
of Sweden and Finland accommodate parties that arguably promote welfare 
state nationalism. These parties were funded in the 1990s, but they lay claim 
to the “true” heritage of their respective nation-states. Has nostalgia replaced 
visions of future glory regarding the Nordic welfare state? It can be argued 
that protest parties are attempting to take control of the national narrative. The 
continuity of history is established retroactively. All political actors participate 
in this “retconning” process. This chapter explores such imagined, constructed 
temporalities of the Nordic welfare state from the perspective of the original 
liberal critics of the welfare state project and through their uses of toponyms 
associated with utopia.
Mythical and literary place names used for the land of bliss, such as lintukoto 
in Finland and the more generic lyckoland (land of bliss) in Sweden, are here 
used as a red thread leading the narrative from the beginnings of the welfare 
state project to its nostalgic denouement during the last three decades. Such 
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concepts have an even longer heritage in the former realm of Sweden, which 
Finland was split off from in 1809. As historian Joachim Östlund states in his 
study on the legitimization of power in Swedish public rhetoric in the early 
modern and modern eras, the idyllic portrayal of the country as a “land of bliss” 
has shown “remarkable continuity” over the centuries, but it was not until the 
late 19th century that the people as a nation began to be imagined as a unit 
independent from God or Crown. The utopian “land of bliss” could become 
immanent as a union of convenience: “the rhetoric from above somewhere has 
to meet the dreams from below – in a Land of Bliss”.4
In Finnish public discourse, the folkloristic-literary expression lintukoto (lit. 
bird’s abode; figuratively, safe haven) is often used to denote an imagined utopia 
of peace and harmony. In early modern folk belief, it was an island at the rim 
of the Earth disc where the sky was low and the people consequently small in 
stature. The migratory birds would spend the winters there. Paradoxically, the 
name of this exotic imaginary place is today often used for Finland, specifically 
a lost idyllic past.
Lintukoto was first mentioned in print in the dictionary of Erik Schroderus 
of Uppsala in 1637.5 Folk beliefs about little people that live at the edge of 
the earth’s disc, as well as lands far away where the migratory birds spend the 
winter, have been recorded around the world. In an ancient Greek version of 
the myth, mentioned in the Iliad, “pygmies” live on the shore of the world-
encircling river Oceanus, where they wage war against the cranes.6 While 
the pygmies of ancient Greek myths tended to live in the south or south-
east, early modern authors placed them sometimes in the far north – most 
famously Swedish cosmographer Olaus Magnus in his Historia de gentibus sep-
tentrionalibus (1555).7 Finnish folklore was conflated with classical references 
in the works of 18th-century folklorist Christfrid Ganander and 19th-century 
poet Aleksis Kivi.8 Lintukoto and its tiny inhabitants achieved literary status 
through an eponymous poem by Kivi, published in 1866. Kivi infused the 
folkloric tale with the isle of bliss topos, inherited from German and Scandi-
navian Romanticism. Unlike the mythical pygmies, Kivi’s little people (keri-
kansa) did not fight migratory birds but happily rode on swans around their 
“isle of peace”.9
Kivi’s idyll influenced successive generations of Finnish writers. Folklorists 
used Kivi’s poem as a testimony of the enduring power of native beliefs in the 
spirit of late national romanticism. Literary scholar Toni Lahtinen states that 
Kivi’s poem has been seen as historically significant as a reworking of a univer-
sal topos “into a Finnish, that is, national, land of bliss”.10 It foreshadowed the 
imagined ideal welfare state in other ways, as Kivi – in contrast to many other 
literary depictions of the land of bliss as a land of leisure – showed the inhabit-
ants happily at work, the men ploughing and mowing, the women weaving 
and cooking. However, Lintukoto’s pronounced isolation and the small size of 
its inhabitants also invited pejorative uses. The poet Eino Leino, who often 
utilized folkloric themes in his works, compared the Finns to Kivi’s kerikansa 
in a poem expressing disdain for narrowmindedness. His Finland was not a 
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summery isle of bliss, but another land at the edge of the world, the desolate 
Ultima Thule.11
The Swedish concept lyckoland (or lyckorike, kingdom of bliss) overlaps the 
meaning of lintukoto, as redefined by Kivi. The land of bliss had been pictured 
as an island since antiquity. The poem Lycksalighetens ö (Isle of Bliss, 1833) by 
the Swedish Late Romantic Erik Johan Stagnelius, Kivi’s “favourite poet”, was 
an important source of inspiration for Lintukoto.12 Stagnelius’ island is a time-
less paradise where autumn’s bountiful harvest can be enjoyed in “eternal May 
sun”, similarly to Kivi’s Lintukoto. But unlike Kivi’s chaste idyll, Stagnelius’ 
fantasy is straightforwardly erotic.13
The literary origins of Stagnelius’ isle of bliss can be traced to a popular 18th-
century novel with the same name, a translation of a 1690 novelization of a 
traditional French fairy tale by Marie-Catherine d’Aulnoy. The tale inspired an 
eponymous play by Per Daniel Amadeus Atterbom from 1824. In this version, 
King Astolf leaves his native Hyperborea – another mythological allusion – for 
the isle of bliss, where he enjoys opulence and immortality with the appropri-
ately named Felicia. After 300 years, Astolf returns to his northern homeland 
and finds it transformed: monarchy and nobility have been abolished, and the 
former subjects have lost their warlike honour. Instead, they waste their time 
on speeches and newspapers and get burdened with ever-increasing taxes.14 
Atterbom’s Hyperborea foreshadows the 20th-century welfare state dystopia, 
although his targets were the liberals of his time.15 Neither Stagnelius’ poem, 
nor Atterbom’s play, were ever translated to Finnish, but this was no obstacle 
for the largely Swedish-speaking Finnish intelligentsia of the 19th century.16
From these 19th-century exchanges of cultural tropes grew a literary tra-
dition that contrasted the dream of perfect happiness with the nightmare of 
failure and loss. Throughout the 20th century, lyckoland was used in the sense 
of utopia or fairy-tale land of happiness in the Swedish language. The uses of 
the trope revealed awareness of its impossibility – Stagnelius’ erotic idyll could 
only be reached through the imagination, and Atterbom’s island of eternal 
beauty was a golden cage. These connotations made lyckoland an apt trope of 
political satire, for example in August Strindberg’s Robinsonade De lycksaliges 
ö (“The Isle of the Blissful Ones”) from 1882.17 Until the mid-1930s, lyckoland 
was mainly used in Dagens Nyheter as a satirical description of the Soviet Union 
or, in a milder tone, of the United States as a destination for immigrants. It is 
as a description of migrants’ hopes that the concept returns in the 1980s, but 
between these decades, it is also increasingly used for Sweden and the progres-
sive project of the Social Democratic Party.
In comparison to the concepts folkhem (people’s home, originally a conserva-
tive metaphor appropriated by the Swedish Social Democrats)18 or välfärdsstaten 
(the welfare state), usually describing something realized in the present, the 
land of bliss is a place in the immediate future or the near past. If it is over-
lapping with the present, it is usually employed with an ironic meaning. The 
liberal critics of the welfare state began applying the terms ironically and reluc-
tantly to contemporary society and increasingly adopted the terms as national 
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self-definitions, until a turning point in 1989–1992. Around and after those 
dates, the terms are used in a nostalgic or moralizing sense to denote a lost era, 
but there have also been attempts to reclaim land of bliss as a cautiously opti-
mistic future vision.19
Visions of Nordic progress
The connection between the Nordic countries and the land of bliss, as well as 
its dark side, preceded the modern welfare state. Hyperborea and Ultima Thule 
of ancient myth could be imagined as the two sides of the same coin – happy 
Hyperborea representing the nightless summer in the far north, and miserable 
Ultima Thule wrapped in endless winter dusk. The name Scandia, originally 
a Mediterranean toponym, was used for islands in Northern Europe by Greek 
and Roman geographers. By reinterpreting the works of Jordanes, who created 
a glorification of Gothic history in the 6th century, Early Modern Swedish 
scholar Olof Rudbeck the Elder resurrected the idea of Scandza/Scandinavia 
as an island – literally or metaphorically – for political purposes.20 Rudbeck’s 
Sweden, the state that was destined to rule Scandinavia, was not just any island, 
or peninsula – it was the mythical Atlantis that would rise again and relive its 
glorious past.21 According to Rudbeck, already the ancient Greeks had “not 
without reason” testified that Sweden was “the isle of the Gods, the Kings, the 
High-Born, and the Blissful” (de Lycksaligas ö).22
Rudbeck’s ideas were revived in the early 19th century after the loss of 
Finland. Although Finnish national romanticists were influenced by this “Neo-
Gothicist” movement, they kept their work locally focused. With the rise of 
Finnish nationalism, the isle of bliss could be found in Finland itself. In a col-
lection of children’s stories in 1891, prolific author Zacharias Topelius com-
bined the latest geological findings about post-glacial rebound in the Baltic Sea 
with folklore and national romantic poetry in his tale of the rise of an isle of 
bliss from the depths of the sea.23 In Topelius’ version, the isle of bliss consists 
of both Scandinavia and Finland. Happiness is disrupted by a jealous Arctic 
sorceress. She sends giants to unite the island with Asia by a land bridge. The 
isle of bliss transforms into a mundane peninsula “where paths of nations cross, 
where powers struggle, where hounds hunt, worries wake and sorrows cast 
their shadows upon glimpses of sunshine. Where, where is the isle of bliss?”24 
Topelius assures the reader that it lives on in the pure hearts of Finnish chil-
dren.25 The progress of post-glacial rebound became a metaphor for societal 
progress as a moral duty. The rising land was a gift from God, a miracle that 
distinguished Finland among the nations. Hence, the children of Finland have 
inherited the Christian duty to serve as stewards over God’s creation and “grow, 
like the land, in body and soul, wisdom and mercy . . . to leave [the land] better 
off than you once received it”.26
In the Nordic countries, the idea of progress became central to several politi-
cal movements, including patriotic movements of civil rights and national lib-
eration, the labour movement, the temperance movement, and liberal parties 
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and associations. Christians like Topelius could embrace ideas of societal pro-
gress as a service to God. For a long time, the progressive land of bliss was not 
identified as actually present. Such utopian visions were, on the contrary, often 
mocked and parodied. All “lands of bliss” were not progressive, but all were 
somewhat dubious; most of them were clearly fictional, such as the 1924 Ernst 
Rolf revue Lyckolandet, one of the most successful shows of the 20th century 
in Sweden.27 Much like Atterbom’s isle of bliss, the revue featured orientalist 
exotism in costumes and scenery.
Transposed on mundane Sweden, the idyll invariably looked ridiculous. 
In the winning verses of a leap year poetry competition of Dagens Nyheter’s 
humour section “Namn och Nytt”, everyday nuptial harmony is promised to 
the presumptive groom in the style of 1936: “We shall dwell in the lands of 
bliss,/and our fashion shall be à la Myrdal.”28 The vision of modern marital 
happiness is tempered with mild irony and the mention of the fashionable 
social scientist couple, whose public example was extended into the private 
sphere.
Until the 1930s, most lyckoländer in Dagens Nyheter were either the destina-
tion of emigrants, such as the United States or Latin America, or the land of 
the Bolshevik revolution, the USSR. Even though the liberal newspaper could 
have been expected to show greater sympathy towards the “land of bliss in 
the West” (lyckolandet i väst), it was relatively cautious. The heyday of Swedish 
mass emigration was over by the time of the First World War, but the fear of 
depopulation and the moral doubts left their effect on public discourse.29
In independent Finland, the lands of bliss lay elsewhere long into the post-
war era. The independence process was a painful disillusionment culminating 
in a Socialist uprising and a disastrous civil war in 1918. The liberal press, along 
with the conservatives on the side of the victors, adopted a cautionary line 
towards utopianism, especially its universalist and cosmopolitan expressions. 
Literary critics also approached idylls with nationalist caution. In 1922, Aleksis 
Kivi’s poem Lintukoto was praised by critic Johannes Vihtori Lehtonen for hav-
ing put the stamp of Finnishness on the universal topic the isle of bliss, creating 
an “unbroken Finnish [emphasis in the original] poem about this eternal dream 
of humanity, . . . that nations and social classes have tried to reach by wading 
through streams of blood”.30 Kivi’s idyll was rooted in Finnish nature and tamed 
with “honest Finnish farmer’s work”.31 Lintukoto’s nature and culture was rec-
ognizably local, unlike Atterbom’s exotic fantasy land.32 This localization of 
utopia meant that the danger of universalism – the upsetting of the existing 
order – was evaded. Lehtonen backed his national and moral interpretation of 
Lintukoto with the words of philosophers who proved the impossibility of man-
made utopias: “they would not last long, humanity being what it is, for suffer-
ing and toil is its inevitable lot”.33 For Lehtonen, it was important to promote 
Kivi’s modest, national idyll “especially in current times, when man seems to 
need more than ever everything that is bright, fair and liberating”.34 Lehtonen 
even reread Kivi’s lullaby Sydämeni laulu (The Song of My Heart), where the 
child is lulled to sleep in the Hades of Finnish folklore, as an idyll of “happy 
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melancholy  .  .  . the intuitive dreaming of the happy dwellers of Lintukoto, 
“‘painless yearning’”, that soon fades away”.35
Lintukoto was rarely used to describe really existing Finland until the 1960s, 
but it did appear sporadically in descriptions of achievements of the budding 
welfare state – such as small homes for young families, exhibited at the Social 
Museum in Helsinki in the war year 1942.36 The connection between lintu-
koto and the smallness of its inhabitants was not lost, as well as the idea that 
lintukoto was only a temporary haven from the evil of the real world.37 The 
name had an appeal for holidaymakers and was used as a name for summer 
cottages (along with Onnela, literally a place of bliss).38 This might have been 
due to the influence of author Joel Lehtonen, who used Lintukoto as the name 
of his countryside retreat in the prose work Lintukoto (1929) and the post-
humous poetry collection Hyvästijättö Lintukodolle (“Farewell to Lintukoto”) 
from 1934.39
Joel Lehtonen’s private Lintukoto was an island in the lake Vanajavesi in 
southern Finland. Even though Lehtonen pictured the island as an escape, a 
“sovereign realm” or a monastery “in splendid isolation”, his island was not an 
abode of indolent bliss. Every living creature on the island participated in the 
struggle for survival. The blue flower of Romanticism was the humble corn-
flower in the rye field, a product of the previous settler’s hard work.40 Lehtonen 
distanced his island dreams from the pretentious and hedonistic “rascals” of the 
European Robinsonade and picaresque literature.41 Finally, he abandoned his 
island shortly before his own death. Literature scholar Juhani Niemi sees in 
Lehtonen’s two Lintukoto works a pastoral idyll with traits of parody and even 
apocalyptic elements. The topos Lintukoto turns into an atopos, a bridge to 
the afterlife, or to oblivion.42 Did Kivi’s extinction of the idyll’s Eros inevitably 
lead to Lehtonen’s embrace of its Thanatos?
The adoption of Lintukoto as a Finnish self-description by journalists and 
authors coincides with the self-identification as a Nordic welfare state. In Swe-
den, this process was initiated a few decades earlier. On the pages of the reluctant 
Dagens Nyheter, it started as a satirical self-identification in the 1930s, referenc-
ing the progressive projects of folkhemmet, the Myrdals and the trend of “New 
Objectivity” (nya sakligheten, from the Weimar era art style Neue Sachlichkeit).43 
Conservatives also employed such ironic terminology. The diplomat and writer 
Rütger Essén, a Nazi sympathizer, entitled one of his popular radio plays on 
political themes in the late 1930s “Idyllen Sverige” (Sweden the Idyll).44 Essén 
let a particular character, a Swedish expatriate, express his discomfort with his 
old homeland: the Swedes, taking the credit for peace and prosperity that was 
merely due to luck, “with sensible and self-wise virtuousness observe their 
own splendidness and distribute warning and advice to a world gone astray”.45 
Essén, like other radical conservatives, lamented that democracy hindered indi-
vidual talents from leading. In Dagens Nyheter, Ivar Harrie reminded Essén 
about his relative privilege: “In authoritarian states, the police take care of [dis-
sidents]. Democratic societies can afford to keep them around, and profit from 
them. Dr Essén owes the Swedish idyll much gratitude.”46
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In the face of such self-sufficiency, even from the liberal critics of the wel-
fare state, it is not surprising that discomfort with the welfare state project had 
to be expressed through poetry and fiction. Finnish poet Elmer Diktonius’s 
prose work Onnela (1925), “land of bliss”, on which the poem’s speaker states 
ambiguously: “Here I am at home – here I am in a foreign land”, was still the 
“meagre earth” of the pre-welfare state.47 Gunnar Ekelöf ’s Non Serviam (1945), 
on the other hand, is a frustrated individualist manifesto against folkhemmet 
Sweden: “I am not at home in this land/but this land acts as if it is at home in 
me!”48
But as foreign commentators began to praise Nordic progress, the temp-
tation to repeat their words arose  – first with mild irony, then increasingly 
matter-of-factly. British professor C. E. M. Joad, who visited Sweden in 1946 
and identified it as the happiest country in the world, had his words repeated 
verbatim in Dagens Nyheter.49 However, his explanation for Sweden’s happi-
ness was not in superior social planning and “socialism without tears”, but 
in the smallness of the population and the national temperament, or rather 
lack of it. The image of Nordic progressivism was created in concert with the 
 foreign – mainly Anglo-American – discourse on Nordic particularism. Still, in 
1975, when Prime Minister Olof Palme’s first government made the country 
“unbearable politically” for many US businessmen, the magazine Business Week 
presented Sweden as a “land of bliss” (according to Dagens Nyheter) for business 
investment and a model for US lawmakers.50
Parallel to the creeping acceptance of the lyckoland identity and the break-
through of the “golden age” of capitalism, the 1950s has been seen as the 
peak of the folkhemmet discourse, while self-identification as a welfare state 
has been seen as a feature of the 1960s.51 The notion of the Swedish idyll 
was losing its satirical connotations, while the original bearers of this myth 
were facing challenges to it. The liberal and conservative press gladly quoted 
the chair of the central organization of the labour unions (LO), Axel Strand, 
beset by the challenges of post-war inflation and the government’s demands 
to lower expectations: “the land of bliss without difficulties and worries only 
exists in our dreams”.52 Parallel to the land of bliss, the dystopias – “the future 
as a nightmare” according to writer Olof Lagercrantz in Dagens Nyheter – 
were always present. As Lagercrantz observed, the warnings of Yevgeny 
Zamyatin, Aldous Huxley, and George Orwell, as well as those of the Swedes 
Pär Lagerkvist and Karin Boye, were inspired by the real sociopolitical pro-
jects of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. These authors contributed to 
a “horror for the future” that Lagercratz predicted would turn many coun-
tries in the West towards conservatism. The Soviet Union had killed the old 
utopia.53
Lagercrantz identified very different interpretations of happiness among 
the dystopian writers. In Orwell, he sees no promise of even artificial hap-
piness. The future is “a boot stamping on a human face forever”, an image 
inherited from Jack London’s Iron Heel (1908). But Zamyatin’s totalitarian 
collective We (1920–1921) lures its inhabitants into simple happiness. Adam 
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and Eve could choose between happiness without freedom and freedom 
without happiness – they chose freedom and became unhappy. Since then, 
humanity has longed for fetters. In Zamyatin’s dystopia, humanity has been 
restored to simplicity, innocence, and chains. Similarly, Huxley shows a soci-
ety where misery has been organized away, at the expense of freedom. Lager-
crantz quotes the example of an elevator operator, who has been injected 
with a drug that makes him feel that the height of bliss is to reach the top 
floor. He loves his job!
Lagercrantz does not compare the worlds of Zamyatin and Huxley outright 
to the folkhem project, but he asks:
In the new society that we are approaching  .  .  . we buy a little fortune 
cookie [lyckokaka] for freedom and unlimited personal opportunities. We 
swap our soul for biological satisfaction. Is such a development  .  .  . the 
necessary result of the new technology, the centralized state, the new mass 
communications and the Zamyatinesque bliss-philosophy?
There are echoes of the heritage of Protestant pietism in Lagercrantz’s judge-
ment of his contemporaries. The fulfilment of worldly desires meant “the risk 
of enslavement under happiness”.54 Instead, one should seek the grace of God 
through the cultivation of virtue, above all contentment with one’s lot, and use 
these “tools of reason” to vanquish worldly desires.
Sixteen years later, psychiatrist and writer Jan Gudmundsson echoed Lager-
crantz’s concerns for the psychological consequences of “biological satisfac-
tion” in his novel Löfteslandet (The Land of Promise, 1976). The main character, 
Henning, was a worker suffering from a crippling anxiety evidenced by both 
physical and behavioural symptoms. Despite being both married and union-
ized, Henning felt like an outsider. According to a review in Dagens Nyheter, 
the utopian “myth of a worker-led welfare society” obscured reality, namely 
Hemming’s alienation. Henning had grown up in an individualistic culture 
that values wealth and celebrity, in the “blinding light of the Swedish land of 
bliss . . . the Swedish compromise”. The reviewer felt that Gudmundsson gave 
tangible form to an almost hopeless contradiction in contemporary ideals, and 
the individual’s consequential alienation. In “the solidarity-based ‘worker-led’ 
welfare society” all conceivable services were readily available to fulfil Hem-
ming’s needs, but availability was not the issue: “The issue is that society, in its 
chief and decisive normal functions, lacks solidarity.”55
Even as the contemporary age began to be identified as an age of increased 
welfare and happiness, the concept of happiness was tainted with the negative 
connotations of worldly desires. Just as in Atterbom’s play, the isle of bliss can-
not give the hero the freedom that he craves, and he abandons it for an ulti-
mately fatal quest into a world that has moved on. The virtues of yore, “truth 
and beauty”, seemed to have been dismissed as unmodern just as they were in 
Huxley’s Brave New World. This criticism would continue to haunt the Nordic 
welfare state until its mysterious dislocation into the past.
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The perils of progress
The liberal critique of the socialist project – usurping the modern project at 
least in Sweden – from the very beginning focused on its character as a uto-
pia (lyckorike, lyckoland), an impossible dream world of happiness. But as more 
and more of the promises began to come true, often with practical support of 
the liberals themselves, the critique changed character.56 The folkhem project 
began to be criticized as fulfilling every wish and therefore limiting ambi-
tion. By making everything possible, it paradoxically limited people’s will to 
explore them. It was dangerously similar to totalitarian systems that also prom-
ised heaven on earth.
The sociologist Antti Eskola was an early Finnish critic of the conflict-less 
land of bliss and an early adopter of the term lintukoto for Finland. The self-
described “anarchist” and “ultra-democrat” Eskola was the son of a crofter from 
the same estate that novelist Väinö Linna immortalized in his 1959–1962 tril-
ogy Under the North Star. In the 1950s, Eskola became a student of sociologist 
Erik Allardt and later eulogized this “golden age of bourgeois sociology” that 
aimed to utilize research in order to make democracy more accessible, increase 
tolerance, remove ingrained misconceptions, and help individuals and groups 
adapt to the structural changes in society.57
However, in 1968, Eskola painted a satirical image of this brave new society 
in his polemical book Suomi sulo Pohjola (“Finland Sweet North”, 1968):
In this ideal Finland . . . the sun is shining, the tractors buzz in the fields 
and the merry roar of GDP growth is heard everywhere. The tiny lads and 
lasses [a reference to the pygmies inhabiting lintukoto] walk around beam-
ing with tolerance, enduring difference and regulating conflicts. Nobody 
asks the fundamental questions, nobody inquires about the legitimacy of 
the basic rules. // There are no abnormals or antisocials. Everyone has 
their functional place: the communists have been integrated by receiving 
responsibilities.58
Eskola’s lintukoto-Finland was closely inspired by Kivi’s 1866 poem and even 
picked up some of the darker shades that Kivi had included in his description 
of the fairy-tale island’s happy inhabitants:
In such a utopia, people are not conscious of the foundations of the social 
order and their own actions. Only occasionally does the hazy shadow of 
such a thought cross their mind, just like the inhabitants of Kivi’s Lintukoto, 
who sometimes sink into a semblance of gloomy contemplation. In real-
ity, they do not contemplate anything, because they cannot articulate their 
feeling in a question: “They seek no answer, they find none.”59
Kivi scholars had puzzled over this mysterious shadow of gloom in Kivi’s idyll 
throughout the 20th century. In the interwar era, Johannes Vihtori Lehtonen 
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proposed that it reflected the premonition of death in Atterbom’s play, while 
poet and writer Veikko Antero Koskenniemi interpreted it as an effect of pre-
lapsarian innocence.60 Koskenniemi’s interpretation foreshadowed Eskola’s, 
who had found one flaw in the idyll: “To reduce suffering, knowledge has 
to be reduced.” The way out of the land of ignorance-is-bliss was to bite the 
fruit of knowledge and create a “conscious society”, to “make people painfully 
aware that society is founded on coercion, that we are only free to do what is 
currently tolerated to be done, and that we have no personality, will, or behav-
iour of our own independent of society”. In outright religious terms, Eskola 
demanded that everyone become aware of their participation in a system of 
oppression where they were both exploited and privileged in relation to oth-
ers: “Man has to comprehend that his every act is a sin; bad conscience must 
trouble him day and night; and mercy must be almost out of reach.”61 A decent 
human being, a “child of Marx and Christ”, had to be able to defend herself 
against manipulation and persuasion of the type that Stanley Milgram demon-
strated in his famous study in social psychology. In Eskola’s words, Milgram had 
revealed that “our culture did not seem to offer the individual suitable ways of 
refusing to obey unjust orders”.62 The democratic welfare state seemed to be 
even more difficult to rebel against than a totalitarian state.
Helsingin Sanomat critic Teuvo Mällinen saw a contradiction in Eskola’s fear 
of a utopia without conflict and his fear of a utopia that regulates conflict.63 
Mällinen pointed out that Eskola himself had modelled democracy accord-
ing to the ideals of regulation of conflict. Eskola returned to the lintukoto 
topic in an interview almost 30 years later. The old radical re-evaluated his 
views on post-war Finland, and longed for more harmonious times. “[W]e no 
longer live safely in a lintukoto between Sweden and the Soviet Union”, he 
lamented.64
In 1970s literature, the toponym became more frequently associated with 
contemporary society, perhaps idyllic and swiftly passing, but really existing in 
youth culture.65 It became synonymous with the hippie movement, popular-
ized – and perhaps institutionalized – in Finland via cultural imports such as 
Hair the musical. This lintukoto of youth was full of “innocent self-sufficiency”, 
much like the Swedish idyll, and Kivi’s poem was reinterpreted in light of 
“ideological escape”, “hippie solutions”, and “rock poetry”.66 Perhaps the con-
sciousness of the toponym’s literary roots and its fictitiousness has been stronger 
in Finland, and therefore it was not easily applied to the Finnish welfare state 
project, a product of pragmatic compromise. It could be recognized as such 
in past projects, such as the research on peasant folklore, reinterpreted as an 
exercise in national self-sufficiency and utopianism: “In our history, romantic 
wanderlust did not have to escape to Medievalism or the wonders of India and 
El Dorado . . ., because in East Karelia was found a living legendary Atlantis, a 
lintukoto of antiquity”, claimed historian Matti Klinge.67
Parallel to the immanentization of lintukoto, the Swedish idyll began to lose 
some of its ironic connotations. Critics of the welfare state like the leader of the 
Swedish Moderate party Gösta Bohman were forced to accept its achievements. 
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These were integrated in the Swedish Moderate party’s vision of the past in 
the book Kurs mot framtiden from 1981, where Bohman envisioned a change of 
tack for Sweden.68 Bohman argued that Swedish Social Democrats had chosen 
the way of liberalization – “freedom and change” – in the 1930s and 1950s, but 
since the late 1960s, socialism and stagnation had been their choice. Bohman 
connected his critique to conservative values of tradition by describing how 
“our ancestors” had preferred individual liberation before collectivism. Still, 
post-war Sweden had been an economic success story, and it was this posi-
tive continuity that the Moderate party set out to preserve, not disrupt.69 The 
progressive welfare state had reached a level of hegemony that forced even 
its opponents to work within its historical framework. In the 1930s, Swed-
ish conservatives accepted democracy “because it was historical”.70 Similarly, 
Bohman’s liberal-conservatives accepted, at least temporarily, the reformist 
welfare state.
Gösta Bohman openly admired Social Democratic leaders like Per Albin 
Hansson, who had led a coalition government through the war years, and 
Tage Erlander, the longest-sitting prime minister in the post-war era. Bohman’s 
vision of the happy past was, paradoxically, a national “we” of individuals work-
ing together consensually for the common good. In 1981, he criticized the 
“new” direction of the Social Democrats that was, in contrast to the previously 
conciliatory path of progress, the road to socialism, collectivism, and conflict. 
Thirty years later, Bohman’s successor Fredrik Reinfeldt described Olof Palme 
as “radicalizing” the Social Democratic Party, while Erlander was part of a 
“Swedish tradition of consensus and spirit of concord”.71
Similar signs of critique appeared in the liberal press in Finland in the early 
1980s. Although the Social Democratic Party had never reached a comparable 
hegemonic position, some of its politicians became targets for liberal critique. 
For Eero Silvasti in Helsingin Sanomat, the social politician and researcher Pekka 
Kuusi was the architect of the “lintukoto of welfare”.72 Acting mainly in the role 
of an expert and a civil servant, Kuusi had promoted redistribution of wealth 
and income as an equalizing measure. Although Silvasti admitted that never-
before-seen levels of prosperity had been reached thanks to societal reforms 
in Finland, he also noted that people were experiencing dissatisfaction and 
unhappiness  – the same paradoxical malaise of the welfare state that Swed-
ish authors had identified in the 1960s and the 1970s. Silvasti found that “the 
slavery of work” had been replaced by “the slavery of consumption”: “The 
well-meaning Pekka Kuusi ended up drawing a cage”. Against the optimism 
of literary scholar Matti Mäkelä, who saw a glimmer of hope in the increased 
consumption of trainers and bicycles enabling the consumer to move and pos-
sibly even think independently from the “global gutenbergian-electromagnetic 
magical circle of mental stuffing”, Silvasti predicted the future menace of “belt-
stereos” and “wristwatch-televisions”. The interconnected society of the 2010s 
has made his prediction come true in surprising ways, as methods of con-
sumer manipulation, surveillance, and data processing have become increas-
ingly refined and totalistic.
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The turning point: looking back at the lost golden age
The older idea of a golden age in the past and its descent into decadence 
remained alive, albeit advocated by a vocal minority. The welfare state was 
contested and depicted as a potential dystopia during its construction in the 
mid-20th century. When did the progressive “brave new world” of the future 
become the lost golden age of the past?
Foreign commentators influenced this turn, too. Eleven years after Olof 
Lagercrantz alluded to the welfare state as a Brave New World in his article 
series on utopia and dystopia, the British journalist Roland Huntford pub-
lished the book The New Totalitarians in 1971.73 Eleven years later, Hans Mag-
nus Enzensberger’s famously anti-utopian critique of the welfare state and the 
Swedish model, Schwedischer Herbst, was written as an article series for Dagens 
Nyheter in 1982. The series was part of a greater debate under the by-line “Is 
Sweden Totalitarian?” echoing Huntford’s book. Franz Zimmer sees Enzens-
berger evaluate Sweden as a heterotopia in Foucault’s sense, an actually real-
ized utopia. Enzensberger inquires about the price that the individual has had 
to pay to belong to this egalitarian paradise – the loss of a healthy mistrust of 
authority.74 According to Enzensberger, the Swedes remained in a “state of his-
torical innocence”. Did the utopia take them out of time, out of the temporal 
development that all other post-war nations in Western Europe were partaking 
of, and condemn them to eternal timeless immaturity and a nationwide regres-
sion into childhood? Enzensberger’s critique was well received in Sweden. It 
provided an opportunity for defenders of the welfare state to respond to his 
abstract critique with paeans to the welfare state’s actual achievements. Enzens-
berger’s ability to express such severe criticisms was taken as proof of the fact 
that Sweden was not only safe and prosperous but also an open society.75
After Enzensberger, various events were used as emblems for a return to 
history, a loss of historical innocence: the murder of Olof Palme on 28 Febru-
ary 1986, the Estonia disaster in 1994, or the murder of Anna Lindh on 11 
September  2003. However, such imagined turning points had already been 
publicized before 1986. The destruction of the land of bliss seems to be a 
recurring event. As early as in 1973, as historians Marie Cronqvist, Sara Kärr-
holm, and Lina Sturfelt have observed, a creeping suspicion had entered the 
Swedish public debate that something was rotten in the land of bliss.76 The year 
was marked by two dramatic mediatized spectacles: the hostage drama at Norr-
malmstorg that would give a name to “Stockholm Syndrome” and the sudden 
illness and death of King Gustav VI Adolf. In May, the existence of a secret 
intelligence organization whose purpose was to register internal dissidents had 
been revealed to the public and endangered the untoppled, 40-year incumbent 
Social Democratic Party’s victory in the coming election. Social Democrats 
took the opportunity to include the passing king in the rhetoric of a modern 
welfare state both as a “co-worker” (Erlander) and a symbol of the nation that 
had accepted change and become integrated harmoniously with the progres-
sive ideals of the welfare state (Palme).77 In their responses to the king’s stoic 
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death-bed struggle, many members of the public expressed fears that a unique 
era was over, and doubted that the crown prince, more famous as a playboy 
than a serious worker, could fill his grandfather’s shoes.
Meanwhile, the hostage drama that unfolded over several weeks at the bank 
at Norrmalmstorg twisted the very definitions of good and evil. The socially 
conscious crime novels of Maj Sjöwall and Per Wahlöö had already handled 
themes that now became reality as conveyed through the tabloid press. Sjöwall-
Wahlöö’s crime novels laid the foundations of the genre that is now known 
internationally as Nordic Noir.78 Reality and fiction intertwined in a narrative 
of criticism against the repressive side of the welfare state.79 In Sjöwall-Wahlöö’s 
works, Sweden was not an exceptional utopia, but a part of the Western capi-
talist system, sharing its burden of exploitation and guilt. The responsibility for 
faults in the system fell on those in power. The happy ending of the hostage 
drama contributed to the re-election of the Social Democratic government, 
which had promised “security”. A few years later, the Swedish prime minister 
was assassinated in a Sjöwall-Wahlöö novel, eerily foreshadowing the murder 
of Olof Palme in 1986 that would again shake the fundaments of the Swedish 
land of bliss.
Interestingly, the dramatic events of 1973 had also been foreshadowed in 
the Finnish press in a review of an exhibition of Swedish modern art. “The 
people’s home is malfunctioning, but why”, the headline asked. The reviewer 
made the careful generalization that “Swedish art seems to prefer to show the 
malaise of society, but does not hint at a cure”.80 Among the visual expres-
sions of “the chilliness of the welfare state against the individual”, the reviewer 
noted the skyscrapers of central Stockholm in the miniature works of Lennart 
Mörk and a Finnish jail cell in the works of Dick Bengtsson. Optimistically, 
he concluded that “stating the truth and reflecting [reality] is also progress”. 
It is also in the 1970s that critics note how Joel Lehtonen’s aforementioned 
literary Lintukoto also contained the destruction of utopia. The narrator fol-
lows the life of the ants on his island and sees in the ant colony “the image 
of an organized human utopian state”. He destroys the anthill with fire like a 
vengeful god.81
Historian Jussi Lahtinen has shown how a Janus-faced image of progress took 
form in Finnish literature in the 1960s and the 1970s, the “golden age” of real-
ist working-class novels.82 Lahtinen has limited his study to novels written by 
male authors, which begs the question of the welfare state malaise as a crisis of 
masculinity. In the novels, Finland appears on the one hand as a welfare state 
where the individual’s standard of living and social security has improved some-
what. On the other hand, the worker protagonists experience the increasingly 
globally connected economy of Finland as a system that primarily benefits 
grand capital and the economic elite, while small entrepreneurs, wage earn-
ers and single women remain in an inferior, even exploited position. Societal 
problems are seen as either problems of capitalism or – similar to the liberal 
critique in Sweden – products of a nanny state collapsing under excessive taxa-
tion and bureaucratization.
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The new Finland was not a utopia. In the 1980s, lintukoto first appeared – if 
we disregard Antti Eskola’s attempt in 1968 – as a denigrating description of 
Finland. Helsingin Sanomat’s Eero Silvasti wrote a pessimistic column on the 
development of Finnish society entitled “Portent of Storm?” in July 1981. In 
Silvasti’s eyes, the greatest paradox of the present was that “the feared and 
threatening 1980s  .  .  . had been taken over so securely and assuredly”. He 
saw dreadful portents in the world economy and international politics, while 
Finland was prospering. Just as before the First World War, Finland was indus-
trializing thanks to the growing trade with Russia, but a bloody storm was 
brewing again. Finland would not be in control of that coming storm, either. 
For Silvasti, “the harmony of lintukoto was the eternal dream of all constructive 
forces”, but now Finland had been “somehow secretly and half-accidentally” 
surprised by it, and not everyone was satisfied: “The intellectuals are mutter-
ing . . . moralism in different forms raises its head and searches irrational forces 
for allies.” The mysterious malaise that Silvasti detected was precisely the suspi-
ciously empty consensus bemoaned by the critics of the Swedish welfare state 
in the 1970s and the early 1980s – the calm before the storm.83
Other authors were also now using the term in a negative sense. Finland was 
a “lintukoto of culture”, but this did not mean a safe haven or a blissful island, 
but a state of “exceptional consensus”.84 Scholars and journalists equated con-
sensus and homogeneity with social tranquillity and income policy solidarity. 
Their respective emphasis on correlation versus causation varied, but most of 
them shared the fear of a future where this package would be lost: a future of 
increasing inequality and increasing distinction between social groups, leaving 
behind the blissful years of the 1960s and the 1970s.
Swedish anti-utopian discourse was also reflected in Helsingin Sanomat’s 
reporting on the neighbouring country. During the 1982 elections, “the 
people’s home” was no longer in order, a commentator wrote.85 The Social 
Democratic Party had spent six years in opposition, so this malaise could not 
be personified by the party. Instead, Olof Palme was able to claim that the 
bourgeois coalition government would endanger the welfare state if they con-
tinued to govern. In 1985, after the victory of Palme’s party and its economic 
measures that were not welcomed by the labour unions, the Finnish press could 
still report that Swedish scholars felt confident in the future of Swedish social 
democracy and the concept of the egalitarian people’s home.86 The Finnish 
reviewer, himself a researcher at Stockholm University, still had to question the 
idyll: “is the people’s home truly so democratic and egalitarian”? Scholars, he 
felt, evaded the debate about “control-Sweden, the Orwellian society, where 
public power penetrates the private lives of people ever deeper”.
The next year was a turning point. The murder of the Swedish Prime Min-
ister Olof Palme created a shock on both sides of the Baltic Sea. Sensitive to 
international reactions, Swedish media reported statements such as Richard 
Reeves’ in the New York Times: “The Swedish idyll disappeared”.87 The same 
year, the Chernobyl disaster, paradoxically, enforced the image of Finland as 
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a safe haven for all the wrong reasons. Previously unspeakable things became 
articulated, for “even in the Finnish lintukoto, the world today demands that a 
responsible minister be found who supplies information now and not on the 
fifteenth day”.88 External threats, like ecoterrorism89 and environmental disas-
ters,90 not internal harmony, now seemed to determine the identity of lintukoto. 
Even so, a happy lintukoto, even in literature, was “disgusting and unrealistic”.91 
The Swedish idyll, on the other hand, was sorely missed. In 1989, journalist 
Mats Nörklit penned the following hopeful verses in Dagens Nyheter upon the 
arrest of a suspect in the Palme murder case: “He has become a symbol for our 
democracy/For our dream of the Swedish idyll would end/If he wasn’t the 
one.”92
The frustration with lintukoto in Finland reached political levels. In 1987, 
unexpected radicals, such as Olli Rehn, the leader of the youth organization of 
the Centre Party, spoke at a “surprisingly fierce” student demonstration against 
“consensual lintukoto-Finland”.93 Even the mild-mannered presidential can-
didate of the left, Kalevi Kivistö, was opposed to “lintukoto thinking”.94 This 
antipathy seems surprising, considering that lintukoto was generally associated 
with positive ideals. However, it was also a symbol of smallness and weakness. 
Lintukoto, like Lehtonen’s anthill, was doomed to die, and Finns were ready 
to kill it with fire. In 1988, historian Osmo Jussila described “the house of 
democracy” in the world itself as “quite a small lintukoto” in comparison with 
the conquests of Leninism and other “ideologies of salvation”, echoing J. V. 
Lehtonen’s 1920s juxtaposition between the purely national land of bliss and 
blood-drenched universalist utopia.95 The 1980s flood of lintukoto rhetoric also 
covered areas like credit cards – in 1988, 40 per cent of the population were 
still living without debt of any kind.96 Finland became lintukoto in theatre,97 
but even in the world of fiction, a Finlandized lintukoto made certain com-
parisons and translations impossible: a translation of an Austrian play, with all 
its references to the violent past and the volatile present in Central Europe, 
became incongruous to the critic in the context of the “peace of the Finnish 
lintukoto”.98 If Finland’s own war-torn and conflicted history seemed irrelevant 
as a point of comparison, had the country finally reached the point of happy 
oblivion that J. V. Lehtonen had hoped for, and Antti Eskola had warned 
against?
In 1989, the great changes in the European political landscape were greeted 
with surprise and also joy in Finland. Among Social Democrats, optimist and 
even utopian visions could be found on the rebuilding of Europe with the 
power of popular movements. The Åland islands, an autonomous region of 
Finland with a neutralized and demilitarized status, were presented as a model 
for Finland as a whole. This insular vision was characterized as a lintukoto by 
Helsingin Sanomat.99 The model of the fiercely independent island appeared as 
naïve in light of the changing present, which inspired re-evaluations of the past 
and a revival of interest in the nationalist project, although “lintukoto-Finland” 
threatened to dilute “the fury of Finnishness into toothless tolerance”.100 Despite 
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such protests, the concept’s insular and protectionist connotations imbued it 
with positive potential in the national context. For example, although mar-
kets were integrating globally, Finnish protectionism enabled a lintukoto for the 
vitally important forestry industry.101 Finnish nuclear energy production still 
trusted the bedrock “in our lintukoto”.102 Thus, a nostalgic potential could be 
activated through the use of this concept in the right context.
The end of Finland as a lintukoto came as abruptly as the downfall of the 
Soviet Union. In September 1990, cinematographer Aki Kaurismäki, the great 
critic and nostalgist of the Finnish post-war era, announced in an interview 
that “the time of the lintukoto is past, unfortunately”.103 Social scientist Eero 
Ojanen mused on the culture pages in November 1991: “It is especially amus-
ing that the metaphor is usually employed by those debaters who belittle the 
meaning of national values and traditions.” Ojanen pointed out that the usage 
of lintukoto to describe Finland was quite distinct from Kivi’s 1866 poem: “a 
different reality somewhere else, far away where the sky and the earth meet”. 
According to Ojanen, Kivi’s escapist “Lintukoto-romance” resembled contem-
porary “Euro-romance” much more than homely Finland. For Ojanen, the 
newfound fancy for the European Union was not wrong, but “utopias ought 
to remain utopias . . . the attempt to realize utopias has, however, often left ugly 
traces”.104 Pace J. V. Lehtonen, Kivi’s Lintukoto now lost its national character 
and its usefulness as a down-home utopia.
Aleksis Kivi created a related concept in the toponym Impivaara (“Virgin 
Hill”). This safe haven in the wilderness figured in his novel Seven Brothers 
(1870), the first published novel in the Finnish language. The brothers retreat 
to Impivaara after failing to adapt to social conventions; they return after 
adventures in the forest and become esteemed members of the community. In 
the original novel, Impivaara is a temporary retreat for the brothers, enabling 
them to grow from boys to men. In contemporary discourse, the place name 
is used in the same sense as lintukoto – a safe but lost haven.105 In the early 
20th century, Impivaara was interpreted almost an ideal Thoreauesque Walden, 
although the novel is rather an original and almost satirical take on the Bil-
dungsroman. Towards the end of the 20th century, the meaning of Impivaara 
became increasingly negative.106 Now Finns were accusing each other of being 
unable to adapt to the demands of progress, such as internationalization and 
globalization.107
When the splendid isolation of lintukoto was breached inevitably “in this 
present time of rupture”, a strengthening of local roots and culture was offered 
as a protection.108 But concrete measures were needed – the first special police 
forces for crowd control were introduced in 1994 as “preparation for interna-
tionalization”. According to a senior inspector from the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, dangerous “extremist elements might come to Finland . . . this country is 
no longer a lintukoto”.109 In 1996, the chief of police emphasized that despite 
the fact that the prediction of an invasion of extremist elements had not come 
true, “Finland was still no lintukoto”.110 The imagined loss of the idyll was uti-
lized to bolster requests for increased public funding.
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The land of bliss and the other
The 1980s and the 1990s also meant a change in the lyckoland rhetoric in the 
Swedish press. Earlier in the 20th century, any destination of emigrants might 
have been designated a lyckoland, a land of bliss, whether it really offered hap-
piness or not: the United States, the Soviet Union, Norway, or Venezuela.111 
Although Sweden had – often reluctantly – received refugees before, it was in 
the 1960s that Sweden itself became a lyckoland or idyll in newspaper reports 
about migrants and refugees, mainly in contrast to the countries that these refu-
gees were leaving.112 In Finland, lintukoto was employed similarly in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. The toponym immediately conjured up its counter-concept in 
the form of the threatening outside world. Whereas the lintukoto of the poets, 
the original isle of bliss, had everyday Finland as its implicit or explicit counter-
image, lintukoto-Finland expelled its own harshness to the outside world. For 
example, the reviewer of Günter Wallraff’s book Ganz unten, translated into 
Finnish in 1986, where Wallraff reported on his impersonation of a Turkish 
guest worker, presented different reactions of Finns to the possibility of dealing 
with the same problems in “the northern lintukoto”: “Fright: [May we never 
have] a migrant problem in this country! Relief: What a wise refugee policy 
we have! Or smugness: It’s different here, foreigners are even treated too well 
here!”113
Without distinction between labour migrants or political refugees, the line 
between push and pull factors was blurred. The word lycksökare, seeker of bliss, 
has a negative tone in Swedish: it can mean opportunist as well as adventurer 
and fortune hunter, although the meaning is connected to the expression söka 
sin lycka, to look for one’s fortune (in the world).114 In Swedish folk belief, lycka 
was a limited resource that could be lost or stolen.115 In Finland, the lintukoto 
rhetoric carried connotations of unwillingness to share the bliss with outsiders, 
although this could be subverted: “I believe that in lintukoto, the mythical land 
of bliss, a much friendlier atmosphere is reigning than in our closed society.”116 
Helsingin Sanomat returned to the topic as refugees increasingly reached Finland 
in the early 1990s. Municipal politicians shirking their duties in the settlement 
of “more than 500 refugees” were still “living in a lintukoto”, but these were 
obviously behind the times.117
In Dagens Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat, the idyllic concepts could be used 
without an obvious hint of sarcasm in news items describing the hopes and 
dreams of refugees and migrants.118 Visitors from Namibia were introduced 
to the “Swedish idyll”, meaning Swedish democracy, represented by election 
campaigners from parties left, centre and right, in the midst of the summer 
greenery of the Djurgården district in Stockholm.119 Visits of international 
VIPs, such as the UN Secretary General, and the crises that Swedish politicians 
set out to solve as self-evident mediators, also provided an effective contrast to 
“the Swedish idyll” in newspaper copy.120 With the increasing crises in Europe 
during the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, the idyllic character of Sweden 
could be admitted to exist – in the eyes of the Other.
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In the context of the “welfare state malaise” rhetoric published by the same 
newspapers, the connotation of mockery was not entirely possible to ignore. 
Just as the US land of bliss proved to be a disappointment to many Swed-
ish emigrants, the Swedish lyckoland could be a trap to unhappy migrants, for 
example “Finns stranded in the Swedish land of bliss”.121 In the early 1990s, 
the most reliable land of bliss was again projected into the exotic past – in the 
shape of a Danish-Norwegian co-production of the South Seas fantasy musical 
Styrman Karlsens flammer, originally performed in 1929, “a true Nordic myth 
about Utopia”.122
Was Utopia something one could buy and consume? In 1980, an Ikea adver-
tisement had invited Dagens Nyheter readers to a “paradise” and “land of bliss” 
of sofas: “not for the rich, but for the smart”.123 “The Swedish idyll” appeared 
in real estate advertisements in the 1980s.124 It could even be utilized to attract 
West German companies.125 As we have seen, the literary genre of Nordic Noir 
achieves much of its thrills from the clash between a peaceful society and the 
horrors that break the illusion. Long before Stieg Larsson’s Millennium trilogy, 
Dagens Nyheter advertised crime series contrasting the “Swedish idyll” with 
“the absurd, crazy and rule-breaking reality of crime”.126 However, the paradox 
of the genre as a marketable product is that the idyll needs to be reinstated in 
order to be destroyed again and again. The publicity around the events that 
each seemed to spell the end of the Swedish idyll followed this pattern. Two 
years after the Palme murder, a museum advertised its exhibits with the lurid 
promise: “Bring your family on an expedition back in time this summer. The 
Swedish idyll is full of historical horrors.”127 Bliss and nightmare could coexist 
and even depend on each other for their continuation.
If “our” land of bliss had retreated to the fantasies of past generations, what 
about “their” search for bliss here and now? The gaze of the Other could be 
constructed as deluded or greedy. The gaze on the Other could make viewers 
aware of their privilege.128 The Swedish idyll could be constructed as a safe 
haven worthy of protection, but also a reason to feel shame and guilt: “Swedish 
idyll as usual. . . . Seventeen-year-old boy deported to the Soviet Union. . . . 
Prisoners tear-gassed in Kumla”.129 In the 1980s and 1990s, the topic of Swed-
ish guilt towards the victims of the Holocaust repeatedly appeared on the cul-
ture pages of Dagens Nyheter.130 There was even something farcical about the 
contrast, as shown in the comedy film Leif (1987), the story of a small town that 
lives peacefully on the profits of its arms factory.131 The Swedish idyll had been 
maintained at the expense of refugees and victims of war in the same dangerous 
world that it tried to shield itself from.
Conclusion: the cycle of Utopia and Dystopia
With the fall of the Berlin wall, it was expected that the liberal newspapers 
would join the announcement of victory over disastrous utopias. In Dagens 
Nyheter, the young editor Johannes Åman noted in 1990 that the relatively 
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recent “discovery of the future” gave radical meaning to politics. A dangerous 
gift, according to Leif Lewin, historian of ideas, for this discovery “led directly – 
not to the Land of Bliss – but to Gulag and Auschwitz”. If the breakdown of the 
Soviet bloc meant “total victory” for liberalism, future ought to lose its value as 
a political concept, Åman concluded. But was it really likely? Ever since the dis-
covery of the future “as a source of inspiration for those that are dissatisfied with 
society”, there had been no turning back, Åman wrote. Evidently, the future 
would continue to be used politically, for good and for evil.132
As Susan Buck-Morss notes in her monumental work on the passing of 
modern mass utopias, there is “real tragedy in the shattering of the dreams 
of modernity”. Even though some goals of progress, equality, and material 
plenty have been reached, the grand vision remains unfulfilled, and in fact it is 
revealed to have been built upon immense human suffering. Indeed, she warns 
the reader not to confuse “the loss of the dream with the loss of the dream’s 
realization”. On “political cynicism”, Buck-Morss cautions that “in denying 
possibilities for change it prevents them; anticipating defeat, it brings defeat 
into being”.133 But if the promise of utopia had been annihilated and the status 
quo became celebrated as the end of history, what else remained to expect than 
dystopia?
Resentment, bitterness and lack of hope are real emotions that have been 
identified as driving causes behind the rise of xenophobic and welfare national-
ist parties in the last three decades.134 These emotions must be taken seriously, 
not in the sense that scapegoating is accepted uncritically, but in the sense that 
the feeling of loss is not rationalized away as inevitable. The defenders of the 
status quo come to the defence of the achievements of the welfare state when 
they have become realized, or when other dystopias disguised as utopias rise 
to threaten the status quo, but often they rush to the barricades after the battle 
against economic rationality has already been lost.
To overcome pessimism about the future, how can promises of progress be 
formulated in the present? Today, narratives of the decay and decadence of 
the nation-state, the welfare state, the labour movement, and other past car-
riers of Progress have taken over public discourse. Concerns over retrograde 
“populism” inspire political actors to present their ideological projects as the 
only bearers of dynamic anti-change. If half of the political leaders declare that 
the welfare state is currently too expensive, the other half will conclude that it 
could be affordable in the future – if the “undeserving” were excluded.
The idea that the land of bliss was maintained at the expense of exclud-
ing others was not new. In the 1930s, in response to the violent upheavals 
in Europe, the “Swedish idyll” in particular was employed in contrast to the 
dangers of the outside world that suddenly came uncomfortably close. The 
cartoonist Jac (pseudonym of Carl Agnar Jacobsson, 1884–1942)135 illustrated 
“the Swedish idyll” in 1935 as an island populated by a family peacefully seated 
around their garden table, dwarfed by their big folkloristic flowers and the even 
bigger waves towering over their cottage.136 The similarities to Aleksis Kivi’s 
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poem are striking. In the very first verse, Kivi compares the fierce waves fall-
ing over the island to armies. In Jac’s cartoon, only a small sign, “anchorage 
prohibited”, stands between the isle of bliss and the raging sea.
As the progressive welfare state project became hegemonic in the 1960s and 
the 1970s, the arguments of its critics also began to emulate its ideals. While 
the environmentalist movement focused on new challenges to a global human-
ity, the liberal critique focused on the unfulfilled needs of the individual that 
collective efforts could not contain. But the malaise that its liberal critics identi-
fied in the 1970s and the early 1980s was increasingly abstract: a discomfort in 
modernity despite – or because of – the fact that all basic needs were provided 
for, which was reflected in the discomfort of Huxley’s protagonist in Brave 
New World at the sight of his fellow human beings living out their base desires 
encouraged by the state.
Moral arguments and appeals to higher values such as truth and beauty were 
outdated, but appeals to liberty made a sudden comeback in the 1990s. By the 
time the welfare state started to be dismantled, welfare state nostalgia returned 
with a vengeance – dissatisfaction channelled by new parties, some of which 
had previously been anti-taxation, others of which had defended the welfare 
state but only for the most deserving.
In Finland, the modern project was never conclusively dominated by the 
Social Democratic Party. Every party and movement continued to project their 
own battles onto it. However, from the early 1980s until the very end of the 
decade, the utopia seemed to have been reached. Lintukoto – the safe and bliss-
ful haven of Finnish folklore – suddenly became immanent within the nation. 
Paradoxically, those who admitted that it existed seemed to be most critical of 
it. Lintukoto and related terms carried connotations of innocence that were no 
longer desirable in the 1980s but became objects of nostalgic longing in the 
1990s.
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4  More or less equality?
Facts, debates, and policies related 
to the Nordic model
Petri Roikonen, Jari Ojala, and Jari Eloranta
The topic of income inequality has become a new nexus of research among 
historians and social scientists recently.1 Piketty (2014) has famously argued:
Inequality is shaped by the way economic, social, and political actors view 
what is just and what is not, as well as by the relative power of those actors 
and the collective choices that result. It is the joint product of all relevant 
actors combined.
Given that redistribution is a core element of the Nordic model and under-
stood as key to the development of social trust and cohesion, all debates about 
social and cultural polarization are also debates about economic inequalities 
and the possible policy choices related to those issues. Moreover, in public and 
political discussion – in Finland especially – income inequality is in many cases 
conflated with various other forms of inequality in the society. This crucial 
difference in what is meant by scholarly versus political discourses at large can 
often lead to inexact policy debates and solutions. In this chapter we con-
centrate, mainly, on exploring the specific concepts of income inequality that 
are measurable and definable, especially what they tell us about this form of 
inequality in Finland and Sweden as our case studies. In addition, we will con-
textualize these cases through comparisons with the other Nordic countries 
as well as other polities. However, as we can see from our discussion here, 
there are striking differences, especially in the public discussions as measured 
by newspaper articles both in Finland and in Sweden, whether the discussion is 
focused on societal inequality in broader terms or, more specifically, on income 
inequality and its ramifications.
In this chapter, we will discuss the period from the late 1960s to the recent 
years, thus examining how income inequality has developed in Finland and Sweden, 
how it has been debated both in research and in public discussions, and whether these dis-
cussions can be linked to changes in welfare state creation as well as redistribution trends. 
This is an interesting period, since welfare states emerged in force during this 
era, thus offering new policy solutions to various forms of inequality, but it also 
saw a widespread challenge to welfare states in the policies of Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher, as well as deregulation of many European economies, 
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including Finland and Sweden. Finally, we also want to touch on the issue of 
what kind of data should and could be used to examine these issues, especially 
from the perspective of income inequality. However, we have to clarify one 
caveat of our chapter in the outset. We will not analyze the actual policy debates 
in the Finnish and Swedish political arenas, since that would require a chapter 
of its own (and they are, to a certain extent, covered in the other chapters of the 
book). Instead, we more broadly focus on the potential linkages in the evolu-
tion of Nordic welfare and tax policies.
This chapter is organized as follows; we will first introduce data and methods 
(Data and methods: research, discourses, and policies) and examine the facts 
(Economic inequality: what do we know) – that is, what do socio-economic 
data tell us about income inequality over time – and we will explore certain 
debates over how they are measured as well. Next, we analyze the research, 
especially on Finnish economic policies and inequality over time, as well as 
discourses on these topics in the media (Discourses on income inequality, mainly 
newspapers) in Finland and Sweden, to be followed by a discussion of the 
policies adopted (Nordic redistribution trends and welfare impacts). Finally, we 
will conclude with a broader discussion of the development trends and future 
prospects.
Data and methods: research, discourses, and policies
Our first goal here is to review some of the quantitative evidence, especially 
the various socio-economic indicators, to evaluate trends in polarization from 
the Nordic perspective. As shown recently via global comparisons by Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura,2 the global polarization in terms of social well-being has 
declined steadily since World War I. Similarly, as discussed by Jan Luiten Van 
Zanden et al. (2014), global well-being on the whole has increased dramatically 
since the 19th century. Most of the indicators used in any analysis on well-
being are correlated with GDP per capita, which is typically viewed as a key 
measure worth looking at when discussing inequality, similar to wealth. Such 
indicators, however, only tell part of the story of societal development and 
polarization, and here we will look at a limited number of indicators of Nordic 
development during the last century or so. Our working hypothesis is that the 
story is similar with all of the Nordic countries; although, here the main focus 
in the comparisons is on Finland and Sweden. However, even a cursory look 
at the data tells us that while the trends have been visible, there are differences 
between what we are measuring and between the countries as well. The Nor-
dic countries did not necessarily form a coherent block in economic and social 
terms. Finally, the Nordic countries today have lower levels of inequality in its 
various forms than most Western nations.
The aim of this study is to analyze how research was setting an agenda to 
public debates, and how research and discussions affected the public policies. 
First, we characterize the main trends and findings in the international and 
national inequality research. Second, here we focus on some of the key Finnish 
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research papers and reports on inequality as well as the major Finnish (Hels-
ingin Sanomat (HS)) and Swedish (Dagens Nyheter (DN)) newspapers to gauge 
the dimensions of debates. Furthermore, we analyze some of the economic 
prognostications produced in the debates by analysts and pundits in the public 
sphere, namely through the lens of a key newspaper. In essence, we intend to 
analyze their views on future economic outlook as well as economic and soci-
etal polarization. We are using here mostly published sources and reports, and 
major newspapers via their digital collections, using keyword searches. Our ini-
tial hypothesis was that economic (or social) data and published research would 
not necessarily be reflected in these debates, and that national debates can be 
distorted by groupthink and lack of perspective. However, we had to refine our 
thinking based on the results, as the public discourse did in fact reflect some of 
the broader themes arising from scholarship, and on occasion some of the key 
studies made enough waves to penetrate the public discourse.
Third, we analyze the “changes” in policies vis-à-vis “facts” (research) as well 
as the debates (discourses). The main policy aspects of this study relate to redis-
tribution policies through taxation and social transfers as well as education and 
other welfare state policies. We argue that the focus on facts/debates/change is a 
valuable tool to understand these processes. The so-called RDP model (research-
discourses-policies model) is the theoretical model of our study (see Figure 4.1).
Research
DiscoursesPolicies
Figure 4.1 The theoretical model of the RDP framework.
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Economic inequality: what do we know?
Top income shares
A certain amount of inequality is unavoidable in modern capitalist societies 
and economies – yet an increase in inequality may in time lead to severe chal-
lenges, even societal crises. European history alone has proved this time and 
again, with bloody revolutions and uprisings. Yet income inequality has also 
been a component of the most dramatic economic transitions in history, such 
as the industrial revolutions and globalization waves. In the recent political and 
scholarly debates, income inequality has become one of the key concepts to 
explore and to evaluate current-day problems from the perspective of histori-
cal development paths, and whether, for example, broad societal changes like 
welfare policies can temper tendencies toward inequality in its various forms.
In the very long run, there are relatively consistent series on economic ine-
quality only for the top income shares (taxable incomes).3 Economic inequality, 
measured on the basis of incomes or wealth, decreased in Western countries in 
the first part of the 20th century.4 The inequality continued to decrease until 
circa the year 1980 (Figure 4.2). The phase of shrinking inequality was reversed 
after, first in the Anglo-Saxon countries and later in the Central Europe as well 
as in the Scandinavian countries. Thus, the trend has been toward lesser ine-
quality in the 20th century; however, the experiences of sharp increases of ine-
quality during the last decades have partly reversed that process. For example, 
in the United States the current-day inequality has reached the levels similar to 
the first decades of the 20th century. On the other hand, there are countries, 
for example, Denmark and the Netherlands, that have not experienced the 
sharp increasing tendency almost at all. Overall, the Anglo-Saxon countries 
have experienced much sharper increases in inequality when compared with 
the Central Europe and Nordic countries.
Gini coefficients
Next, we can further characterize the patterns of (income) inequality in the 
recent decades utilizing household survey data (Figure  4.3). The inequality 
measured by the disposable incomes at the household level (aka including 
received and paid transfers and payments) has relatively similar patterns com-
pared with the top income shares calculated from tax statistics seen in Fig-
ure 4.2 (taxable incomes). The income inequality has increased significantly 
starting from the early 1990s to around year 2007, especially in Finland and 
Sweden. Furthermore, it is noticeable that Sweden was more unequal when 
compared with Finland in terms of income inequality after the year 1990. This 
might be explained with the higher capital gains in Sweden. After 2007, the 
perspective on the Finnish economic inequality depends on the indicators uti-
lized: stagnated (absolute income inequality), decreased slightly (consumption 
inequality and income inequality), or increased (wealth inequality).5


































Figure 4.2  Top 1 percent income share in Scandinavia (a) and in the Central Europe as well 
as Anglo-Saxon countries (b).
Sources: Finland, 1865–1910 (Roikonen & Heikkinen 2018), Finland, 1920–2004 (Jäntti et al. 2010), 
Germany 1876–1880, USA 1870–1910 (Lindert & Williamson 2016, 173), other (WID database).
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Figure 4.3 Gini coefficients for disposable incomes from 1965 to 2010.
Sources: Finland (Official Statistics of Finland 2019), Sweden (Statistics Sweden 2019), Denmark and 
the United Kingdom (LIS) (Milanovic 2016). Other (The Chartbook of Economic Inequality 2019).
Note: Swedish and Finnish data include capital gains.
The income inequality estimates from tax and survey data are slightly dif-
ferent, due to three obvious reasons: first, the concept of income is differ-
ent, since the taxable incomes do not include taxes and transfers as well as 
other non-taxable income sources; second, the inequality measurements are 
 different – that is, the top-income share versus Gini coefficient; and, third, the 
tax statistics are based on individual records, whereas the surveys were collected 
at the household level.6
The disparities with data raise questions about how we should handle these 
types of issues – especially since these types of subtle methodological and ana-
lytical differences are not obvious to politicians and the lay public – and which 
sources we should prefer to use. According to Burkhauser et al. (2012), the 
household surveys have severe problems in capturing the top incomes due to 
under coverage, underreporting, and top coding. In addition, there are many 
other sources of incomes that are not captured (such as capital gains in the 
USA). However, the tax statistics have limitations as well. The tax records 
are hampered by a changing concept of taxable income (e.g., deductions, 
preferences between income sources). Furthermore, tax evasion is a problem, 
especially among the top-income groups. In addition, the poorest people are 
missing in the tax filers’ data. Regardless of these differences, according to 
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empirical studies,7 the top-income shares arising from tax data are relatively 
good proxies for overall inequality and can be a useful substitute for other 
measures of inequality.
Both types of inequality data and measures have possible pitfalls, and accord-
ing to Alvaredo (2011), the survey-based Gini coefficients should be corrected 
by using the more complete top-income data from tax records. Therefore, 
some National Statistical Offices have decided to utilize registers to impute 
incomes in the income distribution surveys, including Statistics Finland; how-
ever, many statistical offices still rely on the answers presented in the interviews.
Finland and Sweden in comparison
As noted before, Finland and Sweden, as well as many other countries, have 
experienced a reversal of the equalization process from the 1990s onward. As 
seen in Figure 4.4, the growing difference between the average and median 
incomes (1) from the 1990s onward supports our earlier findings.8 Poverty 
rates (2) followed similar patterns: the “harsh” Finnish recession during the 
1990s resulted in a decline in the poverty rate, which is due to the automatic 
redistribution mechanisms of the welfare state and the decrease in the aver-
age incomes.9 Furthermore, the poverty rates (2) increased in both countries, 
which indicates that part of the population “missed” the years of growth. The 
“harsh” recession after 2008 caused decreasing median incomes in Finland that 
partly lowered relative poverty rates; on the other hand, Sweden did not suf-
fer such a drop in incomes or poverty rates. The increase in the gross earnings 
of the top decile as percentage median (3) as well as the top 1 percent wealth 
share (4) followed similar growth trends as noted before, despite the periods 
of recession in the early 2000s and 2008–2009.10 Despite the rising contrast 
with the “haves and the have-nots” in Finland and Sweden, it is noticeable that 
the developments are significantly different from many other countries. For 
example, in the United States the average pretax real national income per adult 
increased roughly 60 percent from 1980 to 2014; on the other hand, the real 
incomes of the bottom half of the population stagnated during this period.11 
Thus, it is striking that half of the population did not reap the fruits of the 
economic growth at all during the last 30 years.
Discourses on income inequality
Societal planning and the question of inequality
One of the roles of human and social sciences today is to provide tools for 
societies and governments engaged in societal planning. A plethora of aca-
demic research, surveys, and statistics are produced daily to serve this goal. 
Since World War II, and especially during the past decades, the university sec-
tor alone has grown enormously globally. In addition, human and social sci-
ences have grown as fields, which can be seen in the pure number of research 
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Figure 4.4  Finland and Sweden in comparison. Note: (1) Equivalent annual income (house-
hold income divided by modified OECD consumption units). (2) Percent living 
in households with equivalent disposable income below 60 percent median. (3) 
Personal gross earnings. (4) Share of top 1 percent in total individual net wealth.
Sources: The Chartbook of Economic Inequality (2019). Mean and median incomes from Finland 
(Official Statistics of Finland 2019). Mean and median incomes from Sweden (Statistics Sweden 2019).
outputs in terms of publications. Moreover, a whole industry of consultants 
has emerged to serve both private and public actors,12 as well as research 
institutes and think-tanks of various kinds and with different political agendas 
to satisfy the need for information.13 Thus, there is a massive, and growing, 
amount of information available for decisions-makers to use – even to the 
extent that the reliability of “politicized” information has been questioned 
time and again by both politicians and researchers. In essence, the problems 
and mediums faced by the scholars and policy-makers in the 1970s were com-
pletely different from today, as we now are living in an age of information 
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overload and “fake news”,14 whereas 50  years ago there were fewer voices 
and the media landscape was simpler – and the impact of the Cold War was a 
limiting factor too.
This information provided by human and social sciences to understand our 
contemporary world and to make wise decisions for the future includes also 
information that is specifically aimed at predicting the future. Today, perhaps the 
most influential predictions are related to demography and climate change15 – 
the latter, often thought to be the domain of mathematics and natural sci-
ences, is also a topic that humanities and social sciences address using a variety 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. Using human and social sciences to 
predict the future emerged as an important part of societal planning during 
and after World War II. The Cold War era, particularly, produced projections, 
forecasts, scenarios, and other forms of predictions of world development that 
were essential when governments and corporations made decisions on current 
affairs – these predictions, in turn, have had and will have an impact on global 
politics today as well as in the future. Indeed, the Cold War era created ideolo-
gies suggesting, as Jenny Andersson (2012) has noted, that socio-economic and 
political problems might be “scientified” and predictable as “hard sciences”. 
This development gave rise to new disciplines such as futures studies and futur-
ology that changed the future as an object of science, whereas it previously had 
been more of a concept of utopian imagination. Only recently historians have 
also turned to the study of past visions of future.16 Furthermore, in Sweden and 
Finland, future studies gained a role in societal debates early on.17 Neverthe-
less, the bulk of this social forecasting has been conducted by “old” human and 
social science disciplines. While during the 1970s sociology paved the way for 
societal planning, it is economics that has been a vital force in forecasting dur-
ing the past three decades or so.
These academic debates and “hot topics” on societal issues and forecasting 
were also highly cited in the public discussions featured in the newspapers. 
Thus, they made their way to influence the public opinion and consequently 
the political decision-making. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that 
the results of some academic research became widely referred to in major news-
papers in the Finnish and Swedish cases, as we can see here. However, an open 
question is, though, why some research passes through the public and political 
spheres with barely a mention, whereas others do not.
From today’s perspective, it is relatively easy to anachronistically show how 
“good” or “bad” the predictions made in the past were.18 However, it is equally 
interesting to see in which conditions the analyses and predictions were made 
and which attributes they were based on. Moreover, even though information 
on societal developments and (good or bad) predictions for future did exist, all 
the information was not necessarily adopted into use due to political reasons or 
it was dismissed in the public discussions for one reason or another. Similarly, 
we have a number of cases of academic discussions that were dominating both 
the political and the public debates. As we can see in the following, income 
inequality is not an exception in this perspective: on the contrary, different 
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aspects of income distribution were emphasized in different time periods, fol-
lowing (mainly) the results achieved in academic discussions. Moreover, some 
key politicians themselves actively wrote about income inequality – including 
such a prominent figure as Urho Kekkonen (1952).
Emergence of inequality as a topic in social sciences
In economics, the GDP (per capita) is the basic measure for research, and it 
is also used in societal planning and modelling19. Though the GDP has severe 
challenges as a metric, it still is “widely understood and respected” as the best 
measure of economic development so far developed.20 The GDP is a measure 
of the aggregate economy constructed to help in the study and understand-
ing of macroeconomic growth and its components, and the theory behind 
the measure was mainly developed in the 20th century, mostly during and 
after World War II. Since the 1950s, the distribution of this growth nationally 
and internationally has received a growing attention among economists, social 
scientists, and economic historians.21 The 1950s also saw the rise of a research 
focusing on income and wealth distribution, including new journals such as 
The Review of Income and Wealth and Economic Development and Cultural Change.
The roots for studying the unequal distribution of wealth and income can be 
traced back to the mid-19th century, especially as a response to the Industrial 
Revolution, and to the writings of Karl Marx and his contemporaries.22 The 
early studies of income inequality were also noted in Finland, and some influ-
ential studies were already made during the first years of the 20th century.23 
The most common metric to study inequality, the Gini coefficient, was devel-
oped by Corrado Gini (Ceriani & Verme 1912) – though it was more widely 
adapted as a tool in research to study income and wealth inequality only during 
the 1970s.24 There were some early attempts to model income distribution 
in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway already in the 1940s, 1950s and 
1960s25 – as well as in studies published for international audiences.26
The quality of such research in general, and the ones dealing with income and 
wealth equality in particular, is dependent on the quality of data. The national 
statistical agencies were thus approached to compile suitable data, although in 
the Finnish case only from the late 1960s onward.27 Also, the first historical 
studies since the early 20th century on income inequality were published in the 
early 1970s,28 although it was not until the late 1970s when more adequate data 
were made available.29 In the 1970s and the 1980s, Hannu Uusitalo (e.g., 1975, 
1977, 1989) was especially actively publishing research on income inequality.
Internationally, comparable data to analyze income distributions have been 
produced in many countries since the early 1970s.30 Studies by the OECD on 
income distribution were based on these data and also included Finland and 
Sweden.31 The first international comparisons were made in Finland in the early 
1970s.32 International studies by, for example, Anthony B. Atkinson (1970) and 
Amartya Sen33 influenced also the Nordic scholars during the 1970s. Subse-
quently, Erik Allardt (1976a, 1976b) compiled a comparative study on welfare 
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dealing with Nordic countries in the 1970s. His study, as well as certain similar 
ones,34 was only possible as the first statistics were compiled.
However, topics related to the income inequality did not rise to the center 
of the social science debates until the 21st century, not least because of the 
Pikettys famous book Le Capital au XXIe siècle (Piketty 2013) and its trans-
lated English version (2014). Especially in economics, the debates focusing on 
income distributions and inequality were almost instantly promoted from a cat-
egory of “semi-interesting topics” to be alongside with the big questions such 
as the causes of the growth of GDP or other big debates about macroeconomic 
development.35
Public press reflecting the research
The first Finnish statistics and research on income inequality published dur-
ing the 1970s also gained attention from the public press. The major Finnish 
newspaper, HS, published widely on topics related to income inequality during 
the first years of the 1970s (Figure 4.5), although during the latter part of the 
decade the topic ceased to interest it. On the other hand, before the late 1960s, 
there were hardly any newspaper articles on the topic. Thus, the new research 
managed to set the agenda and, moreover, introduced the concept also to the 
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Figure 4.5  Articles on income inequality published in HS (Finland) and DN (Sweden), 
1968–2018. Note: HS counted by pages (one occurrence per page) until the turn 
of the 1990s and thereafter by articles (one occurrence per article).
Sources: HS, The Päivälehti Archives, Helsinki (retrieved 14 January 2019); The Royal Swedish Library, 
The Dagens Nyheter Digital Archive (retrieved 10 January 2019).
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new research and statistics.36 Moreover, the statistics and research also interested 
the politicians, which, in turn, was discussed in the pages of newspapers as 
well. In particular, several left-wing politicians made statements about wishing 
to equalize the income distribution.37 During the late 1980s, however, there 
were more right-wing politicians claiming that an increase in income inequal-
ity might be an option as well.38 In Sweden, however, the topic did not hold 
similar appeal among the journalists, as shown by the number of articles pub-
lished in DN, the major Swedish newspaper. Nevertheless, there were debates 
in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, especially on wealth distribution, in both 
Sweden and Finland.
Nevertheless, the academic research on income inequality was not wide-
spread in the Finnish case during the 1970s, yet it contributed to an increas-
ing trend during the 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, which is when 
income inequality increased as well (Figures  4.1–4.4). The discussions in 
the 1980s concentrated on topics such as spatial differences39 in incomes, 
or differences between different groups in society, or, in the Finnish case, 
between farmers and factory employees.40 Thus, scholarship was following, 
and amplifying, the interests of the two major political movements: the Centre 
Party (former Agrarian party) and the Social Democrats. Spatial differences 
in incomes, though, were discussed already in some studies published in the 
1950s and the 1970s.41 During the 1980s, research was reflected also in the 
pages of major newspapers.42 Furthermore, the research on income inequality 
was slowly turning from sociology toward economics,43 and even historical 
analyses appeared.44
During the turn of the 1990s, more specified analysis on income inequality 
were published on topics such as education,45 taxation,46 and generational dif-
ferences.47 However, perhaps the most influential stream of study emerged on 
the gender imbalance of incomes. The influential studies by Joan Acker were 
noted also in Finland and even translated into Finnish,48 and several studies 
were published on the topic by scholars that have since been major contribu-
tors in the Finnish economic research circles.49 Markus Jäntti’s studies (e.g., 
1993), for example, were especially influential at the time. These studies also 
gained public attention, which can be seen in the rising trend of related news-
paper articles at the time. Nevertheless, it was not until the mid-1990s when 
the topic of income inequality really boomed in the Finnish public discussion, 
which can also be discerned from the output of articles in HS (Figure 4.5). This 
was mainly caused by concerns about the new statistics suggesting an increasing 
trend in income inequality; interestingly, a similar increase in public discus-
sion in Sweden did not emerge until the 2010s. Furthermore, the Finnish case 
shows that the level of articles remained higher in the 2000s when compared 
with the 1980s. The 1990s was a decade of extremes in Finnish economic 
history too – the first half featured an intense recession, and the second half 
fast economic growth and the rise of the IT sector. These extremes likely also 
contributed to the public interest on inequality.
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Was there, then, a link between the facts, research, and public discussion on 
income inequality? Based on the brief description of major trends in Finn-
ish income inequality, research literature, and timing of published statistics, 
as well as the articles published in major newspapers, one might assume that 
the link does exist (Figures 4.1–4.5). On the other hand, the public interest 
toward inequality (articles published in DN) remained low in Sweden despite 
the increasing income inequality and the rising international debates on ine-
quality in the social sciences. Our study here suggests that the main reasons for 
change in income inequality are relatively similar in Finland and in Sweden: 
capital incomes, taxation, and redistribution.50 Why, then, did the discussion 
on income inequality get more space in Finnish newspapers than in the Swed-
ish ones? One plausible reason might be the more rugged economic cycle in 
Finland: first the 1990s recession; then the rapid growth, with the rise of Nokia 
and the IT bubble; and lastly the recession in 2008 following the ten-year 
period of slow growth. Finland witnessed massive unemployment in the last 
30 years; this was justly discussed in newspapers. Moreover, the welfare state 
creation had longer roots in the Swedish case, and the critiques of this political 
reality had large hurdles to overcome.
The topic of income inequality was introduced in Finnish academia espe-
cially during the turn of the 1960s and the 1970s when the first statistics 
appeared. This was also clearly shown in the pages of HS at the time. However, 
even though the number of academic studies increased in terms of both scale 
and scope throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the issue was less debated in the 
public press – though there was a slight increase during the 1980s. In Sweden, 
the number of newspaper articles was even less significant. Here though, the 
keywords used might at least partly explain the difference. Nevertheless, it was 
not until the 1990s and the rising concerns over increasing income inequality 
in Finland that the number of articles published on the issue got a boost.51
There seemed to be a tendency of overestimating income inequality in 
both political and public discussion. For example, a newspaper article in 1973 
claimed that income inequality was higher in Finland than in the other Nordic 
countries. Though this claim was based on research, it does not entirely hold if 
we look at the statistics compiled afterward (Figure 4.3). Moreover, inequality 
was on a declining trend at the time.52 Six year later another article claimed that 
income inequality had declined slowly in Finland – although according to our 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the development was relatively fast.53 Especially at the turn 
of the 1970s and the 1980s, newspaper articles referred to research showing 
that, indeed, the decline of income inequality was slowing down in Finland.54 
Moreover, more general discussion on “inequality” was more pronounced in 
both Finnish and especially Swedish press during this period, as can be detected 
from Figure 4.6. This, in turn, might have led to a confluence of both the pub-
lic discussion and the political debates: whereas there is no statistical evidence 
of an increase in income inequality in Finland and Sweden during the 2010s 
(Figures 4.1–4.4), there certainly are many other types of inequalities present 
in the society that to a certain degree threaten the Nordic model, as discussed 
in a number of chapters in this volume.
























































HS eriarvois* DN ojämlighet*
Figure 4.6 Articles on “inequality” published in HS (Finland) and DN (Sweden), 1968–2018.
Source: See Figure 4.5. Concepts such as eriarvoisuus (in Finnish) and ojämlighet (in Swedish) refer to 
inequality more broadly (like social, cultural, or educational) compared to tuloero (in Finnish) or inkomst-
skillnad (in Swedish) in Figure 4.5. Both can be translated to mean “income inequality” in English. 
Thus, discussions on “income inequality” in particular and “inequality” in general have somewhat been 
mixed with each other in both public and political discussions, especially in Finland.
Nordic redistribution trends and welfare impacts
In this section we will discuss the broader trends in welfare state creation and 
tax policies and contemplate whether these deep structural societal changes 
were linked to the discourses and scholarly debates explored in the previous 
sections. Regardless, our aim is not to attempt an in-depth analysis of the 
political contexts linked to the discourse patterns, which would be too ambi-
tious of an endeavor. As we can already see in some of the other chapters in this 
volume, the Nordic societies underwent dramatic transformations toward more 
egalitarian societies, mostly in the post–World War II period, based on broad 
societal and political compromises between major political parties. The early 
ideals of more egalitarian societies developed before World War II were slowly 
realized during the postwar decades, and these ideas evolved into fairly encom-
passing welfare states. Moreover, the critique of welfare states that emerged in 
the 1980s has also had a profound impact on Nordic welfare states and socie-
ties as a whole, since most of the left-wing or left-leaning parties55 have come 
to accept some market-based solutions to welfare (and health care) provision 
and, respectively, the more right-wing or right-leaning parties have become 
defenders of the core principles of welfare states, albeit with more cautious fis-
cal policies that would sometimes even lead to government spending cuts and 
lower tax rates.
In general, the Nordic and other Western welfare states developed as a 
response to the rise of labor and socialist movements in the 20th century, as 
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well as the slow democratization processes following the industrial revolutions 
and societal divisions they brought forth in the 19th century. Social spending 
increased rapidly between 1880 and World War II, and then boomed from 
the 1950s onward. The latter half of the 20th century witnessed the creation 
of various types of welfare state, ranging from the Anglo-American model 
of welfare restraint and individualism to the more universal Nordic welfare 
provision.56 The creation of the Finnish welfare state did not begin in earnest 
until the 1950s, and it was built on the stable institutions and governmental 
organizations that had evolved over centuries, strong economic growth, and 
structural changes arising from the post–World War II period. In addition, the 
ideas and solutions offered by Finland’s Nordic and other Western neighbors 
provided the building blocks of this emerging welfare state. The relatively rapid 
building of Finland’s welfare state proves that it is possible to create such insti-
tutions quickly if there are the resources and opportunities to do so, especially 
as a response to developing societal harmony and equality. Furthermore, it is 
possible to sustain such institutions if the welfare policies contribute to the 
economic growth (e.g., by creating human capital). Building and extending 
the welfare state in Finland during the 1970s and the 1980s occurred despite 
political parties were relatively far from each other in many facets of policy 
issues; thus, the thread against this development during the recession in the 
early 1990s might be one of the explanations why income inequality gained so 
much attention in the public press at the time (Figures 4.5 and 4.6).
The Finnish, or Swedish for that matter, development was faster than else-
where in Europe, although hardly unique. And the end result was an encom-
passing welfare state with highly progressive taxation. This can be seen in the 
central government spending levels among most Western countries; in fact, 
they showed little growth until World War I, although there were noticeable 
differences between them. Subsequently, in the interwar period, especially in 
the 1930s, the average central government spending increased. After World 
War II, the effect of the emerging welfare state can be observed until the 1980s. 
The last phase seems to represent a leveling-off stage (or at least a period of 
slower growth) for modern welfare states. Thus, the two World Wars appear 
to have imposed tremendous growth pressures on central government roles 
in most Western countries. Finland, however, seems to have experienced a 
strong period of growth in the 1950s, which differs from most of the others, 
thus catching up to Nordic levels of welfare provision and tax policies, while 
also entering a period of extremely rapid structural change for its economy. 
The United States, the embodiment of the Anglo-American welfare model, 
consistently spent less than the Europeans in the 20th century, whereas Sweden 
spent much more than Finland in the 1960s and the 1970s.57
Therefore, the emergence of welfare states in the postwar period took place 
in increments. For example, between 1937 and 1960, the percentage of GDP 
of public expenditures increased at a relatively slow pace, often more related to 
the increases in defense spending caused by the Cold War. This share was circa 
23 percent in 1937 compared to roughly 28 percent in 1960. However, the 
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period 1960−1980 could be described as the real golden age of public sector 
intervention, with a considerable macroeconomic consensus on the govern-
ment’s role. Criticism of this era of Keynesian dominance emerged in the after-
math of the economic crises of the 1970s, increasing in the 1980s and the 1990s 
with the arrival of fiscally more conservative governments, especially in the 
UK and the United States. Public choice and other institutional theorists have 
since been among the many critics of the welfare states. How extensive was 
this government growth? If we look at the development of general government 
expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) in the latter half of the 20th century, 
we see that the average share increased steadily from approximately 43 percent 
in 1980 to circa 46 percent in 1996. As Peter Lindert has pointed out, most 
Western nations did not cut their spending uniformly nor permanently, and 
globalization has since increased the demand for a government response. Fin-
land certainly belongs in this group as well, having made only small welfare 
spending cuts in the 1990s and since the economic crisis of 2008.58
Furthermore, Finland closely followed the examples of Nordic (mainly 
Swedish) policy models in the post–World War II period, especially since the 
left-wing parties had gained significant momentum after the war and other 
parties would seek to bolster their electoral chances by collaborating with them 
on certain issues. Other factors that made this possible included the rapid eco-
nomic growth and the structural changes in the Finnish economy in the 1950s 
and the 1960s. During the years 1948−1960, public expenditures, which now 
subsidized government-run health care, social security, and administration, 
grew at an annual average of 4.4 percent. The Finnish welfare state, however, 
really took off in the 1960s, when the growth of public expenditures acceler-
ated. The Disability Pension Act and the Old Age Pension Act were passed in 
1962, and the Health Insurance Act in 1964. These measures were followed by 
others, especially in education and health care in the 1970s, which increased the 
social spending role of the municipalities and local government. Education and 
health-care expenditures have generally grown fast, although the proportion 
of current transfers and subsidies increased even faster in the postwar period.59 
The growth in most areas of spending has continued since the 1980s, although 
the growth has slowed down. The periods of recession, such as the early 1990s 
and the period since 2008, have put more fiscal pressure, both domestically and 
from abroad, on the Nordic welfare states. In addition, the recent refugee crisis 
has added to the burden of the welfare bureaucracies in these countries, and 
it has led to a political backlash among the Nordic populations, as seen in the 
rise of nationalist/populist parties, such as in Finland and Sweden, and more 
stringent immigration policies, like in Denmark.60
However, on the aggregate, while the postwar Nordic societies have built up 
extensive social safety nets and invested in human capital, they have also enjoyed 
a high level of economic growth and living standards, something that Lindert 
has termed the free lunch puzzle. Why? According to Lindert, the Nordic soci-
eties have smartly focused on taxing mostly harmful behavior (i.e. enacting so-
called sin taxes, on the use of tobacco, alcohol, gasoline, etc.) to provide societal 
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gains, which has helped them redistribute money for more productive endeav-
ors. In fact, one of the fundamental aspects of the durability and effectiveness of 
Nordic welfare states pertains to their redistribution policies. Thus, the factor 
income inequalities (capital, salary, and entrepreneurial incomes) are consider-
ably higher when compared with the disposable income inequalities, such as 
when adding the social incomes to the factor incomes as well as subtracting 
taxes that were paid and other payments (Figure 4.7). The crucial fact is that 
factor income inequalities (1) increased significantly in both Finland and Swe-
den from the late 1970s to around year 1995; however, the disposable income 
inequalities remained at similar levels in Sweden until 1990 and in Finland until 
1992. In other words, the redistribution activities of the welfare state held the 
inequalities at similar levels even as the factor or market inequalities increased.
However, the impact of the redistribution policies clearly diminished dur-
ing the latter part of the observed period: the disposable income inequali-
ties increased even though the factor income inequalities remained stagnant or 
slightly increased. Evidently, this process can be characterized by the following 
ratio: the disposable income inequality divided by the factor income inequal-
ity (2). Thus, this ratio (2) tells us how much the market income inequalities 
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Figure 4.7  Gini coefficients and redistribution in Finland and Sweden (household, OECD-
equivalence scale). Note: (1) Gini coefficients are calculated from factor (entre-
preneurial + salary + capital incomes, including capital gains) and disposable 
incomes (factor incomes + social transfers – paid taxes and transfers). (2) Dispos-
able Ginis are divided by Factor Ginis.
Source: Finland (OSF 2019: Income distribution statistics); Sweden (Statistics Sweden 2019: Household 
finances).
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policies reversed around mid-1990s toward less equalizing policies. The next 
turning point occurred after 2008, when Finland and the rest of the world 
suffered a recession, unemployment increased, and the automatic welfare state 
social transfers increased in volume. In addition, the recession was not as severe 
in Sweden, and the development toward less equalizing policies was at least 
halted. Nevertheless, it is good to bear in mind that in terms of both of these 
figures, the level of unemployment and the “automatic” social transfer system 
were quite crucial, not necessary the policy changes.
One of the key changes in the redistribution policies in Finland was the 
separation between labor and capital income taxation in 1993, which meant 
that labor income tax rates were progressive and the capital income tax rates 
were flat (25 percent in 1993). In addition, the dividends from the rich closed 
companies were partly tax-exempt ( Jäntti et  al. 2010, Tuomala 2019). This 
strengthened the incentives to transform labor incomes to capital incomes since 
the top marginal tax rate on labor income was considerably higher. Thus, partly 
due to the changes made to the taxation, the share of the capital incomes in the 
top 1 percentage increased from 11 percent to about 63 percent between the 
years 1990 and 2004. Furthermore, whereas the average tax rates of the median 
incomes decreased only slightly from 22 percent to 21 percent between the 
years 1987 and 2004, on the other hand, the top 1 percent tax rates dropped 
considerably from 44 percent to 34 percent ( Jäntti et al. 2010).
These redistribution policies were obviously not only aimed at keeping 
inequality in its various forms, especially income (or in some cases wealth) 
inequality but also aimed at societally acceptable levels – and what was consid-
ered acceptable or desirable obviously changed over time. In fact, the money 
arising from the redistribution policies also went toward investments in policies 
that would reduce inequality and provide economic mobility. These types of 
impacts can be seen in various indicators and outcomes in the Nordic cases. 
As seen in Table 4.1, in the beginning of the 20th century Finland was clearly 
Table 4.1 Average years of schooling in Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, 1900–2010.
Year Norway Denmark Finland Sweden
1900 5.8 5.6 1.7 5.5
1910 6.0 6.0 2.0 5.9
1920 6.3 6.3 2.7 6.2
1930 6.5 6.6 3.6 6.6
1940 7.0 6.9 5.0 6.9
1950 7.6 7.6 6.0 7.4
1960 8.8 8.9 7.0 8.5
1970 10.0 9.8 7.6 9.7
1980 11.3 10.8 9.5 11.0
1990 12.1 11.4 10.6 11.8
2000 12.4 12.0 11.5 11.5
2010 12.6 12.1 12.0 11.9
Source: Clioinfra database. Available from: https://clio-infra.eu/. (Cited 1 March 2019).
80 Petri Roikonen et al.
a laggard in terms of schooling outcomes. However, by mid-century, this had 
changed already, and Finland had started to catch up. By the end of the century, 
Finland was on part with the other Nordic countries. In general, improvements 
in social well-being have come from many sources in the last 100 years among 
the leading Western economies, but one of the most important aspects has 
been the growth in human capital. Regardless, Finland was far behind until the 
1960s and the comprehensive school reform, which put Finland eventually on 
par with the others, and even ahead in terms of achievements (PISA tests) in 
the 21st century.
In general, in most European countries education inequality decreased until 
the 1960s, and even beyond in some cases. However, in Finland the largest 
drops came before the new education laws in the 1960s, and the level of ine-
quality even increased initially. In most countries this measure of inequality has 
decreased in the recent decades.61 The Nordic countries were no exceptions to 
this general pattern. Another measure of human capital, numeracy, gives us a 
longer-term view of these trends in the Nordic countries. Norway caught up 
last among this group to the rest, but overall all these countries had high levels 
of numeracy by the early 20th century and that did not change by the later 
policies. The educational policies and expansion of the latter part of the 20th 
century simply reinforced the strength of the Nordic societies as highly edu-
cated polities,62 which could be seen especially in Finland’s superb performance 
in the PISA tests in the early 2000s.63
Finally, one important measure of societal inequality pertains to gender dis-
crimination and status. It is much harder to obtain long-run data on such 
indicators. One way to look at this is through the representation of women in 
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Figure 4.8 Number of female members in the parliament.
Source: Clioinfra database. Available from: https://clio-infra.eu/. (Cited 1 March 2019).
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the 1970s onward. Overall, women MPs have quadrupled their share of par-
liamentary seats in the postwar era. As we noted earlier, gender imbalance on 
earnings became one of the focal points in the public discourse in the 1990s, 
and the voting patterns seem to be linked to this change as well. Overall, social, 
economic, and political mobility have become hallmarks of the Nordic socie-
ties, and the welfare and redistribution policies have certainly helped them 
along in this direction.
Discussion and conclusions
Inequality in its various forms has become a hot topic of broad societal discus-
sion, in both the academic and policy circles, around the globe, most recently 
due to Thomas Piketty’s work (e.g. 2001, 2014). However, we often perceive 
both public and policy discussions to be somewhat divorced from scholarly 
discourses, especially in determining what actual policy approaches would be 
desirable to achieve certain societal outcomes. Here we have displayed the 
broad trends in income inequality, and the Nordic countries are clearly still in 
the lower inequality group in the 21st century. Moreover, the Nordic trends 
have followed international patterns fairly well, namely high inequality in the 
late 19th century, lesser inequality after World War II, and rising trend since the 
late 1980s. Clearly the Nordic societies have converged over time economi-
cally, socially, politically, and culturally. We also discussed the redistribution and 
welfare state policies that have kept inequality lower in the Nordic societies, 
particularly in Finland and Sweden.
Our broad analysis of the topic of income inequality in the public sphere 
showed that the patterns were not entirely similar in Finland and Sweden, how-
ever. In Finland, it seems, certain academic debates also became public debates, 
and thus most likely had a greater impact on policy debates as well. In Sweden, 
in contrast, income inequality was discussed less until the recent years. Broader 
debates about welfare states and the role of the government in the aggregate 
economy were also parts of these discussions. In general, regardless of the occa-
sional critiques of the welfare and redistribution policies, the broader Nordic 
societal agreement about the need for welfare state has been quite solid in poll 
after poll, even among the more conservative political parties. Our framework 
outlined a connection between research, policies, and discourses. We would 
argue here that in the last 50 years or so those connections have existed in Fin-
land, although not always. In Sweden, the connections, at least in the context 
of income inequality, were less pronounced, perhaps also due to the earlier 
adoption of welfare and tax policies. Thus, the Nordic countries were not quite 
as homogenous as they sometimes appear.
Our goal here was to examine certain historical trends in income inequality 
and debates surrounding this topic, especially from the lens of redistribution 
and welfare state policies. It seems quite clear that politicians and the general 
public are aware of certain debates in for example in economics and economic 
history concerning income inequality; nonetheless, their understanding of the 
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facts or data is often limited. Typically, many politicians would assume that 
income inequality is rising fast in countries like Finland, whereas it is actu-
ally remained relatively similar levels or only slightly increased in the 2000s 
after rapid increase in the 1990s.64 Furthermore, Finland and other Nordic 
societies are much more equal when considering incomes, or other types of 
inequalities, than most places on this globe. The redistribution policies have 
been fairly effective in the post–World War II era, and the welfare state policies 
have  created more equal opportunities for also minorities, yet the impact of 
those policies have waned somewhat in the 21st century.
Should scholars be more active in the public sphere, to provide deeper his-
torical context for debates and point toward policy solutions? It is quite difficult 
to do that, especially in a way that various forms of media would find inter-
esting enough. Moreover, it is also difficult in current climate of viral stories, 
fake news, and extensive social media networks. Regardless, while all those 
elements of modern media can distort “truths” and mislead debates, they can 
also amplify messages from scholars like Piketty, who can have a real impact on 
how societies evolve. And most universities and research centers today in fact 
value the idea of their employees having a public impact, even to the point of 
providing rewards for that, although they would equally be risk averse toward 
potentially negative publicity and embarrassment. This is the difficult balance 
that 21st-century scholars will face in their careers, and the topic of income 
inequality (or any other type of inequality) is a key topic of societal debate now 
and in the future.
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5 Liquid neutrality
Paradoxes of democracy in Finnish 
and Swedish NATO discussions?
Matti Roitto and Antero Holmila
Fluids travel easily. They ‘flow’, ‘spill’, ‘run out’, ‘splash’, ‘pour over’, ‘leak’, ‘flood’, 
‘spray’, ‘drip’, ‘seep’, ‘ooze’; unlike solids they are not easily stopped – they pass 
around some obstacles, dissolve some others and bore or soak their way through 
others still.1
Zygmunt Bauman’s famous conception of the modern condition as liquid 
modernity is in fact an apt description of Finland’s and Sweden’s security strate-
gies during and after the Cold War. In order to understand the ways the Finnish 
and Swedish relationship to NATO has evolved since the end of the Cold War, 
we conceptualise Finland’s and Sweden’s security orientation as liquid neutrality.
Rather than the typical and publicly dominant ‘solid’ conceptualisations such 
as ‘small-state realism’2 and ‘Finlandization’, which put Finnish and Swedish 
foreign policy in a passive and reactive mode, ‘liquid neutrality’ implies an 
active, participatory, daring and deliberate policy orientation that – following 
Bauman – is able to pass around obstacles. Further, liquid neutrality nuances 
Finnish and Swedish foreign policy to show how small powers took advantage 
of cracks along the fault lines of superpower competition.
One area in which liquid neutrality becomes visible is the Finnish and Swed-
ish post–Cold War policy formation regarding their relationship with NATO – 
the subject of this chapter. Typically, the Swedish and Finnish parliamentary 
democracies, often seen as a part of a wide and uniform Nordic model of 
democracy,3 have enjoyed a solid reputation regarding the ideals of democracy.4 
However, during the recent crisis of democracy,5 the Nordic democracies also, 
including Sweden and Finland, have been facing a crisis of legitimacy, effi-
ciency and transparency, as discussed elsewhere in this volume.
An often overlooked aspect of the crisis of democracy is foreign and security 
policy. However, the matter was brought up already in 1975 by Samuel Hun-
tington, Michel Crozier and Joji Watanuki as one of the contributing factors in 
the US crisis of democracy. The high costs of the war and unearthing of the US 
schemes that escalated the Vietnam conflict into a full-scale war meant a crucial 
loss of legitimacy for the US regime.6 Foreign and especially security policy 
also pose a particular kind of challenge for the Nordic democracies. In  this 
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chapter, we address this challenge with a historical analysis of the paradoxes in 
Finnish and Swedish policies vis-à-vis NATO.
Due to its double-faced nature, this side of politics is often overlooked. 
While issues such as budgets are debated in public, others  – for example, 
the technological alignment of weapon systems or channels of information 
 sharing – are kept hidden in the name of ‘national interest’. Some fundamen-
tals of the foreign and security policy are presented in the open in order to 
create identification and anchor points for politics, interests, values and ideas. 
Yet other issues are prepared in secrecy – more so in the phases of preparation 
as leaks can threaten the various national interests. However, a comprehensive 
analysis remains elusive, since many policy documents are still classified. Thus, 
we rely on public documents and other available sources and existing literature.
As ascribed to the archetypical realist Otto von Bismarck: ‘laws, like sau-
sages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made’. 
Although the quote was uttered by John Godfrey Saxe in 1869 and was only 
attributed to Bismarck in the 1930s,7 it highlights a paradox of democracy, par-
ticularly in the realm of security policies. Paradoxically, the more transparent 
policy formulation and execution seem, the less creation of these policies seems 
to comply with democratic ideals. That holds true also in the case of Swed-
ish and Finnish foreign and security policy, and even more so vis-à-vis their 
respective NATO relations and membership debates. Critics suggest that the 
two states have gradually aligned with NATO, to the brink of full membership, 
by various undemocratic double-dealings and technical arrangements.
On the one hand, those who study foreign and security policy are well 
aware of this great game of double-dealing. On the other, scholarship based 
on publicly available parliamentary sources tends to view foreign policy for-
mation through the lenses of increased parliamentarisation and finds that to 
some degree, a certain constitutional role is often reserved for parliaments 
also in foreign policy.8 These works have illustrated that certain parliamentary 
momentums have existed from time to time, even if the professionalisation of 
mass politics and the exponential increase in matters to be covered have shifted 
much of the parliamentary dealings behind closed doors.9
In 21st-century Sweden and Finland, the question of their cooperation 
with NATO has been one such challenge to democracy. Andrew Cottey has 
stated, referring to other scholars, that non-alignment has become a part of the 
identity of the European neutrals, and therefore it is rather unlikely that they 
would abandon this policy. Moreover, the neutrality policy has greatly affected 
European neutrals, including Sweden and Finland, to ‘maintain their national 
integrity and political independence, while avoiding war, during and after the 
Cold War and can therefore be viewed as successful national security policy’. 
According to Cottey (and many others for that matter), the end of the Cold 
War triggered NATO expansion and cooperation outside the actual alliance, 
which is something Cottey describes as a quiet revolution.10
Indeed, the age-old discourse on neutrality and non-alignment has given 
way to a new discourse that goes against the grain of public opinion – or so 
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the grand narrative of the two states inclining more and more towards NATO 
cooperation would suggest. This illustrates how liquid neutrality permeates 
Finland’s and Sweden’s foreign and security policy formulation. Particularly 
since the end of the Cold War, the long-lasting, outspoken political impera-
tives of neutrality and non-alignment, which have been true only in part, have 
been altered in response to the greater paradigm shifts in international rela-
tions. First, Finland and Sweden established much-coveted formal positions 
within the West by joining the European Union (EU) integration process.11 
Since then, they have also approached NATO, to the point that the two might 
become members rather rapidly.
However, even if this seems a novel situation in the two nations’ foreign 
policy, that is not the case in historical perspective. The two formally non-
aligned, neutral Nordic states had conducted a realist and ‘liquid’ security pol-
icy for nearly a century and quite successfully, if judged by the ultimate realist 
criterion: survival of the state.12 The alleged neutrality (oriented to the West 
in Sweden and considerate towards the East in Finland) was a shield under 
which a pragmatic, active stance for the best possible security outcomes could 
be devised. Due to the geopolitical set-piece situation, the antagonistic Cold 
War blocs accepted their neutrality for the sake of stability. In other words, 
neither Sweden nor Finland was as neutral or non-aligned as they branded 
themselves as. Thus, the recent inclination towards NATO is building on a 
long-established tradition.
However, the state of interregnum in post–Cold War international rela-
tions has made these processes visible, which has shocked some observers. 
By ‘interregnum’ we mean a transformative phase in the international sys-
tem during which the old conventions have lost their utility and new ones 
have not emerged.13 The end of the Cold War – even if it was not the ‘end 
of history’ nor triumph of multipolarity14 – and ‘the return of geopolitics’15 
in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea were key events that 
heralded interregnums. The highlighting of the paradox between practice 
and policy declarations has contributed to the current challenges of Nordic 
democracy. The pursuit of vested national interests has become manifest, 
and the preparation for the worst is for the first time revealed and evident. 
Previously hidden information is now transmitted through constant media 
reporting. Security and foreign policy is subject to lobbying, despite the fact 
that most decisions are still made behind closed doors. From the point of 
view of democratic ideals, this might resemble a clandestine push towards 
NATO, despite the NATO-sceptic popular sentiment in both states. In Fin-
land, the support for NATO membership would rise slightly if Sweden were 
to join.16 As no major political decisions about membership application have 
been made, but a certain trajectory of alignment has been pursued, a sort of 
‘paradox of democracy’ appears to exist. This provides a strong resonance 
board for various kinds of politicking and information operations, and might 
also foster a sentiment of alarm. Moreover, it might dissolve trust in political 
processes and culture.
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Historical context: the Cold War era
Typically, the Nordic countries have been lumped together regarding welfare, 
economy, culture or foreign and security policy therefore obscuring diversity 
and dissimilarities that also exist within the Nordic nations. True, they share 
similar policies of progressive taxation and welfare, and an emphasis on what 
has been described as the ‘Nordic model(s)’ of democracy. Politics and policy 
are defined in a similar vein in all of the respective states, and the strategies of 
small-state realism they use to achieve this are very much alike.17 Historically, 
this stems from a long trajectory of shared pasts that has affected the democ-
ratisation of both countries in political, economic and geopolitical terms.18 
Yet there are manifold differences, reported extensively in scholarly works 
published in the Nordic languages. These differences are particularly sharp 
regarding their foreign policy choices.19
With the outbreak of the First World War, the kings of Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark committed publicly to a joint policy of neutrality.20 Likewise, due to 
geopolitical factors, a degree of small-state realism was practised in the Baltic 
region. Russia had for a long time been seen as a potential adversary. However, 
some differences were present then also.21 During the 1920s and the 1930s, as 
a self-proclaimed regional leader Sweden promoted various forms of Nordic 
cooperation that never materialised. Other states opted for other solutions, 
which are rather well known, including the so-called border-states policy.22 
Since the Second World War, the Nordic line of neutrality or non-alignment 
has drastically changed and the ‘Nordic model’ has diversified even more. In 
the post-war situation, some of the Nordic states were more inclined to search 
security options from the West. Having been occupied in the war, Denmark 
and Norway opted for a NATO-backed security solution along with Iceland, 
instead of the ‘Nordic cooperation’ instigated by Sweden.23 However, in much 
of the contemporary analysis, this difference between the countries has been 
overlooked and the Nordic countries have been lumped together to represent 
a ‘third way’ in post-war foreign policy between the major blocs. This has also 
been considered a typically pragmatic small-state realist approach.24
During the Cold War, both Sweden and Finland relied by necessity on pub-
licly proclaimed neutrality and non-alignment.25 In order to attain this status 
in the international system, while simultaneously keeping pace with Western 
trajectories, both countries, albeit sceptically at first, focused on international 
cooperation, mostly under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).26 How-
ever, even in this multilateral form of internationalism, their experiences dif-
fered: Sweden joined the UN in 1945, while Finland, after a number of Soviet 
vetoes, was able to join only in 1956. Despite the multilateral orientation and 
small-state politics, both countries also had contingency plans, backed up by 
independent and strong armed forces.27
Although practically all states have several security policy options, generally 
only a few of them are publicly discussed or accessible.28 Typically, one option 
is pursued as the preferred policy. In Sweden, this has, since the late 1950s, 
Liquid neutrality 95
taken the form of a semi-clandestine partnership with the United States and 
NATO, while simultaneously branding neutrality as the core value of Swedish 
foreign and security policy.29 Finland balanced between meeting the expec-
tations of the USSR and identifying with the West through other means – 
especially through trade and culture. A number of scholars have pointed out 
that these Nordic double-dealings (dubbelspel) are already rather familiar.30 Still, 
most scholars have studied them as part of individual national histories rather 
than using a comparative approach, with the notable exception of Johanna 
Rainio-Niemi.31
Finland, in particular, performed a high-wire balancing act between the East 
and the West, agreeing to a certain amount of Soviet influence in Finnish affairs 
in return for some freedoms. Sweden, in turn, continued to polish her defensive 
shield with declarations of non-alignment and neutrality – backed up by the 
most formidable armed forces among the Nordic states.32 Behind the scenes, 
plans related to NATO and Western defence had been made since the 1950s. 
The Social Democrats dominated Swedish politics at this time, and because it 
was in the national interest, their dubbelspel was rarely challenged, only being 
used as minor leverage in domestic affairs by the political opposition.33 This all 
changed drastically, however, with the fall of communist regimes. The Baltic 
States independence relieved some of the pressure on the Swedish shores of the 
Baltic Sea. While Finland in particular and Sweden to some extent were cau-
tious to offer unequivocal support to the newly emerging Baltic States, they 
keenly supported the establishment of the armed forces of these states.34
Liquid neutrality and the alignment with the European 
community and NATO
The collapse of the USSR briefly brought about the advent of ‘the unipolar 
world order’ or ‘unipolar moment’. In the Nordic countries, this shift in the 
early 1990s was not only perceived but also seized. In terms of security land-
scape, the question was not only primarily about NATO but also about the 
European Community (EC, later European Union, EU), which also included 
the element of common security. Finland was more careful but followed Swe-
den partially out of fear of being left behind or isolated. In 1991, after having 
followed Norwegian EC debate closely, Sweden opted to apply for member-
ship of the EC. Sweden did this without notifying Finland first, much to the 
latter’s surprise. In 1992, the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Assistance from 1948 – which had been the defining feature of Finnish foreign 
policy throughout the Cold War – ceased to be in effect, and there was more 
room for general foreign policy deliberation. Not to be isolated and left out 
when the pieces of the geopolitical puzzle were shifting, Finland was forced to 
apply for EC membership as well in 1992.35
The Swedish non-notification traumatised Finland. Recognising this, the 
US Department of State and Defense noted that the intertwined defence and 
foreign policies of the two states meant that affecting one state would also affect 
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the other and thus shaped US policies in the region.36 If Sweden would align 
itself directly with NATO, it would demolish the core of the ‘neutral buffer 
zone’ in the region. For Finland, this would have been catastrophic, as the neu-
tral zone was a prerequisite for Finland’s attempts to pursue liquid neutrality 
and practise small-state realism.
In both countries, joining the EC/EU in 1995 was not directly related to 
security policy – or at least that dimension was toned down in the rhetoric. In 
foreign policy terms, the integration was part of a wider attempt to position 
formally within the West. To some extent the EU, to use the current acronym, 
was also seen as a possible ‘third force’ between the Soviet Union/Russia and 
the United States.37 Already in 1992, Jaakko Iloniemi commented that in ‘Fin-
land it is still widely believed that joining the EC will not affect our security 
or defence policy. Such a thought is misleading.’38 While the public remained 
ambivalent, Finland’s positioning nevertheless acted as a signal for a willingness 
to align more deeply with NATO structures, which were seen as the backbone 
of the European defence landscape. By applying to the EU, both states also 
accepted shared responsibility for defending Europe. In 1994 – before the EU 
membership was agreed upon – both Sweden and Finland joined the NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and they immediately began to enhance 
their NATO compatibility.39 This can be seen as opening more options while 
staying aloof from binding commitments.
With increasing integration with the West, Cold War era contingency plans 
became less hidden  – particularly in Sweden, but also in Finland. Changes 
in the geopolitical situation of the Baltic, underwritten by Russian weakness, 
meant that the limitations that had formerly prevented Nordic countries from 
having a more public alignment with NATO were now removed. As the lead-
ing Finnish weekly put it in 2001, ‘Finland is already close to NATO’s core’ 
and was ‘engaged with the Western security community that formed around 
NATO’.40 This alignment was not a complete novelty, but already existing and 
well-developed ties could be strengthened.41 The language of ‘engagement’ is 
in itself axiomatic about the ways Finland identified with the West.
Thus, for Finland, EU membership essentially meant claiming a much-
coveted and clear identity within the West while simultaneously seeking to 
keep a strong national defence. For Sweden, the emergence of new independ-
ent Baltic buffer states meant that it opted for cost-effectiveness, meaning heavy 
disarmament, the closing of various military bases, and later abolishing national 
service. The decisions made in 1996 emphasised that Sweden remained non-
aligned, while the defence decision in 2000 led to one of the greatest changes 
in the Swedish armed forces organisation, including disbanding numerous bases 
and forces.42 This pattern was further developed in the defence decision of 
2004, which was the last of the decisions oriented from territorial defence 
towards reactionary defence and crisis management.43 In general, the new secu-
rity paradigm entailed establishing professional military forces and reorienting 
its activities towards international crisis- and conflict-resolution projects under 
the auspices of NATO.44 Liquid neutrality was massaged into the formulation 
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of the policy, allowing Sweden to retain its neutral image while being fully 
integrated to NATO’s structures.
While military-oriented NATO alignment was mainly conducted in the 
background, the public relations exercise opted to rebrand the Swedish military 
as a force for international crisis management and for preserving or project-
ing Western identity.45 This shift was also a response to the detailed accounts 
of the Swedish clandestine cooperation plans with NATO during the Cold 
War – a topic of debate that emerged in public during the 1990s. Thus, amid 
public questioning of Sweden’s Cold War militarisation, the next logical step to 
take was securing and strengthening the ‘special relationship’ while universally 
branding it as international crisis management.46 To a lesser degree, Finland 
dovetailed Sweden but did not give up military conscription. In addition, Fin-
land adopted the former Swedish policy of balancing between semi-formal 
non-alignment and enhancing NATO compatibility. Yet the sheer number of 
gradual changes and technical arrangements in this respect speaks for the policy 
of liquid neutrality once again. Through these measures, Finland and Sweden 
have become more NATO-compatible than most of those European states that 
have joined NATO since 1999.47
The Baltic area’s security environment changed once again when Finland’s 
and Sweden’s smaller neighbours – the Baltic States – opted for full NATO 
membership in 2004. They followed the logic of alliances presented by Ste-
phen M. Walt in 1987. Instead of bandwagoning with the great adversary, they 
allied against it.48 Historically, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
have been cooperating and coordinating on security and defence issues (or 
matters related to security and defence). This cooperation is an example of 
pragmatic small-state realism (implicitly all of these states have practised prag-
matic small-state realism). For the Soviet Union, and in recent times for Russia, 
this has caused annoyance at least. Until 2004, Swedish and Finnish support for 
developing the Baltic States’ defences had been crucially important. This Bal-
tic aspect is rarely addressed in analyses of Nordic defence cooperation.49 The 
motives were essentially based on national interests: militarised Baltic States 
offered breathing space for Sweden and Finland, although it is a matter of 
debate whether the Baltic States’ NATO memberships have a stabilising effect 
on regional security. Be that as it may, after 2004, Finland and Sweden con-
tinued their own NATO alignment – to the point that the option for joining 
NATO was solely dependent on political will, not military harmonisation. 
Yet thus far most of the Finnish political parties have not explicitly stated their 
opinion on Finland’s NATO membership, save the conservative National Coa-
lition Party that advocates membership. Subsequently, public considerations of 
potential NATO membership became a staple feature, especially in the multi-
faceted media debates, but are noticeable also in official policy documentation. 
NATO’s development took a crucial turn after the 9/11 attacks, which 
transformed its role from that of international police and peace enforcer to a mili-
tary and security organisation. Before the terrorist attacks, NATO had accepted 
most former Warsaw Pact States as its members, replaying the 1940s–1950s strategy 
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of containment. The last members, including the Baltic States, were accepted 
in 2004. Some criticism, for instance about overreach, was voiced throughout 
the ‘open door policy’, but this did not change the decision.50 At that point, 
Russia–NATO relations were still more amenable. Soon, however, Russia and 
NATO began to drift apart. Georgia’s pro-Western developments since 2003 
and an open willingness to join NATO finally forced Russia to act according 
to its historical fear of encirclement by hostile powers.51 Even international 
cooperation against terrorism, also important for Russia, could not prevent a 
further divergence between the two. If the former Soviet satellites were clearly 
in the Russian sphere of interests, Georgia was part of the Russian backyard.
The Baltic Sea region sphere of interest contributes to the Finnish and 
Swedish defence dilemmas. To avoid having this natural maritime choke-point 
used against it, Russia might attempt to take over, occupy or at least incapaci-
tate the Baltic States. The Åland Islands, Gotland and the Danish straits are 
also important in such a scenario.52 By linking up with the enclave around 
Kaliningrad, Russia could also better secure sea access for St. Petersburg and 
would also have a further vantage point for the whole region. In many ways, 
the Baltic States offer an extension to the exclusion area protecting the impor-
tant city and strategic base of St. Petersburg. This would also take some of the 
pressure off the Arctic region where Russia has its other important sea route to 
the west. As part of a larger Arctic strategy, which stated in 2008 that the Arctic 
would be its primary resource base, Russia has already improved its network 
of military bases in that region and has increased settlement in the region as 
well.53 In the Kola Peninsula, for instance, there has been considerable military 
build-up and Russia has been seen to exert indirect pressure towards Norway, 
for instance.54
Russia’s drive to reassert its position as a great power evidently conflicted 
with NATO’s rapid enlargement to its borders in Northern Europe. The mat-
ter of security policy became more acute than it had been since the end of the 
Cold War. The first sign was the Georgian war in 2008, which was part of a 
stern Russian response to considerations of additional NATO members along 
its borders.55 Later on, and due to numerous political, economic and strate-
gic reasons, the same applied to Ukraine. These familiar events need not be 
repeated here. However, the NATO debate in Finland and Sweden now had a 
new urgency. From a Russian perspective, Nordic neutrality, in its liquid form, 
threatened to ‘splash’ from its fairly contained space into the quickly cracking 
security landscape.
In Finland, public opinion was against joining NATO, as were President 
Tarja Halonen and Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja. The official position 
was articulated in the government’s security and defence policy statement to 
parliament in September 2004. Finland would continue its policy of military 
non-alignment until 2012; the main task would be the defence of the national 
territory and over 95 per cent of the defence budget would be devoted to it. 
The 2008 defence white paper, however, was due to include consideration of 
the pros and cons of NATO membership.56
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As a response to the cracking security landscape, Nordic countries acted 
according to their own regional interests by tightening Nordic military coop-
eration. According to Malena Britz, after the rift caused by the Iraq conflict, 
political focus regarding Nordic cooperation in security politics has increased 
since 2007. The Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) was established in 2008. At the 
same time, Swedish and Norwegian military leaders co-authored an article dis-
cussing whether the Swedish and Norwegian armed forces should be organised 
regionally so that they could support each other. Another key theme in the 
article was the co-organising of defence material acquisitions. In June 2009, 
Sweden issued a declaration of solidarity for its Nordic neighbours: it would 
not stand aside if any of the neighbouring states faced an attack or catastrophe.57 
The Nordic Council covered defence cooperation in 2009 in line with a report 
from former Norwegian foreign secretary Jens Stoltenberg (current NATO 
Secretary General) and followed up with the Reykjavik Declaration in the 
summer of 2009. This was a new historical development, as during the 1970s 
and the 1980s security and foreign policy was not allowed on the joint Nordic 
agenda and only started to emerge during the first decade of the 2000s. Further 
discussions on security cooperation were pursued by the Nordic foreign secre-
taries in 2010. Subsequently, a statement on the idea of cooperation, ‘the dec-
laration of solidarity’, was issued by the Nordic Council in Helsinki in 2011.58
Finland, Sweden, and the problem of EU-based security
In 2007, Finland’s former Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies said at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington:
In general, Finland is privileged to be located in one of the safest corners 
of the world. However, given our geographical location, the three main 
security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia. And 
not only for Finland, but for all of us.59
Such a statement was striking because it was so untypical. It not only raised 
eyebrows but also stirred up a storm in the ‘teacup’ of Finnish security policy. 
Criticisms came from various Finnish politicians, including the president and 
Ilkka Kanerva, the National Coalition Party’s foreign minister; and it contin-
ued for some time in spite of Häkämies’s assurances that the statement was 
based on formal policy documents and security estimates. Yet equally striking 
was the fact that it was only those three words that the media noted. After 
that line, Häkämies claimed that Russia nevertheless is not a direct threat to 
Finnish security; it posed not only a challenge but also an opportunity. How-
ever, this more nuanced contextualisation fell on deaf ears. According to the 
most nervous responses, Finland had three real security challenges: ‘Häkämies, 
Häkämies, Häkämies’.60
Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, the security challenge 
that the Soviet Union/Russia posed for Finland has been treated with kid 
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gloves – clearly evident in the response to the Häkämies incident. The other 
side of the coin is the question of security; if there is a potential threat, there 
must be also a potential security arrangement. In general, security discourse in 
Finland as well as in Sweden is dominated by attempts to obfuscate the extent 
to which Nordic countries are already thoroughly connected with NATO. 
This is related to the idea that publicly committing to one camp and giving up 
on the formally acknowledged, even if questionable, neutral or non-aligned 
status could push Russia into action that would require a direct answer or 
counter-move. Disregarding this paradox of saying one thing and doing the 
opposite in public debate can be seen, if not as a democratic deficit, at least 
as contributing to the scepticism towards defence debates in the parliaments – 
especially when what is actually happening has become more obvious. Thus, 
the security debate in the 2010s is ‘smoke and mirrors’ in which the truth of 
the situation – de facto (technical) NATO alignment – is obscured with refer-
ence to old and no-longer stable rhetoric, the key component being the ques-
tion of a collective European security system through EU institutions.61
Since the initial attempts in the 1940s and the 1950s and up to today, the 
West European Union (WEU) that forms the security and military component 
of the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) has not come to frui-
tion.62 Cost efficiency has been among the main factors along with political 
will. The Maastricht Treaty and the ‘pillar policy’ that followed were existing 
factors, but in terms of collective security, they offered very little in terms of 
concrete means despite various attempts and promises.63 Furthermore, as in the 
1950s, NATO quickly emerged as the leading institution to guarantee Euro-
pean security. Establishing overlapping European schemes, organisations and 
plans would have increased overall defence costs, hampered organisation and 
perhaps even reduced the effectiveness of NATO.
The collapse of the USSR changed the European-level calculus. Not only 
did the main threat disappear – Russia was noticeably weak at the time – but 
the world-wide economic recession meant that there were fewer resources to 
allocate to European defence planning and capabilities, which remained mod-
est. Further, after a brief period of intensified planning in the 2000s, the issue of 
broadening the Union took over at the expense of deepening and strengthen-
ing European security arrangements. For Finland, this development meant that 
although it had integrated itself deeply into the EU since the mid-1990s to the 
point that re-estimating the benefits of possible alliances within the European 
framework was brought up,64 the European dimension of security was (and is) 
not a viable defence solution. Simply, it lacks the necessary military muscle. For 
Sweden, the situation was similar but even more troublesome, because it had 
abandoned its long-lasting security doctrine of total defence, driving down the 
level of society’s militarisation.65
Since most EU countries are also members of NATO, their need for EU-
based security is not acute, which is reflected in a lack of interest in developing 
a joint European defence and foreign policy. Further, doctrinal changes in the 
1990s and the 2000s clouded the core function of NATO. Since the Balkan 
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crises in the late 1990s, both NATO and the EU oriented themselves towards 
conflict resolution, peace-keeping and interventions in limited conflicts. Forces 
and capabilities utilised in these operations are very much the same, though the 
matter of which hats (or helmets in this case) – the EU or NATO – to wear is 
still present to some degree. As focus shifted to conflict resolution and peace-
keeping, territorial defence and training in Europe were neglected. Neither 
experience from asymmetrical warfare nor evidence that victory through air 
power alone is not plausible has led to significant changes in NATO’s European 
approach. Plans for changes exist on paper, but both within NATO and the 
EU, the will and funds have been lacking, and therefore more ‘cost-effective’ 
planning has been encouraged. In this respect, the organisations have lacked 
teeth. The EU’s initial responses to the Georgian war and the events in Ukraine 
and Crimea were neither rapid nor stern.66 Also, the EU member states’ differ-
ent economic and energy relationships with Russia hamper a unified security 
policy.
This lacklustre European defence system has led Finland and Sweden to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of their security policy. For instance, although 
the EU, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its 
imaginary framework of structures, was repeatedly mentioned in Finnish secu-
rity and foreign policy reviews, especially in 1995, as essential elements of 
Finnish policy, these mentions totally disappeared by 2016.67 NATO’s Euro-
pean members (and EU-members in general) have long been criticised for their 
low defence spending and ‘freeloading’ on the heels of the United States in 
2020 by former US Vice President Mike Pence in Munich.68 At the moment, 
the European states’ capabilities for territorial defence are rather limited, even 
within NATOs own territory. Although Pence’s utterances were no doubt 
related to arms trade efforts and the domestic pressure of Donald Trump’s 
administration, statistics show that the decrease in defence costs in Europe has 
been remarkable until recently. From a Finnish and Swedish perspective, this 
does not portray a pretty picture of organised collective defence – a matter at 
the heart of the Nordic vision of collective security. Therefore, the possible 
gains from NATO membership would depend on US forces, while the Euro-
pean defence and security orientation of the late 1990s and the early 2000s has 
practically disappeared from public discourse, illustrating the total dismissal of 
a European security system independent of US influence. For example, the 
more recent Finnish defence and security policy documentation hardly men-
tions EU-based security, at least in comparison to the late 1990s and the early 
2000s. The same applies to Sweden.69 Moreover, although the Lisbon Treaty of 
2007 provides certain theoretical guarantees of assistance from other members 
in the case of crisis, besides limited political will, capability is de facto lacking.
In addition, the NATO Charter gives some leeway of interpretation regard-
ing the military commitments under Article 5. Even if (European) NATO 
members would spend more than the nominal 2 per cent of their GDP on 
defence, it is debatable what would actually be supplied by each member state 
in the event of a conflict.70 Furthermore, even this deployment would require 
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unanimous agreement, which might take some time.71 Existing research actu-
ally reports that Denmark’s and Norway’s disarmament and development of a 
professional army is geared for rapid deployment in crisis and conflict manage-
ment against lower-tier and asymmetrical adversaries and in counter-terrorism 
operations. Magnus Petersson, for instance, has estimated that Denmark and 
Norway have decreased their level of defence.72 Instead, in the immediate pre-
Crimean era, they heavily oriented their forces towards NATOs global role to 
such a degree that they might have difficulty defending their own territory, 
let alone intervene on behalf of the Baltic States. For instance, Denmark has 
given up her submarine fleet, affecting the ability to defend the Danish straits 
and therefore the Baltic Sea. Similarly, both countries have faced difficulties in 
providing aerial units for international operations.73 For Sweden, this might 
decrease the interest in full NATO membership as it could cause more volatil-
ity and offer very little payback.
All this raises the question of how committed NATO is to the Nordic/
Baltic region. European defence planning is in a state of flux for a number of 
reasons, such as Brexit, the rise of nationalism, internal power struggles and 
resource allocation towards climate change. Finding a joint political will is 
hard enough, let alone the relevant resources. NATO’s ‘Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force’ (VJTF) might, in spite of its name, not actually be as readily 
available or deployable as politicians would like. The NATO Response Force 
(NRF) is also still very much a work in progress and exists mainly on paper, as 
many member states have no troops or weaponry available for it. Additionally, 
maintaining the readiness of VJTF and NRF troops is also costly.74 From the 
Swedish and Finnish point of view, this might mean that they would be gain-
ing less in joining NATO to solve their security situation. By being a member, 
they would be considered a potential foe by Russia (and to a large extent by 
China), without necessarily securing the backup that was sought after. Thus, 
in the current state of affairs, it hardly serves Finland or Sweden’s interests 
to join NATO. However, before any such conflict arose, the membership of 
the two countries would serve NATO’s interests by adding to the security of 
the Baltic States. These conflicting considerations have not surfaced much 
in recent public membership debates, though they most certainly have been 
considered.
Liquid neutrality and developments since 2014
As stated earlier, since the end of the Cold War, both Sweden and Finland have 
altered their respective foreign and security policies. While becoming more 
interconnected with international security and foreign policy systems, they 
have also become more entangled with the global challenges. This, in turn, has 
affected their possibilities for pursuing new security policy options and coping 
with their shared security dilemmas.
The Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 made the return of geopolitics 
imminent also in the Baltic Sea region, as previously distant problems were 
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now at Finland’s and Sweden’s doorstep.75 Unipolar use of strength to attain 
national interests was back on the agenda, backed up by the rising tide of 
information operations. Western hegemony was challenged globally by China 
and regionally in the Baltic Sea region, although not only there, by Russia. 
A state of flux, or interregnum, was evident in the international relations and 
a re-evaluation of existing policies was required. Finland’s and Sweden’s main 
response was a revision of the policies that they had been building since the 
1990s. Liquid neutrality was very much back on the agenda.
Re-establishing national military capability returned to the political agenda. 
Sweden opted for returning to national conscription and scrapped its heavy 
disarmament program coined at FMI2020 (which could be translated loosely 
as “Ideas for Future Defence”) in 1996.76 Sweden also reversed the various 
downshifting processes that narrowed the whole command structure into a sin-
gle command force. The doctrine of total defence was re-established. Heavy 
emphasis was given to the capabilities of the air force and the navy. The vulner-
ability of Gotland Island, a strategic base of operations aimed against the heart-
land of Sweden or for controlling the Baltic Sea, was duly noted. Russia’s Baltic 
vantage point could also increase pressure directly on Finland and Sweden.77 
Moreover, the Baltic area would also be useful for Russia as a way to increase the 
anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) range to prevent an attack on St. Petersburg. 
Another point of consideration would be the recently resurfaced question of 
Russian intermediate range missiles situated in Kaliningrad and Russia abandon-
ing the IMF treaty. Subsequently, in 2017, Sweden also announced its inten-
tions to purchase Patriot missile systems, usually only sold to close US allies or 
NATO members.78 The purchase of the antiballistic missile system is somewhat 
perplexing at first: Patriot missile systems have been reported to have serious 
flaws since the 1991 Gulf War, where the efficiency of the system appeared to 
be very limited. Although some of the data available have been classified, some 
of these evaluations are publicly available.79 The system since has been improved, 
but this also raises considerations about what the actual purpose of the system is. 
It does provide the idea or feeling of security, something to be done to counter 
the reported Russian missile allocation. In the case of Sweden, this was no doubt 
a show of (political) will (and readiness) on several levels. As a response to Russia 
moving new, nuclear-capable medium-range Iskander ballistic missiles to Kalin-
ingrad and supplementing them with heavy SAM protection since 2013 (and 
re-reported in 2018), it also signalled Sweden aligning with the United States 
and, to some extent, NATO. In turn, Finland was allowed to purchase air-to-
ground cruise missiles in order to cope with various threats such as A2/AD or 
ballistic missiles. These have been hard to come by even for NATO members.
Sweden continued gearing up. Stationing a permanent garrison of troops 
in Gotland was put back on the agenda for 2016–2018.80 The experiences 
from various international operations such as IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, 
OUP, RSM and Iraq were also put to use. Although technical, organisa-
tional and other interoperability and compatibility with NATO had already 
been achieved, the capability to use military forces together with NATO was 
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practised in the Swedish air operations over Libya in 2011 and in Afghanistan 
since 2014.81
While structural and operational alignment with the United States intensi-
fied, more emphasis was placed on Nordic cooperation. Above all, cooperation 
with Finland was considered a crucial way to strengthen the first line of Swed-
ish defence, while the Swedes were rebuilding their own capability.82
However, these operational solutions were not considered sufficient. Despite 
potential Russian opposition, Sweden (like Finland) sped up its NATO align-
ment process. In the public sphere, NATO membership became a hotly 
debated option, even if public opinion was still against it. Like Finland, Swe-
den ordered a review of the questions related to a potential alliance. In 2014, 
Sweden, like Finland, participated in the NATO Summit in Wales for the 
Enhanced Opportunities Program, which allowed friendly states to deepen 
their cooperation with NATO, for instance through participation in operation 
planning, military exercises and consultations. The drafting of the NATO-host 
agreement was initiated in 2014. Thus, by this time, neutrality had become 
very fluid. This is exemplified more by the Finnish white paper on defence 
(2017), which stated that the Finnish defence system is developed in such ways 
that there would not be any practical obstacles for a potential military alliance 
(in the future).83
Yet, despite increasing alignment with NATO, the state of total, societal pre-
paredness in Sweden was found wanting and could not be solved by either the 
means of potential defence and security cooperation or by alliances, as Björn 
von Sydow, the Chairman of the Swedish Defence Commission, pointed 
out. Although Article 3 of the NATO Charter recognises the importance of 
general societal resilience, this remains mainly a national responsibility. That 
Sweden is heavily reliant on imports of energy, food and other supplies and 
the whole economic structure is based on a ‘just-in-time’ model with limited 
storage constitute a considerable challenge for the doctrine of total defence 
and preparedness. This tendency is particularly illustrative in the case of Got-
land – an exposed yet key strategic island in need of extensive logistical lines 
of supply. Gaining help or support might take weeks or months, were it be 
provided at all.84
It is against this backdrop that NATO’s host-nation agreement sets in, as 
it focuses on enhancing capability to receive military supply, aid and assis-
tance. Despite some public reservations, Sweden ratified the Host Agreement 
Treaty in 2016. Yet even if Sweden and Finland (which also signed) are not 
full NATO members through the agreement, in practice they are sucked into 
the vortex of NATO operations – a state of affairs that puts them in a pickle. 
Although the treaty has a reserve clause of NATO troops requiring govern-
mental request from the host to utilise the reserved host areas, Sweden and Fin-
land are indirectly almost totally committed to the defence of the Baltic States 
through NATO. The reason for this is that in a crisis NATO would use the 
host option and saying no might be difficult. The cold logic of realpolitik is that 
a superpower would take the necessary steps to fulfil its own security needs, 
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irrespective of the views of Finnish or Swedish parliaments, as without Finland 
and Sweden, NATO would have a hard time defending the Baltic States.85
Even with higher military preparedness than Sweden, Finland also sped up 
its NATO alignment. Finland took part in various Western war games and 
trainings. In 1992, Finland selected US-made F-18s as the core of its air force, 
thus phasing out the old practise of making equal purchases from the East 
and the West alike (or from non-aligned states as an alternative to Western 
purchases).86 These planes are estimated to end their service life in 2030, thus 
requiring somewhat rapid replacement plans (HX-project).87 As of this writing, 
the consideration, bidding and evaluation are going on and lobbying on behalf 
of various respective candidates is somewhat heavy. Besides the actual cost of 
price per unit, the operating costs need to be assessed carefully or the chosen 
solution might become too costly. Moreover, also technical tactical, strategic, 
and above all, political consideration costs need to be assessed. Former Finnish 
Minister of Defence Elisabeth Rehn has, for instance, revealed that the deci-
sions for the acquisition of F-18s were conducted behind closed doors by three 
key ministers, not the full government, and furthermore, without informing 
the parliament or engaging in parliamentary debate.88
In 2014, Jarmo Lindberg, the commander of the Finnish Armed Forces 
signed a host nation memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Finland’s 
behalf. Mandate for this was given by the President of Finland Sauli Niinistö 
and the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, which operates 
under the Finnish Government.89 In public, and as a response to the criticism of 
the agreement, the MOU was stated to be about receiving military assistance. 
Adhering to the idea of liquid neutrality, the Finnish Ministry of Defence’s 
announcement of the agreement was as blunt as possible and revealed no details 
about the contents. A non-classified agreement was, however, attached to the 
issued statement – in English.90 Sweden signed a similar host-nation agreement 
at the same time, thus underlining the intertwined policies of the two Nordic 
states. The most important features of the MOU were:
2.1 The purpose of this MOU is to establish policy and procedures for the 
establishment of operational sites and the provision of H[ost] N[ation] 
S[tatement] to NATO forces in, or supported from the HN, during 
NATO military activities.
2.2 This MOU and its follow-on documents are intended to serve as the 
basis for planning by the appropriate HN authority and by NATO Com-
manders anticipating HNS arrangements for a variety of NATO military 
activities. These missions include those for which deploying forces have been 
identified and those for which forces are yet to be identified.91
In other words, it appears that the agreement allows for any type of missions 
to be deployed on the host nation’s soil. Moreover, the sites established for 
these missions are de facto under NATO command, and this is agreed to by the 
host nation, which will provide its fullest possible support for these missions. 
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Importantly, this agreement is in effect during peacetime and during conflicts, 
and it allows NATO forces to use the host’s national airspace and territorial 
waters. A recent development is the setting up of a permanent communications 
cable network on Finnish soil, which was installed as a part of the secret ‘Bold 
Quest’ manoeuvres.92 The aforementioned HX-fighter might also add to this 
series of technical arrangements, which can also serve as political security sig-
nalling. Furthermore, besides actual NATO alignment, other, bi- and trilateral 
arrangements and statements of intent have been prepared, the latest being the 
statement of intent of trilateral cooperation between Sweden, Finland and the 
United States.93 This attests to the idea of liquid neutrality enhancing various 
capabilities and options without full commitment.
Public opinion in both states had been adamantly opposed to applying for 
NATO membership. This notion was further enhanced by fears that a mem-
bership in one of the newly emerging blocs might jeopardise the two states’ 
national interests as well as their ability to conduct an independent and liq-
uid foreign policy, acting as brokers between the two conflicting blocs. How-
ever, the change also brought forward heavy criticism of semi-clandestinely 
and deliberately moving to full NATO membership  – a path taken gradu-
ally in previous years and decades.94 Re-estimations of the possible effects of 
NATO membership was ordered by both states. The Swedish report by Krister 
Bringéus was much more detailed, feels more like a formal policy paper, and 
contains detailed estimates with sources mentioned, whereas the Finnish ver-
sion, although commissioned by parliament and government and crafted by 
experts, was more like an executive summary and resembles an informal brief-
ing paper.95
If Finland and Sweden were to exchange their current liquid resilience for 
joining NATO formally, it might provide a formal deterrent and add to the 
region’s defence. It would not, however, remove the fact that even the tiniest 
change in the regional security puzzle would require some sort of response. 
This is clearly one of the reasons why the publicly promoted organisation of 
the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) has once more become a 
viable (or at least stop-gap) solution, while also being a way to circumvent the 
question of full NATO membership. It has become much more than a practical 
and flexible attempt to cut back on costs and to complement wider arrange-
ments on the EU and NATO level, as Håkon Lunde Saxi has proposed. Saxi 
has also mentioned that cooperation within the Nordic area itself has become a 
tool for bringing the Nordic states closer to NATO.96 Wider Nordic coopera-
tion includes two NATO members, thus enhancing the NATO compatibility 
of Sweden and Finland further. Subsequently, while the NATO alignment is 
under constant review, enhancing bilateral cooperation between Finland and 
Sweden appears to be at least the intermediate solution.97
Yet, there is one more point to bear in mind: potential membership is not 
guaranteed. President Donald Trump’s view and policies vis-à-vis the future of 
NATO and even more traditional bilateral approaches are ambivalent to say the 
least. NATO is undergoing challenges related to: (i) the grand US strategy now 
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emphasising the foreign policy importance of Asia; (ii) quarrels about members’ 
defence budgets; and (iii) the conflicting political interests of its members noted 
by Finns and Swedes.98 Interest in defending the Baltic States is ambivalent, and 
the capability to do so quickly enough is uncertain, even for those members 
who have committed to Article 5. This is even more the case, as while Finland 
and Sweden are not NATO members, they are obliged to take part in defend-
ing the Baltic States through the Lisbon Treaty.99 Some analysts add that they 
are not obliged to provide this kind of assistance, but overlook the clauses of the 
NATO-host agreement that the two have signed.
That being said, an efficient defence of the Baltic States is important to the 
grand strategies of Finland and Sweden. As NATO members, the commitment 
to their defence would be even greater. In either case, the ‘neutrality’ of both 
states would be negotiable, risking involvement in a conflict between the great 
powers. In that respect, it might be more attractive to become full members to 
attain the umbrella of collective defence as deterrent. However, Russia would 
be expected to react negatively. Finland joining NATO could be interpreted 
by Russia as a containment or encirclement that would require reaction. Rus-
sia today is in a much stronger military position than in the late 1990s or early 
2000s when it had to accept the rapid advancement of NATO and was more 
inclined to cooperate with it.
Conclusion
Sweden’s partnership with NATO is now rather generally accepted to be a 
continuation of a secret arrangement established in the early 1950s. This has 
been dubbed a ‘flexible foreign and security policy’100 and is not so far removed 
from the small-state realism that had previously dominated Nordic foreign pol-
icies. However, as we have demonstrated throughout this chapter, ‘flexible’ can 
be taken even further, as flexible foreign policy denotes a degree of reactivity in 
the face of security challenges. Our neologism of liquid neutrality seeks to push 
the argument from reactivity to proactivity. Like liquid, Nordic security think-
ing flowed into the cracks in a deliberatively active manner. For Finland, the 
partnership took shape when the country joined the EU. In practice, it meant 
that Finland copied the Swedish security solution that has two obvious advan-
tages: the informal security guarantees received from NATO, and the possibil-
ity to stay aloof in case a potential conflict with Russia would turn into open 
war in the Baltic region. This double standard has been noticed by the official 
member states of NATO and the Russians are also well aware of it.101 Accord-
ing to some Swedish commentators, Sweden’s informal NATO guarantees, 
presented in detail, for instance by investigate journalist Mikael Holmström in 
2015, are not in effect anymore.102
If we read the Swedish and Finnish NATO alignment policy in light of 
liquid neutrality and the proper historical context of the two states’ respective 
foreign and security policies, the decisions regarding NATO alignment appear 
to be contingent on the older policies, albeit with more nuances. Against the 
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backdrop of navigating between the interests of great powers in the realm of 
geopolitics, the alignment with NATO can be seen as a pragmatic approach 
of enhancing security capability and negotiating more room to manoeuvre. 
Moreover, it is security and foreign policy in its own right: signalling that 
the two states are not passive pawns of great power politics. Instead, they are 
active, proactive, and subjects on their own merit, acting according to their 
own national interests. The most important of these interests is securing sov-
ereignty and national survival by the means available and necessary. Therefore, 
the NATO policy of the two states continues the past politics in new surround-
ings with other means and therefore ought not raise the level of apprehension 
currently appearing in the public discussion.
If we, however, understand the shocks caused by the changes in the inter-
national system, namely Russian assertiveness, and consider this from the point 
of view of vested national interests and increased ‘path dependency’ on NATO, 
the formulation of Nordic security policies appear to be different. The current 
state of interregnum has revealed the gradual alterations to the age-old doctrine 
of non-alignment and neutrality. The revelation of changes that have taken 
place since the 1990s have occasionally caused shock effects in the population, 
leading to fading trust in political institutions. As the Cold War paradigm kept 
the more pragmatic foreign and security policy firmly outside public purview, 
relying on high-level official liturgy, it is all the more understandable that public 
reactions have varied widely.
The publicly presented estimates of the potential outcomes, plans and risk 
analysis of these plans appear as a clandestine inching towards NATO. As the 
majority of the population in both states are still against full membership, this 
causes alarm. This is not helped at all by the vast and multifaceted media cov-
erage103 on the matter, which includes all forms of information activity rang-
ing from amateur pundits to scholarly analyses, outright lobbying, politicking 
and informal policy reviews often void of any deep insight. Finnish media 
has covered the NATO debate rather intensively. In his doctoral dissertation 
concerning the Finnish-NATO media coverage, Juho Rahkonen collected, in 
addition to radio and TV material, over 1,300 pieces of NATO-related print 
media pieces from 2003 to 2004 alone. Rahkonen stated that the membership 
debate started immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 
and media has been mostly marching to the beat of pro-NATO drum, stating 
membership is inevitable. One of the overlooked aspects Rahkonen mentions 
has been the logic within the media, which has enhanced the reporting due 
to requirements of gaining ‘news wins’ and dramatic headlines. These have 
been put together in various news pieces stating that Finland has been pushed 
towards full NATO membership against the will of the people and by clan-
destine and backroom deals. Another important feature Rahkonen mentions 
has been the lack of actual communication and exchange of views. Instead, 
the media coverage and political discussions have been talking past each other. 
In Finland, the recent mainstream NATO debate on the media has revolved 
mainly around the opinion polls and surveys about the pro and contra views of 
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potential membership. The percentage of Finnish population supporting Finn-
ish NATO membership has steadily declined. The highest percentage in favour 
of membership has never exceeded 30 per cent. Forty-nine per cent thought 
Finland was not non-aligned anymore, 52 per cent were opposed to joining 
NATO, and 59 per cent were against joining if Sweden joined.104 However, 
some reporting has emphasised that the percentage of Finns opposing NATO 
membership has decreased, which testifies to the different framing of the topic 
per media alignment and pollsters.105
In Finland, the tendency to closely follow Swedish intentions (and vice 
versa, to lesser extent) and activities adds to the problematic situation. It partly 
diffuses agency from Finland’s own hands into the hands of Swedish policy-
makers. Also, this deflects from the ideal of transparent Nordic parliamentary 
democracy in which the citizens have wide access to political participation 
and setting the agenda. However, the high-ranking experts who published a 
government-commissioned report on the possible effects of Finnish NATO 
membership considered in 2016 that the Finnish and Swedish NATO debates 
and policies were closely intertwined.106
In order to address this notion of a democratic paradox, a more concise 
and detailed analysis of the past activities, media coverage, interests, gains and 
risks needs to be made available for the greater public. Also the differences 
of the two states’ situations and interests need to be acknowledged openly 
instead of almost alarmistically following the ‘other’. Although this sense of 
alarmism, especially in Finland, originates from the historical experiences of 
‘being left alone’, for example in the case of the EU membership applica-
tions, also the differences between Finnish and Swedish national interests 
needs to be addressed properly and information should be made available for 
the public.
Thus, besides the de facto security challenges and perpetual geopolitical 
dilemmas the two states are facing in this era of international interregnum, 
there is another paradox to consider. In order to foster the legitimacy of the 
political systems and culture, the existing paradoxes and issues mentioned 
in this chapter need to be addressed in detail. Otherwise, the multifaceted 
NATO debate might contribute to the deterioration of legitimacy for estab-
lished representative political democracy. In addition, it needs to be made 
clear that the various, mainly technical arrangements that have been made 
in order to increase the two states’ NATO compatibility have had politi-
cal backing. No such technical arrangements could be made without policy 
 guidance – and if they have been, alarmism is truly called for. A clarifica-
tion of, for instance, the stances of the different political parties, at least, 
would enable the people to find out what their representatives are advocat-
ing, thereby enabling a democratic choice. The problems originating from 
the lack of trust in the international system during this era of interregnum 
and the subsequent liquid security policy responding to this situation might 
contribute in enhancing mistrust in domestic politics, political culture and 
politicians. One can sit on the fence only for so long. However, it will remain 
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a balancing act how to combine such democratic procedures with the need 
to keep certain national interests classified.
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6  The decline of Nordic social 
democracy
Kjell Östberg
Social democracy’s present crisis
Social democracy has generally been considered one of the most successful 
political forces of the 1900s. In particular, the 30 post-war “golden years” – the 
century’s most prosperous period – have been closely associated with social 
democracy and seen as the standard bearer of modernization and the solidaric 
welfare society. The Nordic countries have taken an obvious leading position 
in this development and are viewed in a special light.1 The Nordic model, 
building on the institutionalized, corporatist collaboration between capital, 
labour and state and long extolled as a successful compromise between a com-
munist planned economy and free market capitalism, has close links to Nordic 
social democracy.
Twenty years ago, social democracy was Europe’s leading force. Its lead-
ers were Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair, Lionel Jospin  – and Nordic leaders 
Göran Persson, Paavo Lipponen, Jens Stoltenberg and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. 
Twelve of the prime ministers who made up the Council of the European 
Union were Social Democrats, and the so-called Third Way promised to give 
answers to the challenges of a globalized society.2
The organizational home of Nordic social democracy has been the Social 
Democratic parties; working-class dominated mass parties with deep roots in 
trade unions and popular movements. Today, international social democracy 
is in deep crisis, ideologically, politically and organizationally. In recent years, 
Social Democrats have suffered dramatic defeats in a series of parliamentary 
elections. The German Social Democratic Party, which for long periods of 
time has been the most powerful in Europe, has been overshadowed by Angela 
Merkel since 2005. In the fall election of 2017, it lost 5 per cent of its votes, 
ending up at a record low of 20 per cent. In the European election of 2019, it 
sank to 15 per cent. The French socialists had a catastrophic election in 2017, 
getting a mere 6 per cent of the votes in the presidential election; their man-
dates in the national assembly dropped from 280 to 30. In the Netherlands, the 
party went from 25 per cent of the vote to 5.7 per cent. In Austria in 2016, the 
social-democratic presidential candidate received 11 per cent of the votes and 
was defeated in the first round.
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Nordic social democracy, long viewed as the jewel in the crown of inter-
national social democracy, is no longer an exception.3 It is true that Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark in the summer of 2019 have Social Democratic prime 
ministers, but the election support for all three is at a historic low. In Sweden, 
the Social Democratic Party has lost 40 per cent of its voters and two-thirds 
of its members over the last decades. To be able to lead a fragile coalition gov-
ernment together with the Green Party, the Swedish Social Democrats were 
forced to accept harsh political concessions to bourgeois parties, in the same 
way the Danish party did when it accepted much of the immigration policy of 
populist and xenophobic Dansk Folkeparti.
This chapter will, by focusing on Sweden, discuss the situation of Nordic 
social democracy against the backdrop of the developments of recent decades. 
Despite some clear distinctions between them, the parties will all be seen to 
share a special Nordic tradition. By way of introduction I will formulate two 
possible explanations for the development of international social democracy. 
The analysis will follow two red threads, one political and one organizational.
In the mid-20th century, to follow the political thread, social democracy 
formulated an objective that found more mass support than any other leftist 
idea: to offer citizens protection against the inequalities created by an unregu-
lated market.4 According to one thesis, social democracy’s decline is associated 
with the fact that it has abandoned this policy.
Social democracy’s ability to translate its ambition into reality, to follow the 
organizational thread, is also dependent on the party’s historical ability to build 
strong movements with deep social anchors that offered significant potential 
for implementing its policy.5 My thesis is that these movements are, at present, 
eroding. Underlying these questions is the role of social democracy in the 
democratization of society.
What is social democracy? An organizational definition
When researchers try to describe what social democracy is, they have some-
times made use of a “broad” definition and a “narrow” one. One might say that 
these correspond to the aforementioned political and organizational levels.6
The narrow definition is based on the movement and its history. Its point 
of departure describes parties that have their roots in the (industrial) working 
class but at the same time are part of a larger movement. Trade unions have 
often been a central part of this movement, as have a number of other citizen 
organizations. The pattern varies from nation to nation. For a century, the 
working class in Nordic countries has been among the world’s best organized. 
At its peak, the Swedish Social Democratic Party had 1.23 million members, in 
a country with a population of 8 million. Three-fourths of the party members 
were affiliated through the trade-union movement. For a long time, between 
80 and 90 per cent of workers were members of the LO, the Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation.
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The party’s Youth League was long dominated by the working class. There 
was a Women’s League, and children were organized into the Young Eagles 
(Unga örnar). At its height, the so-called A-Press published some 30 social 
democratic daily newspapers. However, the social democratic family extended 
still further. Most important was the LO with more than 2 million members 
in the 1980s. The Workers’ Educational Association (ABF) organized up to a 
hundred thousand study circles and lectures in a single year, and there were 
1,000 people’s houses around the country. Organizations such as the Swedish 
National Pensioners’ Organization (PRO) and the Swedish Union of Tenants 
(Hyresgästföreningen), with hundreds of thousands of members, could also 
unquestionably be seen as part of the movement. Furthermore, an extensive 
cooperative consumer movement (KF) collaborated closely with the party 
as did the insurance company Folksam; HSB, a cooperative housing society; 
a film production company; advertising firms; and even a national chain of 
undertakers. Hundreds of thousands of members held positions in local poli-
tics.7 People could spend their whole lives, from cradle to grave, within the 
social democratic movement.
Even though Social Democratic Party influence in other Nordic countries 
has not been equally hegemonic, particularly in Finland and Denmark, social 
democracy has often been described as the “people’s movement party”. The 
parties can be characterized as socially imbedded institutions that are bearers 
of a specific political culture with clear democratic functions. The parties suc-
ceeded in organizing, mobilizing and socializing large groups that had previ-
ously been without political influence, first and foremost the working class. 
They contributed actively in creating a collective identity that became the basis 
for political activity. But they also contained a broader democratic potential, 
exceeding parliamentary institutions. In these milieus political demands and 
projects could be discussed, formulated and implemented between elections 
and the limits of politics could be challenged and widened.
A political definition
The broad definition of social democracy is, meanwhile, used in an attempt 
to single out some central features of a common reformist ideology that Social 
Democrats tried to translate into political action. Several terms inspired by 
the English Social Democrat Anthony Crossland sum it up: democracy, mixed 
economy, welfare state, equality. To this we usually add further specifications: 
on the one hand, corporatism, the institutionalized cooperation between capital, 
labour and state; on the other decommodification, a welfare state limiting the 
influence of markets.8
After the Second World War there was a sort of symbiosis between capi-
tal’s wish for mass production and the people’s wish for mass democracy. The 
strength of the economy, it was argued, depended on the welfare of the wage 
labourers.9 Economic development was driven by the 30 golden years of the 
post-war era, the longest and strongest boom in international capitalism.
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The Fordist welfare state developed into something that, from different 
political standpoints, was seen as a legitimate means by which the state could 
intervene in developments on behalf of democracy, social security and efficient 
markets. This intervention was seen as the solution to problems posed by capi-
talism and industrial society.10
But in that case, what distinguished the Social Democrats from other liberal 
and bourgeois forces? The latter were willing to put up with greater govern-
ment intervention in exchange for stimulated productivity and an infrastructure 
appropriate to the new conditions of production. For the Social Democrats, 
Keynes made it possible to merge the interests of the working class with the goal 
of national growth. Economic planning, full employment, expansion of the wel-
fare state with a clear general building programme, redistribution of resources to 
compensate for inequalities created by the market, greater equality – all this could 
be located, at least as stated goals, within the framework of the reformist project.11
In the Nordic countries, this was social democracy’s greatest moment. In 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the party was in government for most of the 
1950s and the 1960s. The working class was larger than ever, and three-fourths 
of the workers voted for the Social Democrats. In Finland, the situation was 
different, but in the 1970s the party gained influence both politically and 
organizationally.
A clever reform policy, which gained international notoriety, also caused 
significant portions of the middle class to share the reformist ambitions of the 
party. These fitted nicely into basic capitalist structures. Real departures from 
the market economy were yet to take place. Left-wing critics could, with stri-
dent bitterness, ask if a class compromise during an economic boom was all 
social democracy could accomplish.
Around 1970, things took a new, more radical course, especially where the 
Swedish welfare state was concerned. This can, to a large degree, be explained 
by a forceful shift in the spirit of the time. In Sweden, as elsewhere, the radi-
calization of the 1960s began with a youth movement characterized by inter-
national solidarity, new Marxist thinking and the appearance of a series of 
new social movements. These groups often criticized the Social Democrats 
for being bureaucratic and ideologically shallow. Instead of flagging after 1968, 
radicalization deepened and spread to additional sections of society, reaching a 
climax in the mid-1970s. The new women’s movement also affected traditional 
women’s associations, while the environmental movement succeeded in put-
ting a stop to the expansion of Swedish nuclear power.
The workers’ movement was also greatly affected. A notorious mining strike 
in 1969/70 triggered a wave of wildcat strikes, showing that central parts of the 
Swedish working class had joined the radical movement. At the same time, the 
social democratic workers’ movement had never been larger, stronger, or better 
organized. Forty years in power had given the party experience, competence 
and self-confidence.
The reforms undertaken during these years were the most extensive ever 
implemented in Sweden. The manner in which the welfare state was organized 
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was also of great importance. There was a striking degree of movement away 
from market dependence and toward an increasingly decommodified system. 
Everything from schools to day care to healthcare and care of the elderly was 
financed, owned and run by the public sector. The public sector became the 
spearhead of the social transformation.12
The best indication of how far the workers’ movement was willing to go 
is the fact that the LO, which traditionally belonged to the less radical part of 
the workers movement, endorsed the proposal to create so-called employee 
funds. This proposal, had it had been implemented, would have meant that 
the major part of today’s Swedish business sector would have been owned by 
trade unions.13 A similar development, if less dramatic, took place in the other 
Nordic nations.
The welfare regimes dominated by social democrats were far from unprob-
lematic from a democratic point of view. They gained their power from struc-
tures organized by and for the masses. But they were led by bureaucracies. 
These were necessary if the parties were to function as mass organizations, 
in order to maintain ties to the masses – but also fulfilling their functions as 
parliamentary and corporate structures. As the years passed, and the workers’ 
movement expanded its influence in various public agencies, critical voices 
were raised against a growing tendency towards autocracy.14
The end of the golden years: politics and market
As suddenly and unexpectedly as post-war social democracy had entered its 
golden age, suddenly – and unexpectedly, at least to many Social Democrats – 
the decline set in. The long-lasting post-war boom petered out and a series of 
crises took its place. They were structural crises associated with great changes 
taking place in global capitalism. They had serious consequences for the 
employment rate and standards-of-living, and also led to extensive ideological 
shifts, not least in perceptions of the welfare state. Keynesian economic policy 
no longer worked. Stagflation, a combination of the two worst alternatives, 
inflation and economic stagnation, became a new phenomenon.15
A central tenet of the perception developed by bourgeois actors was the idea 
that politics had gained too much influence in the market. The solution was 
to let loose capitalism’s self-healing powers, to emphasize the primacy of the 
market rather than politics. Once again, global economic developments greatly 
influenced democracy. In this context, the broad-based mass democracy asso-
ciated with the welfare states was seen as a particularly great problem. Such a 
view stood in direct contraposition to the ideal that had come to be associated 
with post-war social democracy.
The issue of the relationship between market and democracy has, during 
recent years, received much attention and has been critically examined by lead-
ing social scientists.16 One focus concerns the gradual move away from redis-
tributive mass democracy.
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The welfare state has shrunk and, to a large degree, been integrated into 
the market economy. The efforts toward decommodification, which had been 
notable in Sweden, have diminished or ceased altogether. A  series of social 
regulations introduced during the post-war years has been repealed, as was the 
case where labour laws are concerned, which has resulted in precarity, wage 
dumping and the suppression of union rights. Another factor is the effect of 
growing state debt. This has contributed to a situation in which less and less of 
the state’s resources could be used for financing new reforms.
Politicians also made important decisions divesting themselves of power over 
economic policy. In Sweden, this development began in the second half of 
the 1980s, with symbolically significant decisions to deregulate banking and 
to allow the exchange rate to float. In 1990, it was decided that the goal of a 
maximum of 2 per cent inflation was to take priority over low unemployment. 
When the national bank became independent of political regulation in 1999, 
the politicians left crucial parts of macro-economic policy up to economists, 
often recruited from the banking sector.
Another sign of circumscribed space for extensive political intervention 
in the market economy is the trend towards increasing regulation of political 
activity. This is meant to tie the hands of supposedly irresponsible and med-
dlesome politicians. The Swedish budgetary legislation is an example of this. 
When Sweden joined the EU in 1994, many decisions were moved beyond the 
purview of democratically elected politicians.17
Challenges to reformist politics
Clearly all this hit social democracy hard. It was a challenge to their strongest 
card – Keynes and the attempts to regulate the market, using an expanding 
public sector as a lever for reducing market power. The crisis has also directly 
hit the movement’s base, the industrial working class. This was, in part, a result 
of a significant decline in the number of industrial jobs; it was also in part 
because the common experience of shared struggle that had played such a large 
part in the creation of the workers’ movement had become somewhat moth-
eaten during the golden years. It was further diluted as the trade unions were 
weakened and increasingly attacked.
It was a rude awakening. In one country after another, the Social Democrats 
have been forced – or have chosen – to adapt to these new conditions, usu-
ally as a result of acute political and/or economic crises. Instead of nostalgi-
cally looking backwards towards the policies of a different era, European Social 
Democrats, initially inspired by New Labour, entered into a dialogue concern-
ing the important issues of this new era, such as globalization, information 
technology and individualization. In order to participate in this discourse, they 
accepted its fundamental conditions: monetarism; a freer, deregulated market; 
a balanced budget; low inflation rather than less unemployment; diminished 
income transfer (that is, greater gaps in income); and privatization. The welfare 
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system and the public sector had to be streamlined, slimmed down, shrunk but 
not abolished. Capitalism was to be streamlined and the Social Democrats were 
once again to be the bearers of modernism.18
At the same time, the EU was seen as an opportunity to implement part 
of the programme that seemed impossible to accomplish at the national level. 
However, the hopes raised by the social dimensions of various EU treaties, from 
Amsterdam and Lisbon to Gothenburg 2017, have only to a very small extent 
translated into binding agreements. It is a common perception among research-
ers that the crucial obstacle hampering the realization of a social Europe is built 
into the structures of the EU. As a matter of fact, according to the Greek social 
scientist Gerassimo Moschonas, the EU undermines three of the classic, funda-
mental features of social democracy: faith in the state, faith in the primacy of 
politics and a welfare policy related to the working class.19
In the introduction, social democracy was sketched out in general terms. 
This broad definition was an attempt to capture some central features of a com-
mon reformist ideology. It was based on the assumption that Social Democrats 
and capitalists shared an interest in creating the best possible conditions for 
economic growth including both state regulation and the welfare state. This, 
in turn, could take forms that allowed politics to limit the power of capital. 
Clearly the preconditions for this platform have been undermined. Today, to 
put it mildly, capital’s wish to join in common projects with the workers’ move-
ment is minimal, and social democracy’s programme for curbing the market is 
not particularly concrete. After the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the European 
Social Democrats were to pay the price for this.
The crisis of the 1930s had been the beginning of the social democrat suc-
cess story. An important reason was that Social Democrats succeeded in offer-
ing a successful alternative to the economic liberalism of the time. The Social 
Democrats had no such alternative to propose in 2008. Clearly the EU has 
played an important role in this context.
The EU has gradually developed from being an economic-political union 
to being primarily a tool for the implementation of neo-liberal policy. In the 
Maastricht and Lisbon treaties, monetarism was codified as a foundation for 
EU economic policy. When the euro was introduced, most countries were 
formally bound to implement a monetary economic policy and far-reaching 
market reforms. With the arrival of the troika – which includes not only the 
ECB and the EU Commission but also the IMF, an authority over which the 
EU has no control at all – the final say in European politics has been placed 
with a hydra without formal judicial or political standing and beyond demo-
cratic oversight.20
The post-financial crisis policy, imposed by Brussels and Frankfurt with an 
iron hand, has torn Europe apart. The severe cutbacks forced upon those in the 
periphery of the monetary union have led to income gaps and social misery 
of a kind that had not been seen in Europe for decades – without succeeding 
to put an end to the economic turbulence that began with the financial crisis 
nearly ten years ago.
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In none of these cases have the Social Democrats raised objections. On the 
contrary, all the leaders of the European social democracy have assented to 
this development. In many cases, indeed, they have been the ones to crack the 
whip over countries that could not sufficiently meet the demands of the mar-
ket. As is well known, Greece is an especially pitiful example. The European 
Social Democrats have acted in like manner when it comes to the EU’s other 
great failure, the refugee question. The refugee crisis, to a substantial extent 
a result of EU intervention in the Middle East  – from the invasion of Iraq 
and onwards – is a humanitarian and social catastrophe. It is also an expres-
sion of a moral collapse on the part of the EU, which has not only refused to 
take responsibility for preventing further human suffering, but whose cynical 
behaviour has further contributed to strengthening the rapidly growing xeno-
phobic forces in Europe.21
Social Democrats have simply abandoned what was, during their years of 
success, their strongest talking point  – the prioritizing of political concerns 
over market interests. They have consciously refrained from proposing any kind 
of alternative policy and have actively contributed to tying their own hands. 
And they have made a virtue out of this necessity. By concentrating entirely 
on trying to win over the middle class, Social Democrats have tried to erase 
differences between the political blocs. In countries like Germany and Fin-
land, Social Democrats have formed coalitions with bourgeois parties. In other 
countries, such as Spain and the Nordic countries, right- and left-wing parties 
take turns being in power, without either making significant political changes.22
A decreasing movement
But the narrow definition of social democracy has also been affected by the 
neoliberal turn. The space in which traditional mass parties  – not least the 
Social Democrats – operate has changed fundamentally.23 This neoliberal turn 
created a larger gap between citizens and their representatives. What had previ-
ously made the party members essential – the election of party leaders, financ-
ing activities, input into policy formation and implementation – is no longer 
necessary. Sponsorships and state subsidies have made membership fees less 
important to party budgets. Public surveys have replaced input from member-
ship organizations. Media and PR consultants spread the parties’ messages more 
effectively and directly than the members can.
Party leaders are being recruited from an increasingly narrow social circle, 
different from those of party members and voters. Party leadership has become 
professionalized and career paths become more and more alike from party to 
party. The loyalties of the leaders also increasingly lie with the political class. 
The tendency to form a new political class is reinforced by a general consensus 
on policy, or from there being, at least, little scope for a change of political 
course.24 A fight for the middle has, of course, characterized politics for the 
last decades. Engagement in political parties has dwindled. Voter loyalty to a 
party has also weakened significantly, as it has become increasingly common 
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to change party preferences between elections. The post-war mass parties have 
developed into professional “catch-all-parties”.25
This development has had obvious socio-economic consequences. Those 
who first and foremost have lost confidence in politics and have distanced 
themselves most from political participation are those who are hardest hit by 
the growing social gaps that have developed in the wake of policy changes. 
The emergence of populist right-wing parties can, to a certain degree, be seen 
as a reaction to this development. This, of course, has particular consequences 
for the social-democratic mass parties.26 Large sectors of what used to be social 
democracy’s base of popular movements have weakened, even eroded.
There are several reasons for this. One has to do with changes in class struc-
ture and social composition. The size of the industrial working class that had 
formed the social base for social democracy has diminished greatly. This is due 
to the almost complete disappearance of the many factory towns – often built 
around one factory – in which social democracy had been hegemonic. Voting 
according to class, with two-thirds of the LO’s members voting social democrat 
and most of the remainder voting for other left-wing parties, has dwindled 
in the new millennium. In the election of 2018 only 40 per cent of the LO’s 
members voted for Social Democrats.
The social composition of the party’s membership has changed. Workers 
are very much underrepresented in political congregations of party members, 
and even more as a proportion of voters. Their relative scarcity becomes more 
palpable the further up the hierarchy one goes. The proportion of “politi-
cal broilers” – party leaders who have never been part of the workforce – has 
grown dramatically.27
For a long time, values based on the workers movement’s egalitarian ideals 
were dominant, even within the right-leaning strata of the Social Democratic 
Party. As the party’s recruitment base changed, the hold these values have on 
the party has loosened. This may also be in response to the party’s policies 
becoming increasingly adapted to the market. When they leave politics, social-
democratic top politicians continue their careers within the private sector, 
something that was unimaginable a few generations ago.
Another central factor is the weakening of the social movements from which 
social democracy sprang. Sweden’s LO has lost half a million members over the 
last ten years. For the first time since the 1930s, the proportion of organized 
workers in the party is below 70 per cent. Social-democratic cooperatives have 
been commercialized, People’s Houses to a large extent have been sold or shut 
down, and the social-democratic press has gone bankrupt.
All the parties’ memberships have collapsed. A  crucial change took place 
when the LO, in the early 1990s, abolished collective membership in the Social 
Democratic Party. Until then, the party had had more than 1.2 million mem-
bers. In 1992, the number was still a quarter of a million. Today, the number 
has sunk to 90,000, and the average age of its members is 60. With the par-
tial collapse of the social-democratic youth association (SSU), the party lost 
what had traditionally been its most important source of leadership recruits 
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for different leadership levels. In Finland, social-democratic membership has 
shrunk by more than a half over a couple of decades, and the workers move-
ment’s “red machines” have suffered a severe loss of power.28
The EU’s two major failures – first, its inability to hold the Union together 
socially and economically after the financial crisis of 2008 and, second, the 
migration question – led to the consequences mentioned previously. In Swe-
den, the Social Democrats have found themselves trapped within frameworks 
created by these two issues.
While the Swedish economy has grown in recent years, Sweden’s economic 
and social gaps have increased more than in most OECD countries. The series 
of tax reforms that were implemented by social-democratic governments before 
2006 and by the conservative government between 2006 and 2014 benefited 
primarily society’s upper echelons.29
At the same time, the foundation of the solidaric welfare state has eroded. 
Social security increases, as well as increases in subsidies such as child benefits, 
have lagged behind inflation.30 The continued privatization of care and educa-
tion has undermined the political control of a previously public-run welfare 
apparatus and has created new fissures, especially within the educational sector. 
The return of a social democratic government in 2014 merely led to minor 
adjustments of this policy.
The most spectacular outcome of the 2014 election was the rise of the 
right-wing, populist Sweden Democrats. They succeeded in doubling their 
votes to 13 per cent, which meant that none of the traditional political blocs 
was able to form a majority. Unlike their sister parties in Denmark and Nor-
way, the Sweden Democrats have their roots in openly racist and pro-Nazi 
organizations.31 Since the late 1990s, a new generation of young leaders has 
successfully managed to build an effective party organization, starting from 
local strongholds in southern Sweden. Xenophobia and anti-immigration have 
been the party’s main ideological platforms and the main reasons they have 
been able to win votes. With increasing parliamentary influence, the party has 
made efforts to downplay its more openly racist rhetoric, expelling some of its 
most enthusiastic representatives. The party has also lately tried to stress the 
national-conservative features of its programme, in imitation of similar trends 
in Poland and Hungary. The Sweden Democrats’ economic and welfare poli-
cies, in fact, resembled those of the Conservative Party. For a long time there 
was a de facto agreement between the traditional parliamentary parties that 
the Sweden Democrats should be isolated; all were to refrain from involving 
them in negotiations. This was one reason why Sweden’s right-wing parties 
accepted the red-green coalition in 2014.
The huge numbers of refugees in 2014 and 2015 – Sweden received 80,000 
in 2014, 160,000 in 2015 – changed the political situation almost overnight. 
Before October 2015, there was broad consensus that Swedes were prepared 
to “open their hearts” – to quote former Conservative Party leader Fredrik 
Reinfeldt. Initially, only Sweden Democrats criticized the massive immigra-
tion. When the party started to grow and shortcomings in the organization 
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of the reception of refugees became obvious, most leading parties, including 
the Social Democrats, agreed to put an immediate stop to the influx and re-
adjust Swedish immigration policy to conform to the EU’s minimum  criteria. 
This change was more than a formal adaptation to new conditions. It was 
accompanied by a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments, anti-Muslim agitation 
and demands from the traditional parties  – including the governing Social 
 Democrats – for tougher legislation against what were claimed to be crimes 
committed by immigrants.32
Just before the election of 2018, the Social Democrats’ policies took a turn 
to the right, not only concerning immigrant-related legislation but also in 
terms of attitudes towards law and order. In 2017, Sweden was hit by a terrorist 
attack. At the same time, attention was drawn to a series of fatal shootings that 
became associated with criminal gangs of immigrant background. Now the 
Sweden Democrats were no longer alone in demanding more severe penalties 
for crimes that were alleged to be linked to immigration.
Clearly one reason for the change in policy was the threat posed to both 
Social Democrats and Conservatives by the Sweden Democrats. As could have 
been predicted by looking at experiences in other countries, the change of tac-
tics did not work. The Sweden Democrats continued to grow at the expense 
of these two parties in particular. The result of the most recent election in 
2018 confirms this conclusion. The Social Democrats’ votes fell to 28 per cent, 
their lowest result since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1921. The 
Conservatives lost even more, falling by 3.5 per cent. Meanwhile, the Sweden 
Democrats reached 17.5 per cent, an increase of almost 5 per cent.
A majority of the working class is not voting left any more. Thirty years ago 
70 per cent of the working class voted Social Democrat (and another 10 per 
cent Communist). In 2014, 53 per cent of the members of the LO voted Social 
Democrat; in 2018, only 40 per cent (and another 10 per cent for the Left 
party).33 The outcome changed the political landscape in several regards. The 
result led to a stalemate between the two traditional political blocs. To be able 
to take over the government, the Conservatives together with the Christian 
Democrats were prepared to pass the demarcation line that until then existed 
between the traditional political parties and the xenophobic right-wing popu-
lists and form a government with a de facto support of the Sweden Democrats.
This attempt was blocked by the two liberal parties who broke up a long-
time alliance with the Conservatives and decided to support a social democratic 
government. The support was not without costs. The Social Democrats had 
to accept a political agreement forcing the government to carry out a robust 
neoliberal programme, including increased privatization of the welfare sector, 
lower taxes for the wealthy and higher rents for tenants. Perhaps most contro-
versial was an agreement that threatened to weaken the influence of the trade 
unions.
The political development of the last few decades has been discussed mainly 
from a top-down perspective. Few of the reforms and political course changes 
implemented by the Social Democrat leaders were instituted due to pressure 
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from below. On the contrary, each departure from traditional social-democratic 
policy has met with extensive protests. When the first step was taken toward 
a neoliberal policy focused on deregulation in the 1980s, the result was the 
so-called War of the Roses, with the LO leading the critical charge. A major-
ity of the social-democratic electorate voted against joining the EU in the 
1990s. The new, individual-based and market-oriented pension system that 
was implemented at the same time failed to get support from any of the social-
democratic party congresses that discussed the issue. In spite of its great efforts, 
the social-democratic government did not manage to push through Sweden’s 
inclusion in the European Monetary Union (EMU) after the turn of the 21st 
century. Over the last years, opposition to further erosion of the public sector 
has primarily focused on education, healthcare and other care activities and 
the emergence of large, for-profit organizations within the tax-funded welfare 
sector.34
The outcome of the 2018 elections has created further protests among trade 
unions and rank-and-file members of the party. However, this has not had any 
deeper impact on the party leadership. It is obvious that the Swedish Social 
Democrats have chosen to continue the road also taken by several other Euro-
pean Social Democrats. There are few reasons to believe that the results would 
be different in Sweden.
In Finland, the Social Democrats after the 2019 parliamentary elections were 
able to form a centre-left government. The party made some gains and became 
the largest, but only got 17.7 per cent of the vote and came in just slightly 
ahead of the right populist True Finns. The result is far below the vote levels of 
what the party used to attract a couple of decades ago.
The combination of the strengthening positions of the global market econ-
omy, the declining space for political decisions, the decreasing ambitions of the 
social democratic leadership and the gradual vanishing of the movement that 
once constituted the democratic core of the social democratic movement has 
led to a fundamentally altered condition for political mobilization and actions 
and, by extension, for the future of democracy.
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7  Conservatives at the 
crossroads
Cooperating or resisting 
extremism and populism?
Torbjörn Nilsson
Right-wing populist parties have gained support and been successful in national 
elections in the past few decades, including in the formerly stable Nordic party 
systems. This is challenging not only for the traditional democratic right, but 
for the Nordic Model as well. Established in the authoritarian 1930s and helped 
by the successful concept “the People’s Home”, the model now fights for its 
survival. In this chapter, I will compare how the conservative parties reacted to 
threats from right-wing extremism in the 1930s and in the first decades of the 
new millennium, analyzing how they balanced strategies of cooperation and 
resistance and how they tried to modify or isolate the new parties.
During the 1930s, the Nordic democracies were threatened by the rise of 
National Socialism and various other forms of right-wing extremism. Most 
vulnerable were the conservative parties and especially their youth leagues, 
where many members listened to the siren calls from Italy and Germany.
Without discussing the concept of populism in this chapter, “right-wing 
populist” will be used for today’s parties that also can be described as “national 
conservative” or “extreme right” That does not prevent elements of social 
 radicalism – at least favoring the ethnic majority.
The tensions between liberal-conservative parties and right-wing populists 
are rarely studied in a historical perspective. My intention is to compare the 
past few decades with the 1930s when parts of the conservative parties became 
pro-Nazi. Undoubtedly, the older opponents differed from today’s parties that 
are trying to become legitimate parts of the system. However, the problem of 
the democratic right has been the same: distance themselves from the new par-
ties or cooperate with them? By taking-off in the 1930s and ending in contem-
porary politics, this study at the same time illuminates conservative strategies 
and the difficulties for the Nordic Model.
Varying strategies have been used in the Nordic countries, and there are dif-
ferences between the strategies of today and those of the 1930s. How crucial 
to the decision-making process were the overall differences between the 1930s 
and post-2000, for example the emergence and strengthening of the Nordic 
model in the intervening period, and what is the role of differences in national 
political cultures?
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I will first discuss the conservative parties and the right-wing extremism in 
each country in the 1930s.1 How strong were the new challengers? This is fol-
lowed by a corresponding discussion about the past few decades. Then the two 
periods can be compared to explore similarities and differences. Are there ele-
ments of a Nordic conservative consensus in how to act against extreme parties 
to the right? If so, did or does any country tend to diverge from the pattern, 
either in the 1930s or today? The wider question of how vulnerable the Nordic 
model is to the progress of the extreme parties will also be discussed.
Conservatism and right-wing extremism in the 1930s
The established conservative parties
Denmark. The Conservative People’s Party (Konservative Folkeparti, KF) was 
established in 1915, succeeding the more aristocratic and traditional Right Party 
(Høyre).2 The new party mixed liberal and conservative positions, mostly sup-
porting the liberal farmers’ Left party (Venstre). With John Christmas Møller 
as chairman, a more independent course was introduced in 1929. Christmas 
Møller, supported by the Conservative Youth League (Konservative Ungdom, 
KU), gained new sympathizers by stressing social and national matters. The 
membership of the KU doubled from 1932 to 1936, from 15,000 to 30,000. 
The KF gathered 60,000 members, so the Youth League was an important part 
of the conservative family, especially in the election campaigns. In the elections 
in 1932–1938, the conservatives reached 17–19 percent of the vote.
Norway. The Right party (Høyre) was already established in 1884, much 
earlier than other Nordic conservative parties.3 The main opponent, the Left 
Party (Venstre), became the leading party, but when the Workers party (Arbei-
derpartiet, Ap) made progress in 1906 after the change in voting rights, the 
Right party for a time succeeded in becoming the strongest party in the parlia-
ment (Stortinget). In the 1930s, the conservatives upheld second place, secur-
ing 21–29 percent in the elections. The joint election campaign with a former 
splinter group from the Left Party, the Liberal Left (Frisinnade Venstre), ended 
in 1931. Instead, that small group with its slightly misleading name began to 
cooperate with various extreme right-wing groups. However, very few of the 
conservatives were attracted by the extreme right.
Sweden. The Conservative party (Allmänna Valmansförbundet, AVF) 
was hesitatingly formed in 1904, still opposing a modern party system, full 
democracy and parliamentary rule (and, until 1913, female members).4 After 
the democratic breakthrough in 1917–1921, the party managed to keep an 
important position, gaining 18–24  percent in the elections to the parlia-
ment (Riksdag) during the years 1932–1940. The Swedish National Youth 
League (Sveriges nationella ungdomsförbund, SNU) significantly increased its 
membership, reaching approximately 40,000 in 1932. However, the political 
initiative had from that point on been taken over by the Social Democrats. 
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After the conservative Prime Minister Arvid Lindman’s resignation in 1930, no 
conservative politician would participate in a government until 1976 (except in 
the 1939–1945 wartime coalition government).
Finland. The National Coalition Party (Kansallinen kokoomus/Nationella 
samlingspartiet) has its roots in two parties from Finland’s period as part of 
the Russian empire: the moderate Old Finns and to a certain degree in the 
Young Finns, who had advocated more active resistance against russifica-
tion.5 After independence in 1917 and the subsequent civil war, the Coali-
tion Party worked energetically for a monarchical constitution. However, due 
to Germany’s collapse, a republic with a strong presidency was established. 
The Coalition Party had sympathizers in many of the extreme right organi-
zations, especially the Lapua Movement (Lapporörelsen) and the Academic 
Karelian Society (Akademisk-Karelska Sällskapet, AKS). An agreement with 
the new right-wing, fascist-oriented party IKL (Fosterländska folkrörelsen), 
was reached in 1933. However, the result of the election was a disappoint-
ment and the contacts with IKL became increasingly frosty. In 1939, the 
Coalition Party politically dissociated itself from IKL. It is also important to 
mention the conservative minority in the Swedish People’s Party (Svenska 
folkpartiet, Sfp) that tried to establish a coalition with sympathizers to the 
Lapua Movement.
The challengers
In general, the various extreme right-wings groups were not serious challeng-
ers to mainstream conservatism in the Nordic countries, except in Finland. 
The Danish National Socialist Workers Party reached 1.8 percent in the 1938 
election; in Sweden the results were even worse, 1–1.5  percent (depending 
how different groups are classified); and in Norway Vidkun Quisling’s National 
Coalition (Nasjonal samling, NS), founded in 1933, did not manage more than 
1.8 and 2.0 percent in 1933 and 1936, respectively.
The real problem in Denmark, Norway and Sweden turned out to be their 
youth organizations. National Socialism, fascism and other extremism was to a 
high degree a youth protest against traditional society and the political system, 
attracting teenagers, male and female, with collective and often violent actions. 
Disregarding differences in other aspects, in this sense there are similarities with 
the radical protests in the 1960s.
Denmark. “Young Denmark” had been a widespread concept already in the 
middle of the 19th century.6 It was neither a movement nor a program. Instead, 
it has been seen as an intellectual conception, interpreting how to be truly 
Danish. The core of “Young Denmark” was an anti-liberal, organic national-
ism. To be Danish was incompatible with being liberal. Both young conserva-
tives and the old school of classical conservatism were influenced by this way of 
thinking. However, the party chairman Christmas Møller was too nationalistic 
to accept the new German vision and too much of a democrat to brush aside 
the parliamentary system.
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Anyway, the antagonism between anti-system and system-friendly conserva-
tism increased. As a result of profound contacts with SNU, the program of 
Danish Youth League was a nearly complete translation of the Swedish pro-
gram. In a couple of years, the tension among the three Nordic conservative 
organizations would lead to splits and a new conservative Nordic landscape.
Norway. Despite the fiasco for NS in the elections, right-wing extremists 
could cause problem – recruiting younger people and attacking the old con-
servative traditional politics. Besides NS there were other right-wing organi-
zations that failed for different reasons. Fridtjof Nansen, the well-known 
explorer, scientist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, died in 1930. No one could 
replace him, although not a fascist, as potential leader of a broad authoritarian 
movement.7
Sweden. SNU had been formed in 1915, and soon became very important 
during the conservative election campaigns, although not formally belonging 
to the party organization. Young persons in academia, especially in Uppsala and 
Lund, were attracted by conservative ideas. From the beginning of the 1930s, 
SNU became more critical of the democratic political system. Some members 
had never really accepted the democratic breakthrough in 1917–1921. Also 
other extreme positions were integrated, like economic collectivism and the 
wearing of party uniforms. The SNU increasingly distanced itself from the 
main party. The right-wing in the SNU was stronger than in Norway. A clear 
majority in SNU supported the turn to the right and the positive view of the 
regimes in Italy and Germany. In 1934, the chairman of the Conservative Party 
Arvid Lindman broke contact with SNU. Afterward, this can be interpreted as 
a crucial moment for the development of democratic conservatism in Sweden.8
Finland. In contrast with the other countries, the young conservatives in 
Finland were less attracted by National Socialism and other extreme views 
than the older generation that had been formed by the civil war in 1918. 
However, as a whole, right-wing extremism was stronger in Finland than in 
the Nordic region generally. The Academic Karelian Society had sympathizers 
among Finnish-speaking students and intellectuals, and the Lapua Movement 
was established by landowners in Ostrobothnia, although dissolved after the 
violent actions in 1932 (in Mäntsälä). Instead, the dominant party became IKL, 
uniting various extreme groups and participating in the election of 1933, allied 
with the conservatives in the National Coalition Party. Right-wing tenden-
cies could also be found in Sfp, in the faction that worked for an alliance with 
groups to the right in order to neutralize the communists.9
The decisive moments: agreement or confrontation?
The developments in Denmark, Norway and Sweden were quite similar. Oppo-
sition groups among the young conservatives were defeated by the established 
party machines. In that struggle, the contributions of esteemed conservative 
leaders like John Christmas Møller (Denmark), Carl-Joachim Hambro (Nor-
way) and Arvid Lindman (Sweden) were decisive. They despised pro-fascist 
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and antidemocratic ideas and strongly defended a conservative tradition that 
integrated democracy and nationalism.10
In Denmark, the party opposition was defeated. The Conservative Youth 
League kept its loyalty to the main party, and in the end leading opponents had 
to leave the party. In Norway, some district organizations participated in elec-
toral alliances with NS, for example in Bergen where the two parties worked 
together in 1933. However, the party executive strongly criticized all such col-
laboration and afterward succeeded in isolating the NS and other groups. In 
that way, the Conservative party also saved the contributions from the industry 
that for a couple of years had been divided between the party and right-wing 
groups.11
SNU was too strong to be defeated. When Lindman cut ties with SNU in 
1934, only a minority among the members stayed loyal to him. The major-
ity continued as an independent party, soon changing its name to Sweden’s 
National League (Sveriges Nationella Förbund, SNF). However, the youthful 
character of the organization should not be overestimated. Many members 
had stayed in the SNU, notwithstanding of age, in the late 1920s when SNU 
increasingly became an oppositional right-wing organization. Lindman had to 
build a new Youth League (Ungsvenskarna). In some places, Conservatives and 
SNU/SNF formed electoral alliances (Norrköping, Helsingborg, 1934–1938). 
However, SNF never succeeded in building a strong party. The three members 
of the parliament that belonged to the organization were not re-elected in 
1936. Therefore, SNF became merely one of several pro-Nazi parties, compet-
ing for the small group of Swedish Nazi sympathizers.
In Finland, the election in 1933 was a disappointment for the conservatives. 
The alliance with IKL gathered fewer votes than the Conservatives alone had 
reached in 1930. The adaption of some of the more extreme positions was 
strongly criticized and the electoral alliance was not repeated. However, IKL 
held its position and participated in the government 1941–1944. IKL was char-
acterized by anticommunism, corporatism, ultra-national foreign policy, pure 
Finnishness, an ideal of the strong leader (“the Führer principle”), and a tradi-
tional Christian faith. The best election result was 8.3 percent in 1936. During 
the Continuation War (1941–1944), pro-German views were widespread and 
not limited to IKL.12
As already mentioned, Denmark, Norway and Sweden share a common his-
tory in the 1930s, at least regarding the relations between the Conservative par-
ties and various extremist challengers. Opponents in the Youth Leagues were 
tolerated to a certain degree. But when they went too far and tried to establish 
themselves as more independent factions, repressive measures were taken. KU 
in Denmark was overtaken by more loyal elements, and soon the opposition 
was defeated. Norway shares the same history, and Swedish SNU was excluded 
from the conservative family. In all three countries, the party leaders were 
decisive in the struggle against fascist and other extreme elements. Such groups 
outside the parties were seldom considered coalition partners, and local agree-
ments were strongly counteracted by the central executives. However, some 
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exceptions could be found in Sweden, where some local arrangements were 
upheld for a couple of years, not causing much trouble.
In the middle of the 1930s, the conservative parties had triumphed. By 
linking democracy to old national traditions, fascism and National Socialism 
were characterized as un-national and incompatible with Nordic traditions.13 
The antifascist contributions by the conservatives have seldom been taken into 
account when analyzing the failure of right-wing extremism in the Nordic 
countries. However, the efforts by John Christmas Møller, Carl-Joachim Ham-
bro and Arvid Lindman motivate their places in a hypothetic Nordic pantheon 
of antifascism. Of course, they should share their glory with liberals as well 
as the Social democrats, succeeding to stabilize society with broad coalition 
agreements that weakened extreme elements in the farmer’s organizations and 
generally turned depression and unemployment to stability and belief in the 
future.
Finland has a very different story. The civil war, the communist activities in 
the 1920s in order to start a revolution and the frontier to the Soviet Union 
polarized society. Strong authoritarian groups combatted the communist threat 
with legal as well as illegal methods. Liberal politicians, especially in the Swed-
ish People’s Party, and Social Democrats engaged themselves against the fascist 
threat, but that never became a consensus view in Finland. The Conservative 
party accepted some of the new, extreme ideas, but the formal alliance with 
IKL turned out to be a failure. The reactions from conservative statesmen like 
Juho Kusti Paasikivi (president 1946–1956) against the right-wing violence 
were important, but did not more than temporarily deter extremist strength.
Conservatism and right-wing populism in the past few 
decades
Needless to say, the political landscape in the Nordic countries has changed in 
a profound way since the 1930s. In particular, the welfare state and other ele-
ments of the Nordic model have been decisive for these changes. The former 
conservative parties are more liberal than before, not least on economic issues. 
At the same time, differences between conservatives and liberals to some extent 
have been blurred. Also the relative strength inside the nonsocialist bloc (if 
there is such a thing) has been changed. In Denmark, the Conservative Party 
nowadays is a small party, receiving only 6.6 percent of the votes in the 2019 
election. Instead the Left Party, liberal/right-wing, has succeeded the Con-
servatives as the leading party on the established right. However, both parties 
will be discussed, and similarities as well as differences observed.
Nowadays, the challengers of the right in the Nordic countries are of a 
different kind, in comparison with those 60 or 70 years ago. They have been 
developing outside the traditional conservative parties, outside the traditional 
party system as such. Generally, they have appeared as protest or populist parties, 
critical to elements of the Nordic model such as taxes, bureaucracy, centraliza-
tion and progressive values. An anti-immigrant policy was integrated after some 
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time and has grown to be the most important issue for these parties.14 However, 
characterizing the new parties as fascist is misleading. Populism, authoritarian, 
national conservative, or sometimes ultraliberal are more useful concepts. An 
exception is the early phase of the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, 
SD) with its roots in the Nazi milieu in the 1980s, ideas that nowadays have 
disappeared.15 On the other hand, the party has been relatively successful in 
connecting its policy to the concept of the People’s Home.
In contrast to the crisis in the 1930s, losing party organizations to the chal-
lengers has not been the main problem for the conservatives. Instead, the 
debate has circled around the strategies of the parties. Which relationships were 
desired or feasible? Could the new parties be reliable as supporters of the gov-
ernment, or maybe even as a part of coalition governments?
The established conservative parties
Denmark. In the 1990s, various groups had been criticizing the liberal Dan-
ish immigrant policy. Some restrictions were instituted and when a center-
right coalition of the Liberal and Conservative parties assumed power in the 
2001 elections, a radical change of policy was introduced. The government 
was supported by the populist, anti-immigration, nationalist Danish People’s 
Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) that had been successful in the election. The new 
government policy was popular domestically, but criticized by international 
observers. In the cultural-ideological field, the left paradigm was seriously chal-
lenged by right-wing conservatives, especially by the priest Sören Krarup. His 
Christian thinking is built on nationalism. By stressing the struggle between 
Christianity and Marxism, Christianity and science, and not least, Christian-
ity and Islam, he rejects the modern homage to the individual. For some years 
Krarup was a member of parliament (Folketinget) for the Danish People’s Party. 
His aggressive attitude to Islam became very influential for the changing of 
Danish immigration policy after the year 2000.16
The Liberal-Conservative coalition, under Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen (V), was re-elected in 2005 and 2007. When Rasmussen was 
appointed secretary-general of NATO in 2009, he was replaced by the foreign 
minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen. The restrictive immigration policy was not 
changed, not during the Social Democratic government 2011–2015, and not 
during the following governments dominated by Venstre. In the 2015 election, 
it reached 19.5 percent and the coalition partners, the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Alliance, each received 3.4 and 7.5 percent of the vote respectively. DF 
received 21.1 percent, but stayed outside the government. Although Venstre 
kept its share in the 2019 election, the Social Democrats took over, supported 
by RV and two left parties in Folketinget.
Norway. During the past few decades, the Conservative Party has usually 
been second in parliamentary strength after the social democrats in the Work-
ers Party (Ap). However, the left has been weakened, and in 2013, Conserva-
tive leader Erna Solberg became the first prime minister from her party since 
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1990. She headed a minority coalition government with the Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet, FrP). The small parties in the middle (the liberal Left Party 
and the Christian People’s Party) chose not to join the new government, but 
agreed to support it in return for some softening of the restrictive immigration 
policy that for a long time had been the core issue for the Progress Party. After 
the 2017 election, the coalition managed to stay in power, although with a 
narrower margin. In 2018, the Left Party accepted a place in the government 
and in 2019 the Christian People’s Party after a trying party debate followed 
suite.
Sweden. The liberal-conservative Moderate Party (former Right party) 
turned to the middle after a disappointing election in 2002. The new party 
chairman Fredrik Reinfeldt abandoned many of the party’s former core issues: 
a strong defense, reforms of the laws inspired by social democratic values in 
the labor market and cuts in the welfare system. He also proclaimed a more 
open and generous immigration policy and at the same time clearly dissoci-
ated the party from the anti-immigration Swedish Democrats.17 No collabora-
tion whatsoever with SD was possible during his reign. Reinfeldt was prime 
minister from 2006 to 2014, jointly with three smaller center-right parties. 
After the 2014 election, he resigned. The successor, Anna Kinberg Batra, did 
not succeed in formulating a trustworthy political line when the refugee crisis 
turned many traditional ideas upside down.18 To avoid uncontrolled immi-
gration to Sweden, the Social Democratic-led government instituted a much 
more restricted policy, transforming the unique Swedish immigrant policy to 
one resembling a mainstream European one. In October 2017, Kinberg Batra 
was replaced by Ulf Kristersson. In the election of 2018, the Moderate Party 
was one of the losers, although with 19.8 percent of the votes it was still the 
strongest party in the non-socialist Alliance and second after the Social Demo-
crats with 28.3 percent of the vote.
Kristersson had accepted being prime minister with the help of SD, although 
at the same time refusing further cooperation with the party. However, his 
candidacy was voted down and instead the Social democratic chairman Stefan 
Löfvén reestablished the coalition with the Green party. This time with the 
support of the Liberal and the Center parties from the former non-socialist alli-
ance. The new collaboration was possible due to the weakening of the Social 
democrats and the clear opposition of the two middle parties supporting a 
government in any way dependent on SD. The relations with SD are still con-
troversial in the Moderate party, although the role as opposition party might 
bring the two parties closer to each other.
Finland. The conservatives in the National Coalition Party have kept its 
position as one of the leading Finnish parties. It has participated in most of 
the governments during the last 20 years, sometimes also filling the post of 
prime minister (Holkeri, Katainen, Stubb). One explanation is the Finnish tra-
dition of majority governments, including parties of the right, center and left 
at the same time. In the 2015 election, the conservatives reached 18.2 percent, 
a decline from the 20.4 percent of votes they had in the previous election. 
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The decrease continued in 2019, 17.0 percent. For the first time since 2007, 
the Conservatives were left out from the coalition government.
The challengers
Denmark. In the sensational 1973 election, the Progress Party (Fremskridt-
spartiet) became one of five newcomers to the parliament. The controversial 
lawyer Mogens Glistrup had established it just one year before. Until his death 
in 2008, Glistrup would remain a spectacular figure in political debates, most 
of the time as leader of his anti-bureaucratic and soon also anti-immigration 
party. Muslims were a particular target for Glistrup’s scoffing. However, in 
later years he could not lead his party due to his imprisonment for tax eva-
sion. At that time, the party had lost its seats in the parliament.19 In 1995, Pia 
Kjærsgaard and other leading members broke with the party and established 
the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF). They wanted to form a 
party that would be more acceptable to other parties, and using that strat-
egy, influence society, especially immigration policy. In the 2001 election, DF 
came in third with 12 percent of the votes. The governments led by the Left 
Party (V) were dependent on DF from 2001 to 2011. Agreements between 
the government and DF were made before the proposals were sent to parlia-
ment. Therefore, the nationalistic policy of DF regarding immigration as well 
as the EU became official Danish policy. The strong hostility toward a multi-
cultural society has continued to be the core element in DF’s ideology during 
the chairmanship of Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who succeeded Pia Kjærsgaard 
in 2012.20 In the 2015 election, DF reached its all-time high with 21.1 per-
cent of the vote, surpassed only by the Social Democrats (26.3 percent). In 
15–20 years, DF had an important position in Danish politics, without partici-
pating in the government. This situation ended abruptly after the 2019 elec-
tion when the Social Democrats took over. DF lost more than half of its voters, 
reaching only 8.7 percent.
Norway. In 1973, an equivalent to Glistrup’s party was established, named a 
bit narcissistically the Anders Lange Party (Anders Langes parti). The platform 
was also reminiscent of Glistrup’s creation: lower taxes, less bureaucracy and a 
populist critique of the authorities in general. It immediately won four man-
dates in parliament. However, Lange died in 1974 and after choosing a new 
party name, the Progress Party, and the appointment of Carl I. Hagen as chair-
man in 1978, the party became an important force in the Norwegian party 
system.21 Sometimes the economic policy was characterized by neo-liberalism, 
sometimes by promises of welfare reform, especially for the elderly. More con-
tinuity can be found in the immigration issues, where the party established a 
strong resistance against refugees, especially those from outside Europe. Hagen 
led the party for 30 years and left behind an established party with extensive 
experience in national politics and local government. However, it was his suc-
cessor Siv Jensen that led the Progress Party in a coalition with the Conserva-
tives after the 2013 election (16.3 percent), a coalition that stayed in power after 
Conservatives at the crossroads 147
the 2017 election (FrP 15.1 percent), still dependent on the smaller parties in 
the middle. Jensen has been minister of finance in the coalition government 
since it was established in 2013.22
Sweden. The first successful populist party in Sweden, New Democracy (Ny 
demokrati, ND), was established in 1991. Thanks to widespread media cov-
erage, well-known party leaders and a growing dissatisfaction with Swedish 
immigration policy, ND received 5.7 percent of the vote in the 1991 election, 
enough to get 25 seats in the parliament. Disagreements inside the party and 
controversial statements made by some of the leading politicians broke down 
the party and it eventually fell out of parliament already in the 1994 election. 
No agreements between the center-right government and ND had been made, 
but secret negotiations between the Moderate party secretary and ND helped 
the government when ND fell apart.23
The Swedish Democrats have formed a more stable party, although every 
now and then the party is hit by accusations of crime or political scandals con-
cerning racist or other remarks by leading members. SD’s roots are in neo-Nazi 
groups from 25 to 30 years ago. Although quite successful in forming a more 
modest and democratic image (“national conservative” or “social conserva-
tive”), its history still casts a shadow over the party. It managed to get 5.7 per-
cent of the vote in the 2010 election, a share that was increased to 12.9 percent 
in 2014. In the 2018 election, the increase continued to 17.5 percent, which, 
however, was not as much as predicted.
In June 2002, all seven parties in the parliament (except SD) had published 
a joint proclamation against the SD. Neither the center-right government of 
Reinfeldt nor the Social Democratic/Green Party government of Löfvén made 
agreements or negotiated with SD when in power. Even informal political talks 
with SD representatives were out of the question.
However, due to the strengthening of the Swedish Democrats in 2014, 
claims for a different attitude to the challengers were raised in the Moderate 
Party. Particularly at the local level, various forms of cooperation have been 
established. In the build-up to the 2018 election, this current became more 
outspoken, at least outside the party-executive. The party chairman Ulf Kris-
tersson explained that his first option was an Alliance government. However, 
he also declared that he would accept SD’s passive support in order to form a 
government containing Moderates and Christian Democrats. After the election 
in 2018, a couple of local alliances were formed by the Moderate Party and SD, 
defying the official party line.
Finland. The first populist party in the Nordic countries, the Smallholder 
Party (Småbondepartiet), was established in 1959 as a splinter group of the 
Agrarian Party. (Cf. Emilia Palonen’s article in the book). Its leader, Veikko 
Vennamo, had participated in the government of Urho Kekkonen, later the 
president of Finland, but became critical of the situation for the Karelian peo-
ple who had come to Finland after the War of Continuation. In 1966, the 
name was changed to the Countryside Party (Landsbygdspartiet/Suomen Maa-
seudun Puolue, SMP).
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The 1970 election was successful, 10.5 percent of the vote. Thereafter, strong 
internal divisions, defections and other trouble weakened the party. In the 1980s, 
it made a strong comeback with Pekka Vennamo, son of the founder, as party 
leader. The party participated in various governments but again faced trouble 
when it went bankrupt in 1995. The party was formally dissolved in 2003. 
The Finns, formerly the True Finns (Sannfinländarna/ Perussuomalaiset), was 
founded in 1995 as a successor party, but did not reach the parliament before 
2003. With his anti-EU, anti-NATO and anti-immigration policy in 2011, 
Timo Soini led the party to a sensational result of 19 percent of the vote (in 
2007, it was 4.05 percent). After the 2015 election, the party became a mem-
ber of the government with Soini as foreign minister. When Soini resigned in 
2017, the far-reaching opponent of immigration, Jussi Hallo-aho, was elected 
chairman. Some of his opponents broke with the party and founded a separate, 
more moderate, group in the Riksdag. However, the hard line faction clearly 
won the competition. In the 2019 election it gained 17.0 percent – but was not 
invited to the government – while the moderate group only got 1.0 percent.
The decisive moments: agreement or confrontation?
The four main challengers discussed here demonstrate differences as well as 
similarities. Three of them have a long history, founded in the 1950s (Finland) 
or the 1970s (Denmark and Norway), if original party creations are included. 
Sweden is an exception, also in view of the first challenger in the 1990s, New 
Democracy. The backgrounds differ. When the populist, anti-bureaucratic 
character was obvious in the Danish and Norwegian parties, for a long time 
carrying synonymous names, the anti-urban trait was more important in Fin-
land. SD in Sweden has a completely different background due to its roots in 
the neo-Nazi tradition.
The strategies of the Nordic conservative parties display clear differences. 
One side is represented by Finland, Denmark and Norway. The challengers 
have been handled much in the same way as other parties in the political sys-
tem. The Countryside Party participated in the Finnish government in 1966. 
However, the party was not so controversial, compared to the two forms of the 
Progress Party from the 1980s. Immigration was a non-issue in Finland dur-
ing the Cold War. However, while never a governmental party, DF’s support-
ing position strongly influenced (some might say decided) the government’s 
policy on immigration, which is the best example of political success for the 
challengers. Participation in the Norwegian (2013–) and Finnish (2015–2019) 
governments marks still more progress for right-wing populist members of the 
Nordic party family.
The coalitions and other forms of collaboration do not seem to have caused 
any sharp tensions in the conservative parties. Also the Danish Social Demo-
crats have accepted most of the new policy. In a nearly desperate bid to win 
back its former voters, they have declared a general agreement with DF on 
many political issues. It seems that the conservatives have easily accepted the 
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restrictive immigration policies that have come from the right. If so, the price 
to pay for letting in the populists has been moderate.
The exception is, of course, Sweden. SD has been seen as not “house-
trained”, a spiteful remark about DF made by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, Danish 
prime minister (1993–2001) and leader of the Social Democrats. Accepting 
the party in government is unthinkable in political debate in traditional parties, 
at least on the national level. Agreements with or formal dependency on SD 
for gaining a majority are also hard to accept. In the past few years, any hint 
of consideration for the party’s existence has been criticized from either the 
right or the left. The difficulties concerning SD have made it difficult for the 
Moderate party to establish a clear policy on the relationship. The election in 
2018 did not give enough mandates to build a non-socialist government based 
solely on the four parties in the Alliance. The Moderate party did not succeed 
in persuading the middle parties to support Kristersson as prime minister if 
this required the votes from SD. The party had to stay in opposition after four 
months of complicated party negotiations.
From internal threats to external help?
By comparing the 1930s with the beginning of the 2000s, some differences 
have been brought forth. The new parties are much stronger than the old fas-
cists groups. It was, of course, easier to isolate small parties in the 1930s than 
treating today’s parties representing 15 to 25 percent of the voters the same way.
The threat that stands before the conservative parties today is external, not 
like the internal threat in the 1930s when certain elements of the movements 
stepped out of the democratic field. The modern right-wing populist parties 
do not share a common conservative or liberal-conservative idea of society and 
politics, although tax reductions, anti-bureaucracy and anti-socialism often are 
common platform points. By adapting their policy, the conservatives could 
use the new situation as a strategic weapon, transforming the general threat to 
a threat against the left, thereby challenging aspects of the Nordic Model that 
they consider too socialist.
The party conflicts in the 1930s resulted in a polarization between con-
servatism and extremism. Today, some important ideas have been accepted by 
conservatives, and to some degree also by center and left parties. Most obvious 
is the new agenda regarding immigration policies. With the exception of Swe-
den, the new parties have been accepted in government (Norway, Finland), or 
as an auxiliary force for the government, with strong influence on governmen-
tal policy (Denmark). By getting votes from the working class, populist parties 
have diminished the left’s chances to lead the government. On condition that 
the conservative parties continue to collaborate with them, strong center-right 
or right governments could be the Nordic model in the future. However, the 
development is not determined. For the moment, in September 2019, three 
of the Nordic Prime Ministers are social democrats. The result of the Swedish 
2018 election was a Social Democratic-Green government, supported by the 
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liberal parties. The four-party alliance that governed Sweden 2006–2014 has 
broken down. Instead, the government has promised to carry through impor-
tant liberal demands. The Swedish Democrats won’t hold the balance of power 
as long as the left – liberal collaboration remains.
Of course, there are other options: the populist parties may start falling apart 
when some of their ideas have been realized. Or, perhaps, they will sharpen 
their demands and try to change more fundamental elements of society. Based 
upon the situation in Denmark, one should not leave aside the possibility of 
a social democratic – populist alliance. Both parties are dependent on support 
from the lower classes and consequently share some social demands. Today the 
challenging parties work inside the system, determined to change as much as 
they can in the area of “multiculturalism”, a concept that besides “liberalism” 
can be seen as their main enemy.
The extreme right parties in the 1930s, influenced by fascism and National 
Socialism, turned their backs on the relatively young democracy. Today, the 
new parties have accepted the democratic system, although leading politicians 
and ordinary members, not only in Sweden, have shown negligence concern-
ing human rights.
Maybe the democratic system is not at stake today, but populist parties have 
learnt to use democratic means to change society. That could be fateful, not 
only for the Nordic model  – what still remains of it  – but for all forms of 
rational, human and tolerant systems. Democracy is after all mainly a system for 
majority decisions, not a guarantee for tolerance and human reforms.
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8  Nordic populists as 
hegemony challengers
Emilia Palonen and Liv Sunnercrantz
This chapter explores populism in Nordic countries where there is a long tradi-
tion of heterogeneous, populist parties with incompatible political ideologies 
transforming over decades. Between the anti-communism, anti-elitism, anti-
tax-paying, anti-immigration, and agrarian features, little unites these parties. 
We argue, however, that at least one feature fits: they were all hegemony chal-
lengers. This may indeed be a feature of populism as such following the theory 
of Ernesto Laclau.1 Hence, a particular study of Nordic populists would reveal 
hegemony as the particular shared social imaginary horizon in each of the Nor-
dic countries. The chapter develops a Laclaudian understanding of populism 
and provides a chronological narrative of the populist parties in Finland, Den-
mark, Norway, and Sweden, and a discussion of hegemony as it emerges and 
transforms over time. Populist parties have emerged as a reaction to dominant 
thinking in each of the political contexts. Our study explores alternatives or 
points of contestation regarding key issues emerging during the studied period, 
most notably relations to the Soviet Union and market deregulation as well as 
migration and welfare chauvinism.
There are several ways to approach populism, and Nordic populist par-
ties have been studied from ideational perspectives as well as a party family.2 
Our post-Gramscian approach to populism includes an idea of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony: populist parties are challengers of the status quo who seek 
to offer a new alternative vision, question, or basis of argumentation for a 
political ‘us’.3 Two features mark Nordic politics: the strong position of Social 
Democratic parties and a culture of consensus in coalition governments, as 
stressed by David Arter.4 Despite the potential for conflict, overriding social 
democratic ideals enabled a political culture where issues were settled through 
compromise. Low levels of conflict over the basic rules of the political process 
and the exercise of power combined with a high degree of concertation in 
public-policy creation characterise this culture of consensus.5 While we do not 
study consensus politics per se, we do investigate how hegemony challengers 
have fertilised and used the powerful myth of a social democratic consensus 
(although in Finland this position has been occupied by the Centre Party).6 The 
emergence of populist parties has to be analysed with view to this initial setup. 
The most prominent feature that we find when exploring Nordic populist 
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parties is that they challenge a status quo that transforms over time. Studying 
populist parties in the Nordic countries not only reveals – often unsuccessful – 
alternatives these parties pursued in politics, but what they sought to challenge. 
Until now, the research on populist parties has focused on their ideology or 
style, or on voters, in line with dominant trends such as the ideational approach 
in political science.7 While we recognise similar topoi as ideological contents 
like some previous researchers,8 our contribution lies in the logic of populism. 
The logic is not reducible to a tool kit, although it might benefit from it or the 
hybrid media system.9 Furthermore, adding to research on the radical right, 
we insist that anti-immigration is not synonymous with populism, although it 
may entangle it.10
From our perspective, populism is not an ideology or substance. It is debat-
able whether it is ideological at all.11 Political theorists Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe conceptualise populism as a logic of articulation. Accord-
ingly, the substance of populism is a particular logic or form.12 It is composed 
of three ingredients – an abstract content of identification: ‘us’; a dichotomy 
with ‘them’; and an element that grips the audience  – through passion or 
an emotional attachment. We have simplified this into the following formula: 
Populism = usaffect1 + frontieraffect2. Rather than looking for particular ideas tied to 
populism, the formula allows us to analyse populism as a performative process. 
In a given rhetorical situation, the ‘us’ category of identification can be substi-
tuted with various forms of universal and inclusive forms of ‘us’ that can take 
up the representation of the political subject that integrates disparate identities 
and demands into temporary unity. Who gets defined as ‘them’ or what lies 
beyond the ‘frontier’ also constitutes ‘us’. As hegemony is constituted through 
otherness, in this study we demonstrate that it is not constant. Over time and 
through different political actors and movements, the contents of ‘us’ and the 
‘frontier’, alongside the affects and emotions that heighten them, transform.13
Theoretically, generating a typology between populist parties, we divide 
populist parties into mainstream and fringe populist parties. Mainstream popu-
lists seek to take over political space as a whole from a central position in the 
core of politics, as one of the larger and often traditional parties. Fringe populist 
parties and movements would challenge all the other parties from a supposed 
outside. They seek a position outside the core: they operationalise the ‘frontier’ 
against the other established parties. It is typically fringe populist parties we dis-
cuss in this case of Nordic countries. If they attempt to advance their positions, 
fringe-leaning parties face challenges such as how to claim a mainstream posi-
tion and successfully represent the whole political field. To further develop the 
understanding of populism, we argue that populism is not constant but emerges 
in moments. Here, we analyse particular ‘populist’ movements and political 
parties and recognise the form of populism in their rhetoric and articulations.14 
The study of Nordic populism stresses the particularity of Nordic countries as 
a particular region in Europe with its historical contingencies.
The Nordic countries differ from the Latin American countries Laclau stud-
ied. There, the populist party were the parties of the people rather than the 
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elites, and workers rather than industries dominated the spectrum. Yet their 
power became institutionalised while the political spectrum polarised. They 
became mainstream populist parties. Laclau sought to theorise on a more uni-
versal level taking examples from the Russian Revolution and the workers’ 
movements: populism has to do with mobilisation and becoming, temporarily, 
the people.15
Our analysis shows that the emergence of Nordic populist parties has, in 
particular, to do with a reaction against the hegemony, which could also mani-
fest itself as overall shared imaginary rather than particular policy positions. 
Hegemonic discourses or imaginaries with overarching concepts in the Nor-
dic countries could, of course, be seen from different angles, just as Götz and 
Markund with their colleagues have demonstrated studying Nordic ‘open-
ness’.16 Consensus may also refer to the lack of diversity of opinions; contesting 
it would mean calling for plurality over polarisation or single-vision.17 From the 
discourse-theoretical perspective hegemony is something that becomes con-
sensual, unquestioned and sedimented through political practice. It is distinct 
from a set of practices of power sharing and policy-making – although these 
may play a part in the process of hegemonisation. Furthermore, we analyse 
how populist parties have contested sedimented and institutionalised practices 
(including consensual decision-making) in the Nordic countries.
In her work from the 1990s and the 2000s, Chantal Mouffe, Laclau’s partner 
and co-theorist, drew on experiences from her native Belgium and another 
country she frequents, Austria. In Austria, the emergence of the Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) with their leader Jörg Haider was a reaction from the regions against 
the consensus of the Viennese elites; rather than a racist vote as it had been 
interpreted by those elites, she explained.18 Similar regionalism can be found 
in our Nordic set. We see it in the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun 
puolue, SMP) – as the name would indicate,19 and in the Danish national elec-
tion of 2015, when the Danish People’s Party’s (Danske Folkeparti) success in 
rural areas can be attributed partly to their representation of the rural region 
against the capital.20 Likewise, the emergence of the Finns Party (Perussuoma-
laiset) and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) has been reduced 
to racism and anti-immigration of the left-behinds of global capitalism, rather 
than an anti-elitist and anti-consensus response. Although, as Ainur Elmgren 
has highlighted in her chapter, the anti-consensus Finns Party has indeed called 
for openness challenging the Finnish elites on their own ground, just as they 
perform consensus as closure.21 Digging deeper into the background of popu-
lists in Finland and Sweden, we see that racism and anti-elitism intertwine, but 
there are also other features to challenge and contest. In neighbouring Norway 
and Denmark, populist parties have focused first and foremost on issues of taxa-
tion. While nation-centrism and a focus on the people were present in those 
parties, it was only in the late 1980s that they adopted an anti-immigration 
discourse.22
Consensus culture in politics is present in all Nordic countries but political 
systems differ. In countries like Sweden, left-right coalition (‘bloc’) voting has 
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divided the political spectrum and often results in minority governments.23 
Forming a government had been rather simple until 2014, as Kjell Östberg dis-
cusses in his chapter. By contrast, in Finland, elections give voice to individual 
candidates on party lists, and can cause bottom-up ordering of policy-makers. 
Yet, there had traditionally – until the elections in 2015 – been three major 
parties, two of whom had invariably been in a majority coalition government: 
the former agrarian Centre Party (Centre), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
and the right-wing bourgeois National Coalition Party (NC). Until 2015, this 
praxis had generated some continuity in politics. For example, none of the 
governments have sought to radically alter the Finnish welfare state, and this 
continuity has been praised as a key feature of Finnish democracy. In both Fin-
land and Sweden, the strong status of trade unions and the praxis of negotiation 
between the employers’ and workers’ representatives has further sedimented 
consensus. It has been difficult for a single political party to challenge the 
power of three large parties and corporatism24 and demonstrate whether these 
are society-wide phenomena, as the SMP and Green Party examples show.25
Nordic populist parties have experienced waves of popularity related to 
different grievances and protests: from elitism in the 1960s to taxes in the 
1970s–1980s and to immigration from the 1980s and onward. A  common 
thread through these cases is the welfare state as a point of contestation.26 The 
exact rise, decline and forms of expression of populist challengers in the Nordic 
countries vary within the social context. While populist parties emerged in 
Denmark, Norway, and Finland in the late 1970s; Sweden only caught up with 
this trend many years later.27 Researchers have questioned why it took such a 
long time for a markedly populist party to gain ground in Sweden, in compari-
son to neighbouring countries.28 We explain how, in the early 1990s, Swedish 
New Democracy (Ny Demokrati) utilised the populist appeal of the broader 
neoliberal movement, which lacked direct parliamentary representation at the 
time.29 In this study, we particularly look at the hegemony challengers’ emer-
gence in Sweden.
1950s–1960s and onwards: emergence of the Finnish rural 
party
The Finns Party’s predecessor Finnish Rural Party (SMP) emerged as an anti-
Soviet, anti-bourgeoisie, anti-elitist front as a response to both the Agrarian 
Party’s affluent small-holder tradition, and the socialism of both anti-Soviet 
and pro-Soviet left. Founder Veikko Vennamo was elected to the Finnish Par-
liament Eduskunta in the 1940s and 1950s representing the predecessor of the 
Agrarian Party (Maalaisliitto) today’s Centre Party. He deviated from the main-
stream of the party backing Urho Kekkonen, and ultimately joined a new party 
of the small-holders that was formed into the SMP. The new party gained from 
Vennamo’s networks as he was leader of the office administering the post-war 
settlement to the current borders of Finland, Eastern Karelia. They established 
themselves mostly in rural communities and suburbs, but were set apart from 
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the locals due to their dialect, and rural communities were not always inclusive. 
Vennamo drew support from the party from his formal employment where he 
took care of settling the Finnish refugee population after the war. Attention 
to the marginalised and excluded, and the anti-elitist rhetoric defending the 
‘ordinary people’ was characteristic to the Finnish Rural Party, with Vennamo 
as the key orator.
Among the Finnish parties, the SMP sought to provide an alternative to the 
Agrarian Party led by Urho Kekkonen, who eventually became the longest 
serving president of Finland and was a keen negotiator with the Soviets from 
the 1950s. The anti-Soviet stance was a useful tool for Vennamo.30 It would 
resonate among the settlers, contest the hegemony of Kekkonen’s Agrarian 
Party, and challenge so-called Finlandisation, which was becoming a norm. 
Much of the polarisation was personified between Vennamo and Kekkonen. 
In the historical landslide elections of 1970, SMP went from 1 to 10 per cent 
of the vote and demanded a non-communist government. The Agrarians went 
back and forth in negotiations with Vennamo: some in the Agrarian Party 
thought that if SMP stayed in opposition they would become too strong. The 
Communists (SKP) protested the possibility of SMP in the government, which 
fuelled Kekkonen’s worries that SMP could play the card of old parties being 
against them.31
Leading contemporary analysts, such as Risto Sänkiaho, locate the SMP 
between the Left and Right and discuss urbanisation and the use of recognisable 
and strong rhetoric.32 As Aarni Virtanen demonstrates in his thorough study, 
Vennamo and his movement were branded systematically as fascist in Kansan 
Uutiset, the newspaper of the party of the left SKDL and communist SKP. Kek-
konen also supported this view, and this kind of branded cordon sanitaire made 
it difficult for the political right to collaborate and associate with them. Vir-
tanen’s analysis brings to the fore the combination of clear non-socialism, anti-
communism, and the left-wing policies and right-wing conservative values in 
Vennamo’s SMP. The party sought to represent the rural poor (the lumpenprole-
tariat, one could say). Moving to the suburbs and the increasing fluidity of party 
identification enabled support for a relatively new party.33 Around the 1970 
elections, the SKP informed East German comrades about the fascist SMP and 
the reactionary National Coalition Party (Kokoomus). Non-socialist coalition 
building, however, always failed. The party put their faith in SDP’s Mauno 
Koivisto and got a victory from their arch opponent Kekkonen when Koivisto 
(once the favourite of Kekkonen) was chosen as his successor.34
In terms of socio-economic groups, the SMP’s main competition was from 
the further left-wing parties, and here anti-communism set them apart. It also 
challenged the Agrarian Party, which could be seen as too liberal or represent-
ing the more well-off people. In 1970 Kokoomus leaned to the left in their 
social policy. Both Kokoomus and SMP were eager to get into government. 
This meant collaborating with the Agrarian-Centre Party. For both of them, 
challenging the status quo did not target the welfare state, but objected to the 
power of the KGB and Soviet influence in Finnish internal affairs. While under 
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Holkeri’s leadership, Kokoomus was moving towards collaborating with Kek-
konen’s Centre, and when he saw a change, Vennamo began to collaborate. On 
many occasions in the 1960s and the 1970s, parliamentarism was more visible 
in contrast to Kekkonen’s presidentialism (in a semi-presidential system): SMP 
was an extremely active party in the parliament, and what Vennamo and his 
colleagues were getting in trouble for was speaking too much in parliament. So 
the label of populist anti-parliamentarism does not hold here. Koivisto finally 
launched the long legislative process of increasing the power of the parliament 
over the president.
Although this negative branding about the emergence of a fascist movement 
existed, it is difficult to argue that the roots of the Finns Party would have 
been outright nationalist-xenophobic,35 in part because immigration was not 
a salient issue or policy field.36 None of the other Nordic countries witnessed 
anti-immigration right-wing populism from the start.
1970s: emergence of right-wing tax populism in Denmark 
and Norway
Right-wing populist parties emerged in both Denmark and Norway in the 
1970s. Their points of contestation were bureaucracy and tax burdens, which 
they framed as unjust and out of proportion. These parties’ discourses were 
initially not concentrated around the national people, nor did they mobilise an 
active opposition against immigration until the 1980s.
Lawyer Mogens Glistrup became known to the Danish public when he, on 
live television in 1971, revealed that he, lawfully, circumvented all income tax – 
thus exposing the shortcomings of the existing system. A year later, he founded 
the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) in the fight against income taxes, 
bureaucracy, and the extent of the public sector. The Progress Party burst into 
parliament as the second-largest party in the ‘landslide election’ of 1973 and 
remained in parliament until 1999. Although Glistrup’s rhetoric was somewhat 
xenophobic from the outset, the anti-immigrant message became more promi-
nent in the 1980s.37
The precursor to the Norwegian Progress Party is usually traced to the estab-
lishment of Anders Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and 
Public Intervention (Anders Langes Parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter 
og offentlige inngrep; ALP) in 1973. Lange, inspired by Glistrup, opposed 
bureaucracy, state capitalism, and socialism. He was a strong supporter of neo-
liberalism. When Carl I. Hagen took leadership in 1978, the ALP became the 
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) and quickly gained swing-vote leverage.38
Nordic countries experienced similar discussions even though populists 
were not everywhere in the forefront of liberalising economy. Meanwhile, in 
Finland, the Korpilahti meeting brought ‘consensus’: it mainstreamed the idea 
of shrinking the role of state companies, sustained criticism of the welfare 
state and highlighted the need to improve competitiveness. Meeting up in a 
hotel in a remote part of Espoo, a city neighbouring Helsinki, was enough to 
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mainstream several ideas among the political elites. The move from the welfare 
state system towards the right happened within the existing political parties and 
their mutual balance39 rather than through a new or anti-welfare statist populist 
actor.
1980s: towards xenophobia from mainstreaming 
neoliberalism
During the 1980s, the Danish Progress Party was torn by internal factions. 
Glistrup served time for tax evasion and upon his release in 1985 railed against 
Muslims as a threat to Danish identity. In the meantime, the party experienced 
their worst election results ever in 1984 under Pia Kjærsgaard, who officially 
became party leader in the mid-1980s. While the Danish Progress Party had 
started out as a populist-libertarian project, they took a more xenophobic turn 
around this point.40 Simultaneously, radical right-wing protest groups and racist 
subcultures gained ground in Denmark during the 1980s (inspired by radical 
right-wing projects in Germany and France). The Left suffered from visionary 
disorientation and demobilisation as the Eastern Bloc started to collapse. Radi-
cal right-wing rhetoric gained disproportionate media attention. The Progress 
party used the momentary attention on the EU and immigration as well as the 
consensus among mainstream parties (who nevertheless failed to hegemonise 
the public discourse) to take up a contesting, alternative position.41
Swedish business interpreted the employee funds in 1983 as a breach from 
the old consensus between labour and capital.42 Business, think tanks, and 
intellectuals joined forces as Swedish neoliberals mobilised against contem-
porary hegemony: the social-democratic welfare state.43 They challenged the 
status quo and offered a new alternative vision and basis of argumentation 
centred on private and individual (rather than public and collective) ownership. 
Swedish neoliberalism took shape around the specific purpose to question the 
consensual norm in politics. As expressed in a neoliberal analysis of the failing 
bourgeoisie political project (in 1987):
The more [the bourgeoisie] disliked the class struggle  – the more they 
advocated consensus. There is of course a limit where consensus is no 
longer possible. But psychological mechanisms easily work in a way that 
one who is inclined to confrontation compromise less than one who wants 
consensus.  .  .  . They want so much consensus and wish to see as little 
political struggle that they gradually accept adaptation to an all the more 
politicised climate. They defend the proposals that they opposed yesterday 
as a desperate chance not to have to give in to further demands.44
Neoliberal intellectuals sought to challenge the social democratic hegemony 
and renegotiate what was ‘politically impossible’.45 Through historical anal-
yses of the ‘privilege to define problems’,46 they concluded that the labour 
movement had successfully defined the political agenda for the 20th century. 
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Inspired by the Left, they developed strategies to redefine the social field as 
divided between two opposing camps: the individual (the underdog, the peo-
ple, the ‘common man’, the oppressed masses, ‘you’, ‘I’, ‘we’, and so on) versus 
the welfare state (the establishment, power, social democracy, and so on). At 
the core of the neoliberal discourse that followed was not literally ‘the people’ 
but other inclusive forms of ‘us’ such as ‘individuals’ or ‘human beings’. Para-
doxically, the ‘individual’ which functioned as addressee, subject, and appeal 
was a collective, universal individual everyone could identify with.47 Neoliber-
alism represented the interest of ‘ordinary people’ while parliamentary parties 
(i.e. ‘the establishment’) represented the special interests of one class or another, 
it was argued.48 Much like the first wave of populism in Norway and Denmark, 
Swedish neoliberal populists protested against the strong taxation of the wel-
fare state system. In Finland, there were only minor parties emerging with the 
(neo)liberal economic agenda with anti-Sovietism – for example, Liberal party, 
Georg C. Ehrnrooth’s SPK/POP.49 These have been largely marginalised and 
disappeared in contemporary Finnish politics.50
The Valco corruption scandal in 1979 gave a boost to the SMP who con-
tested the rich elites and their abuse of power. A non-socialist government was 
not formed, but four years later, the party, hyperactive in their parliamentary 
activities, made it to the government in 1983. They were brought into a coali-
tion with the SDP and Centre Party – but they saw themselves in the mid-
dle of the two.51 It may have been better to keep them in parliament rather 
than active in opposition. Their support shrunk by 1987, but they joined the 
first post-war government led by the National Coalition and SDP. The 1980s 
were economically a boom in Finland with opening regulations and the ‘casino 
economy’ (kasinotalous) overheating the market. The anti-elitist party being a 
junior partner in government led to criticism in terms of the metaphors of 
the softness of the seats of ministerial Audi’s and accusations of party ministers 
having spines made of banknotes – the latter trope, seteliselkärankainen, actually 
signified a split in the party. In the 1980s, the bases for corporatisation of state-
owned companies were laid.52
The Norwegian Progress Party was redefined as a libertarian party in 1983 
under the leadership of Carl I. Hagen. According to Swedish neoliberals, 
Hagen and his party did not measure up to mainstream media’s descriptions of 
‘ “neoliberalism” or “populism” ’.53 The party took aim at immigration in time 
for the 1987 local elections, when Hagen used a (now infamous) forged letter 
to portray a Muslim threat against Norwegian culture and Christianity.54 Still, 
Hagen argued as late as 1989 against ‘insane’ media accusations of xenophobia: 
‘Our profile has initially been, from the start in 1970, that we were against 
taxes, fees, and public intrusions. . . . but we have long been in favour of an 
immigration stop, as long as we have a socialist welfare state’.55 It was not until 
the 1990s that the party discourse would be rephrased around cultural differ-
ences and integration as key concerns.56 Meanwhile, neoliberal actors treated 
the Norwegian Progress Party as a fellow anti-welfare-state actor and down-
played their xenophobic tendencies.57 Just as the Finnish Rural Party was losing 
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their connection with the people in the minds of many when they were in 
the government in the 1980s, similar criticism was directed at the Finns Party 
when in power in 2015–2017. The Sipilä government, analytically termed as 
a three-legged Aalto chair – well-integrated but wobbly – carried out anti-
welfare state policies and tightened immigration policies.58
By 1989, Sweden was on the road to a fiscal, social, and political crisis that 
knocked the social democratic welfare-state project off its foundations. The 
minister of finance, social democrat Kjell-Olof Feldt, played a central role in 
the years and decisions leading up to the crisis. Feldt was generally recognised 
as a right-leaning economist. Swedish neoliberals applauded his inspirations 
from Thatcher and Reagan, welcomed him as ‘the high priest of Neoliberal-
ism’ and described the following tax reforms as ‘a form of Glasnost’.59 Neolib-
eral challengers to the social-democratic hegemony attempted to construct a 
chain of equivalences between the Swedish Social Democrats, the Soviet state, 
and politics in dissolution. In parallel to the Soviet Union, the Social Demo-
crats attempted to save the system through reforms aimed at higher efficiency. 
Feldt, like the Soviet leaders, embarked on an extensive reform programme. 
Hence, the failing system and its rulers were constructed as the main offenders 
in the counter-hegemonic critique at the time.60
1990s: neoliberalism – from fringe to mainstream
The Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War brought an end to 
the bipolar conflict. Neoliberal forces utilised this opportunity to administer 
economic shock therapy, and a wave of privatisation rolled across Northern 
and Eastern Europe. In several countries, neoliberal networks mobilised popu-
lar support, built coalitions, and framed privatisation as the only alternative 
to discredited statist systems. Social-democratic regimes (e.g. Poland, Sweden) 
launched economic reforms to transform and privatise state enterprises. Neo-
liberal emphases on private property and individualism shaped major aspects of 
these processes.61
Most analyses of Nordic populism focus exclusively on parliamentary party 
politics.62 From such a perspective it is easy to conclude that New Democracy 
were the only populists in Sweden and that they were largely unsuccessful – 
especially when compared to the electoral success of Danish and Norwegian 
People’s Parties. Yet, at the same time, neoliberal populists were able to move 
quickly from the margins to the mainstream, managing in the process to insti-
tutionalise political demands for decreased taxation and increased privatisation. 
They did so, however, without founding a parliamentary party. Instead they 
relied on extra-parliamentary ways of doing politics (think tanks, business asso-
ciations, etc.).63 Their demands gained parliamentary support because they were 
taken up by conservative and social democratic MPs who felt compelled to 
partially align their views with the neoliberal movement. When analysts won-
der at the seeming lack of populism in Sweden, they have simply been looking 
in the wrong place. Populism did indeed leave substantial marks on Swedish 
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politics in the 1990s, but it did so largely through the extra-parliamentary 
politics of radical neoliberals who succeeded in their stated aim to make the 
‘politically impossible possible’.64
Sweden’s first right-wing populist party, New Democracy, rolled in on a 
wave of populism created by the Swedish neoliberal movement. The party 
program was presented in 1990 in a context of severe fiscal and social crisis. 
While New Democracy mobilised against immigration policies from the out-
set, the xenophobic tendencies grew and became more apparent through the 
years.65 In 1991, the Swedish Social-Democratic party experienced their worst 
election since 1921; a right-wing government took office after nine years in 
opposition; and New Democracy, with their populist appeal, went from non-
existent to parliamentary success in less than a year (although their decline was 
nearly as swift). A shift in politics marked the end of the social democratic ide-
ology that had permeated Swedish politics since 1932. The social democratic 
hegemonisation of politics and society had assured a political consensus on the 
Swedish democracy and welfare model, but, as neoliberal ideas permeated the 
public debate, this model was described as a problem rather than a solution. 
Affective appeals and emotional engagement abounded in neoliberal rhetoric. 
Mainstream public political debate was, however, characterised by rational rea-
soning and managerial concerns. Social Democrats defended the administrative 
systems.66 They argued in terms of efficiency, instead of formulating a politics 
for the masses against ‘a few capitalists’, as chairman of the Social Democrats 
and two-time prime minister Per Albin Hansson put it in the famous ‘People’s 
Home-Speech’ (Folkhemstalet) of 1928.67
The Scandinavian populist parties all experienced crises in the mid-1990s. In 
1993, conflicting factions were tearing the Norwegian Progress Party apart. So 
far, conservatives and radical neoliberals had been united by common interests 
in market economy and liberal alcohol policies. Opposition grew between an 
older generation of ‘reactionaries’ proposing ‘large restrictions on immigration’ 
and a younger generation of ‘true liberals’ in favour of ‘completely free immi-
gration, dismantling the welfare state’,68 and so on, according to contemporary 
analysis by neoliberal intellectuals. Internal oppositions were even flaunted in 
televised debates in the aftermath of the poor election results of 1993. By 1997, 
immigration was framed as a threat to the existing socio-cultural harmony. 
With a rhetoric centred on ethnicity and difference, ‘ethnic Norwegians’ were 
coupled with norms and values like equality, peace and harmony, while immi-
gration was linked to conflict and loss of equality. On top of re-gaining voter 
support from losses in 1993, the Progress Party became Norway’s second-largest 
party in the 1997 national elections.69
In parallel, New Democracy’s populist leader abruptly left the party after 
internal conflicts in 1994. With new leadership, the core signifiers of the party’s 
discourse turned from taxes to immigration and electoral support plummeted. 
Like the Norwegian Progress Party and others that experience sudden success, 
New Democracy was unprepared for the number of seats they needed to fill. If 
the party had been better organised and less dependent on the two charismatic 
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founders, it might have retained support. While the Progress Party in Norway 
was able to build alliances and reinvigorate their rhetoric, New Democracy 
failed at both.70
Likewise, internal conflicts and power struggles eventually spelled the end of 
the Danish Progress Party’s success story. Kjærsgaard and her allies abandoned 
the party in the mid-1990s, and founded the Danish People’s Party. In People’s 
Party rhetoric, the ordinary people were positioned against the elite of well-
to-do experts, intellectuals, and socialists. Much like the Swedish neoliberal 
discourse, the right-wing populist message of the Danish People’s Party met 
little resistance from the Left. While the Danish People’s Party shared many of 
the demands initially posed by the Danish Progress Party, the former promoted 
welfare chauvinism (for ‘real’ Danes) against public sector reductions and pri-
vatisations. The nationalist tendencies of the People’s Party were clear, but they 
have nevertheless positioned themselves as equal to established right-wing par-
ties. Simultaneously, right-wing nationalists attacked leftist values and ideals at 
all levels of society.71
If populist parties in the Scandinavian countries were able to challenge 
social democratic hegemonies through demands for increased privatisation 
and decreased taxes in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, these notions became 
hegemonic themselves in the end. Therefore, we can speak of a hegemony 
that emerges and transforms over time. The central issues emerging from the 
1970s to the 1990s are the relations to the Soviet Union and market deregu-
lation. Populist parties have emerged as a response to dominant thinking in 
each of the political contexts. Yet these parties (and movements) take form 
around different points of contestation at different times, to contest cultures 
of consensus.
In Finland, the SMP spent the 1980s working inversely against unemploy-
ment and poverty, for example, through taxation. They were strongly anti-
elitists, but having held power, their support was collapsing. In the early 1990s, 
the economic recession steepened due to collapsing Eastern trade with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. SMP and its party newspaper consequently went 
bankrupt.72 In 1995, some of its key actors reinvented the party as the Finns 
Party (Perussuomalaiset). Simultaneously, in the ethnically relatively homoge-
neous Finland, the arrival of Somalian refugees and even the Ingrian peo-
ple from the former Soviet Union neighbouring areas – the latter especially 
welcomed by Mauno Koivisto, whom the SMP supported for Finnish presi-
dent – provoked some Finns Party politicians, notably Sulo Aittoniemi.73 For 
the Finns Party leader, Timo Soini (from 1997), the key point of contestation 
became the other parties and the European Union, which started to fill the 
hegemonic narratives in Finland in the 1990s. In complete contrast with the 
thinking of Veikko Vennamo, the original founder, the party adopted a stance 
against European integration and a critical perspective towards immigration and 
refugees.74 Welfare chauvinism became an entangled feature of the new party.75 
This transformation could be attributed to the collapse of the Soviet other and 
Finlandisation of the Finnish self-image, and the need for new narratives.
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Other potential populist parties in Finland at this point included the Greens 
and the liberals, although the roots of the Green movement in Finland are 
longer. The emblematic populist environmental moment was the Koijärvi 
movement in 1979 that inspired a generation and boosted the organisation of a 
political party in the shape of a fringe populist force contesting all the existing 
parties to offer an alternative.76 The Greens have been strong in Helsinki for a 
long time as the third and then the second-largest party, but attained national 
relevance only in the late 2010s. This was partly due to the success of a veteran 
from the 1980s, Pekka Haavisto, and confrontational, even populist, rhetoric 
by their then leader Ville Niinistö. In 1973–1992, the small liberal party on the 
style of Scandinavian populists, Constitutional Right Party (Perustuslaillinen 
oikeistopuolue, POP), led by Georg C. Ehrnrooth originally of the Swedish 
People’s Party,77 was right-wing particularly in terms of being anti-communist 
and against Kekkonen line.78 As SMP grew softer under Veikko Vennamo’s son 
Pekka Vennamo’s leadership, in particular, and joined governments, POP kept 
their ‘fringe populism’ going – until Ehrnrooth’s point of contestation disap-
peared in the early 1990s.
2000–2010s: mainstreaming fringe populism
Euroscepticism has been relevant to some degree for all the Nordic populist 
parties.79 In the case of the Danish People’s Party and Sweden Democrats, 
immigrants had been the source of identity after the hegemonic shift to the 
right in economic policies. This thinking also started to spread in Finland. 
One could also say that the Vennamo heritage on left-wing policies was lost 
and only the anti-elitist rhetoric (in the style of rötösherrat kuriin) remains in 
the renewed Finns Party programme. In the Nordic countries, populist par-
ties moved more steadily from the fringe to the mainstream and other parties 
appropriated their ideas.
The 2000s saw the establishment of the Finns Party. In his master’s thesis in 
1988, the Finns Party chairman Timo Soini discussed Scandinavian populism. 
He also named Pia Kjærsgaard as his reference point in his opinion pieces in 
the Helsingin Sanomat in the 2000s.80 His rhetoric confirmed how the duality 
of anti-elitism and anti-EU overshadowed anti-immigration; yet the tension 
remained. In the early 2000s, the voice of the suburbs, Tony Halme, an iconic 
boxer, became an MP for the Finns Party in Helsinki. Meanwhile, Timo Soini 
was elected as one of the representatives of the Helsinki Region at the Finnish 
parliament. The real breakthrough came only after the 2007 general elections, 
and in particular in 2008, when the scandal of election funding and the Law 
of the Land (maantapa) was debated. Established political parties had developed 
practices through which they could avoid unveiling their sources of electoral 
funding. Set against the ‘old parties’, the Finns Party emerged as a novel alter-
native: it did well in the 2008 local elections, and it gained a landslide in the 
2011 and 2015 elections. The voices of anti-immigration, with Jussi Halla-aho 
first elected to the Helsinki City Council in 2008, became intertwined with 
Nordic populists as hegemony challengers 165
anti-elitism. However, as Arter argues, the party was for the so-called ‘Finns’ 
but not as aggressively as the Scandinavian counterparts.81
In Sweden, the Social Democratic Party turned right to navigate the crisis 
of the 1990s. The political playing field became increasingly crowded around 
the centre. All the more so when the conservative party incorporated for-
mer social democratic slogans into their rhetoric in the early 2000s. The four 
right-wing parties formed a common alliance in the mid-2000s, and the vot-
ers’ political options were narrowed down to a choice between two ‘blocs’. In 
addition, voters experienced that the difference between the established parties 
shrunk to such a degree that it hardly mattered which party you voted for.82 
In this sedimented political culture, the Sweden Democrats gained attention 
as an alternative to the established order. The Sweden Democrats successfully 
exploited the political vacuum and presented themselves as the only viable 
political alternative to the disrupted consensus-oriented political elite. They 
adapted to the mainstream technical-rational political discourse by speaking of 
the costs of immigration, while mobilising voters with more affective appeals 
in their political propaganda. The organising principle of the Sweden Demo-
crats’ politics has always been the opposition between a national ‘us’ and the 
immigrant/non-Christian ‘them’ – unlike other Nordic populist parties, who 
initially focused on tax issues. In comparison with populist parties in Denmark, 
Norway, and Finland, the Sweden Democrats have lagged behind and only 
emerged as a real political contender since 2010–2014.83
The three populist alternatives in Sweden (the New Democracy, the extra-
parliamentary neoliberals and the Sweden Democrats) share similar politi-
cal strategies. Folklig is a term in Swedish (folkelig in Danish and Norwegian) 
that signifies practices that are popular, plebbish, or ‘like ordinary people’. 
Politicians may strive to appear folkliga. When political spokespersons appear 
as ordinary people do  – in sweatshirts and bucket hats in the case of New 
Democracy; with flaws or petty criminal behaviour (be it moonshining, tax 
evasion, gambling or drunk and disorderly behaviour) in the case of neoliber-
als or Sweden Democrats – their popularity increases. Both New Democracy 
and extra-parliamentary neoliberals emphasised fun, alcohol consumption, and 
common sense. New Democracy’s campaign film from 1991 was even titled 
‘Common Sense’.84 They bragged about their vast number of volunteers but 
limited finances. They toured the country in boats and cars, and spoke on fun 
fairs, campsites, and squares.85 Stressing the need to ‘listen to the people’ on 
national television in 1990, party founder Bert Karlsson appeared as ‘a man 
of the people’ who sympathised with the less fortunate. In congruence with 
our point about the post-foundational understanding of populism, a populist 
party is not by definition representing the ‘underclass’ or represented by it. The 
co-founder and party leader Ian Wachtmeister stood in stark contrast with his 
upper-class roots and ideological message of radical market liberalism coupled 
with anti-immigration. It has since been ‘the count’ Wachtmeister, rather than 
‘the valet’ Karlsson, who the Sweden Democrats have consulted in their elec-
tion campaigns.86
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New Democracy used rhetorical tropes that had been prominent among 
neoliberal radical intellectuals for many years: to take from the state and give 
to the individual, and so on. Their rhetoric positioned common people against 
politicians and their ‘contempt for people’. In short, they contested the politi-
cal status quo through affective arguments that appeal to the audience’s sense 
of neglect. New Democracy’s populist logic built on an ‘us’ that integrated dis-
parate identities under a common identity: ‘the common people’. It identified 
established politicians as ‘them’. In the preceding, broader neoliberal discourse, 
the populist logic is even clearer. There, the unifying ‘us’ mobilised against the 
system was the people as individuals, and the political ‘frontier’ was set against 
the social-democratic welfare state.87
As long as Sweden was characterised by a social-democratic hegemony, 
populism was voiced as an opposition to the social-democratic welfare state. 
Lately, the Sweden Democrats have begun to frame their politics as a more 
traditional version of social democracy  – in contrast to the contemporary 
Social-Democratic Party. Since the social-democratic welfare state has lost its 
hegemonic standing in Swedish politics, it no longer functions as the main 
opponent of populist politics. Consequently, these actors are left grappling for 
a new frontier. In positioning themselves as the true Social Democrats, spokes-
persons for the Sweden Democrats have made use of the old concept Folkhem-
met (the people’s home).88 Folkhemmet is a ‘shining example’89 of the culture 
of consensus mentioned at the beginning of this chapter and was produced 
by a historic compromise between capital and labour. However, it was also an 
important metaphor for the successful social democratic hegemonisation of 
Swedish political discourse, as argued by Erik Åsard and W. Lance Bennett.90 It 
has long since been obsolete in social democratic rhetoric.
The folkhem metaphor has now been re-activated by the Sweden Democrats 
to appeal to traditional social democratic voters – all the while articulating a 
nostalgic vision for the Swedish nation. The Social Democratic Party rep-
resents the political elite, just as it did in the neoliberal populist discourse of 
the 1980s and 1990s.91 The argument is that the Social Democratic Party has 
betrayed their ideological roots as well as the Swedish people.92 The Sweden 
Democrats’ financial politics have turned increasingly towards a market lib-
eral agenda during the past decade. Paradoxically, the party’s attitude to trade 
unions and workers’ rights have simultaneously taken a turn to the left, as voter 
support among unionised blue-collar workers increasingly favour the Sweden 
Democrats.93
Remembering the emptiness at the core of populism, we should also consider 
left populism. Recently, leftist aspirations in Sweden challenge the neoliberal 
hegemony through conscious and explicit populist politics inspired by Chantal 
Mouffe’s advocacy for a left populism.94 That is, a logic of articulation that places 
the universal identification ‘us’ in a dichotomy with ‘them’. Moving on from an 
attempt to re-assert class as the central signifier in political discourse,95 social dem-
ocratic think tank intellectuals recently initiated a new group within the Swed-
ish Social Democratic Party: ‘the Reformists’ (Reformisterna). These Reformists 
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challenge the neoliberal hegemony in and outside the Social Democratic Party. 
With demands to ‘reinstate the monetary system’, they attempt to construct a 
political frontier between ‘ordinary people’ and ‘the economic elite’.96 Through 
the articulation of a reform program that highlights a Green New Deal, they 
link together multiple environmental and economic struggles around a demand 
for equality and social justice against the status quo.97 Using the ‘ordinary peo-
ple’ as a point of identification enables them to reclaim voters from the Sweden 
Democrats – without constructing the latter or their voters as the enemy.
The Reformists actively challenge the status quo in both politics and media. 
Swedish news media have adopted a cultural valuation scale (GAL-TAN) from 
the political sciences in attempts to explain the successes of what they call 
populism: the Sweden Democrats, Brexit, Trump, the Finns Party, and so on. 
According to mainstream media, ‘the old battle between right and left’98 has 
been replaced by one between liberal globalists and conservative nationalists. 
In contention, the Reformists expose hegemonic practices that cover up redis-
tributive concerns. That is to say, they have emerged as a response to dominant 
thinking in Swedish politics and contest the status quo where cultural concerns 
are said to have replaced economic concerns.
The Finns party had a landslide in 2011 but remained in opposition. In 
Finland, the Finns Party went to a neoliberal austerity government in 2015 
with the Centre Party and the National Coalition. The millionaire faction in 
power in the Centre moved quite far from some of their traditional values, and 
after the failure in 2019 and steep decline in the party membership, the party 
changed leadership. The Finns Party term in office led to the decline of its 
support. Some also argued that the government did not succeed in contain-
ing immigration. The leadership was challenged and changed by a faction that 
mobilised on social media and Hommafoorumi online platform in the party con-
gress in June 2017. The congress elected Jussi Halla-aho, an MEP known for 
his strong anti-immigration and civilisationist stance and founder of the plat-
form, as party leader. None of the five ministers or those close to the founding 
member and chairman of the FP were chosen in the leadership. This faction, 
comprising half of the parliamentary caucus, stepped out and by autumn 2017 
established a new party: Blue Reform (Sininen tulevaisuus).
With the transformed leadership, the Finns Party succeeded in the 2019 
elections becoming one of the three largest parties. After the elections, fierce 
debates over whether or not they should be sitting at the right-wing end of the 
parliament where they were now assigned, as their economic policy resembled 
the early versions of Nordic right-populist parties. The earlier seat in the centre 
originated from the SMP, a splinter from the Agrarian Party, and an economic 
policy between the Left and the Right – until Juha Sipilä’s austerity govern-
ment (2015–2017) and leadership change. The Blue Reform were, however, 
not successful in the polls in the 2019 elections and did not run in the elections 
to the European Parliament, and Finns Party, while becoming the main opposi-
tion party and the most popular party in the polls in the summer 2019, did not 
do as well in the Euroelections as those for Eduskunta.
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The week preceding the European parliament elections of 2019 were over-
shadowed by the question of Russian influence in the newly forming nationalist 
bloc that included cooperation between Italian Lega, Freedom Party of Austria, 
and others with Nordic populist parties. The issue of hegemonic struggle with 
the eastern neighbour re-surfaced. It became apparent that several European 
populist parties, such as Matteo Salvini’s Lega in Italy or the Austrian FPÖ, 
with video-exposed leader Heinz-Christian Strache, had close ties to Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia. Considering the anti-Soviet heritage, this could have contrib-
uted to their poor result in comparison to the polls in general. As the tradi-
tional national identity in Finland is formed through what it is not (Russian 
or Swedish), questions remain to what extent the Finnishness in the renewed 
Finns Party is defined through opposition to Russia or the European Union or 
simply the migrants. The Sweden Democrats did not join this coalition.
In Norway and Denmark, the Progress Party and People’s Party respectively 
managed to secure increased voter support through the 2000s despite a series 
of scandals.99 Both have survived changes in leadership, replacing long-term 
leaders Hagen and Kjærsgaard, respectively. Widespread scepticism among the 
other Norwegian parliamentary parties initially made it difficult for the Pro-
gress Party to practice its theoretical leverage. The Danish People’s Party and 
the Sweden Democrats alike have transformed themselves by adapting social 
democratic ideals and rhetoric. Simultaneously, more radically right-wing and 
anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim parties emerge to challenge already-established 
populist parties from even stronger fringe positions. In the 2019 parliamentary 
elections, the Danish People’s Party suffered a significant setback  – halving 
their voter support – which can, if only in part, be attributed to the rise of new 
fringe parties. This is largely due to the Social Democrats adapting their lost 
rhetoric and combining it with a tough-on-immigration stance that had now 
become mainstream.
Addressing the overall transformations and political logics in different con-
texts, it is easy to see that the contents of demands and policies vary much 
more than the forms of their presentation do. Like the neoliberal movement, 
early right-wing populist parties in Norway and Denmark were neither ethno-
nationalist nor mobilised against immigration (until the 1980s). The Sweden 
Democrats have, on the contrary, always been ethno-nationalist and anti-
immigration but never neoliberal: they vote with the Social Democrats and 
Left party in many instances concerning labour market policies and workers’ 
rights. One thing is clear, however: the fringe populist parties mainstreamed 
themselves in the 2000s. However, many of them either fell back to a fringe 
position, such as in Finland, or were pushed there by more popular parties, as 
in the Danish case.
Transforming hegemony
There are several conjunctures that we can draw on that also have to do with 
international politics and are transnational. Going back to the 1960s, the 
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Finnish populist SMP was born out of the direct reaction against the Soviet-
friendly politics epitomised in the figure of Urho Kekkonen as the head of the 
Agrarian party, and finally the longest-serving president. The coupling of the 
Soviet developments and the domestic politics in the Nordic countries contin-
ued in terms of populist parties. As the Washington Consensus was establishing 
and the Soviet model crumbling, the populist parties also sought to question 
either the foreign policy related to it (in Finland) or the economic models 
that gained their raison d’être from the response to those models (Sweden and 
Scandinavia). In both Sweden and Finland, market deregulation discussions 
started in the 1980s. In the geographically more western Scandinavian coun-
tries Norway and Denmark, populist parties had already contested the idea of 
high taxation as a basis of the welfare-state model. As market liberalism was 
declared the winner in the Cold War global ideological contest, Soviet-style 
economies crumbled, welfare states were transformed, and communism no 
longer provided a political Other, the populist parties and movements were 
losing their point of contestation. In the 1990s, while the Finnish economy was 
in recession, in Sweden some claimed that the Soviet economy was privatising 
‘too fast’; others believed that it was not fast enough; but all agreed that priva-
tisations were necessary.100
The intertwining of neoliberalism and anti-immigration discourses often 
goes unexplained as a curiosity in Nordic populism research. The rationalising 
argument that supported neoliberal reforms, stressed as a given that the wel-
fare state is not affordable. This led to nationalism coupling with the welfare 
chauvinism that tries to rescue what is left of the welfare state and safeguard 
it from the newcomers. The recent turn of the Danish People’s Party to early 
social democratic ideals and the Sweden Democrats’ emphasis on the nostalgia 
of Folkhemmet that includes the welfare state testify to this process. Going back 
to the theoretical framework and our formula Populism = usaffect1 + frontieraffect2, 
we ask ourselves what picture of populism is emerging? Clearly each period 
has its own contents, but overall we argue that in the Scandinavian countries, 
the frontier feature to be opposed became welfare statism, to which individual-
ism and market economy were contrasted; while in Finland, the confrontation 
thrived with anti-Sovietism:
Scandinavian Populism (1970–2000)  =  people-as-individualsanti-system + welfare 
statismpast-system
Finnish Populism (1970–2000) = ordinary peopleinclusion + Soviet-leadloss of independence
Affects are a dimension we have not closely studied here – we add here anti-
system confrontation and the naming of something as past and allusion of inde-
pendence as potentials. The rhetoric of neoliberalism was affective in that it 
provided a vision of a new era and recognised of the individuals rather than a 
system (with clear anti-Soviet tones). In the Finnish case, one could hypoth-
esise that populism provided healing for the loss. Moving to the 2000s, it was 
replaced by nationalism that highlighted the Nordic people versus immigrants 
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axis. However, even here, it is about livelihoods: transforming neighbourhoods 
or surroundings as well as the foreign element of religion heightened the fron-
tier concept.101 However, welfare returns to the side of the ‘us’, as an affective 
dimension where welfare could also feature alongside nationalism. One inter-
pretation could look like this:
Nordic Populism (2000–2010s) = Nordic peoplewelfare-nationalism + immigrantstransforming-communties
We argue that welfare chauvinism restores the belief in the welfare state. In the 
Scandinavian countries, populists, and in Finland, some other parties spoke 
for years against the welfare state as a luxury to be afforded on a global scale, 
which has paved the way for welfare chauvinism. Fear of losing the welfare 
state in the face of the newcomers could explain a particular transformation 
that took place. In a sense, this fear was used by neoliberals in the 1980s – but 
their solution was to cut welfare expenditure and support for all, not just for 
a few. In short, the argument on the need to cut welfare provision in terms of 
economic efficiency and ageing populations provokes responses that are welfare 
chauvinism. This is how neoliberalism and anti-immigration can get entangled 
in populist meaning-making.102
We conclude that, using the framework of the formula of populism, it is 
easy to see that the political Other has transformed: the frontier used to mark 
a contrast to the welfare-statist regulated market, or the collaboration with the 
USSR in Finland, but as marked deregulation mainstreamed, the contestation 
focused on the suspicion of newcomers, sometimes with welfare-chauvinist 
undertones. The political ‘us’ emerged from this contestation as a relatively 
monoethnic constellation.
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9  Cultural policy and cultural 
diversity
Pasi Saukkonen
Policies reflect societal realities as well as political ideas and ideologies. There-
fore, policies are in a state of constant change. Cultural policy makes no excep-
tion. In modern times, both the more narrow arts policy and the broader 
cultural policy have developed in relation to what has been taking place in their 
local and national environments, with regard to international agreements and 
in the context of the proliferation of ideas and innovations. In addition to the 
promotion of arts and creativity, policies regarding arts and culture have always 
had other, more instrumental, societal functions.
The first half of the 20th century was characterized in Europe by the consol-
idation of nation-building processes, and cultural policy instruments were used 
to strengthen national feelings and enhance national esteem. In the second half 
of the century, especially in the 1960s and thereafter, cultural policy increas-
ingly became a tool to enhance welfare and well-being. At the same time, the 
cultural needs and rights of traditional minorities and the value of the diversity 
of cultural expressions received more attention.
Meanwhile, immigrants from other parts of Europe and from other parts 
of the globe began to arrive. In the final decades of the century, practically 
all European countries had become destinations of international mobility. As 
immigrants formed families, new ethnic groups and cultural minorities were 
established. Many countries acknowledged the diversification of societies; some 
of them even celebrated multiculturalism. Gradually, national cultural policies 
started accommodating their principles and operations in relation to changing 
demographic and ethno-cultural structures.
In the 1990s, however, different forms of neo-nationalism appeared on the 
political scene, challenging multiculturalist ideas of responding to the new 
diversity. Nationalist forces have been able to occupy influential positions in 
many countries and this development has had repercussions for national cul-
tural policies. Moreover, the global financial crisis that started in 2008 has put 
additional pressure on the funding of public services. In many countries, cul-
tural policies and arts policies have suffered from austerity measures.1 In times 
of affluence, it is also easier to allocate resources for minorities and other devia-
tions from mainstream culture than in periods of resource scarcity.
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In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the development sketched previ-
ously by focusing on four Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. The main questions guiding the analysis are the following: what has 
been the national cultural policy reaction towards the increasing ethnic and 
cultural diversity in these countries? Have neo-nationalist political ideas, parties 
and movements during the last few decades already influenced national cultural 
policies? Is there a Nordic cultural policy model, and if yes, is this model under 
pressure?
Nordic nations and the diversification of societies
Nordic countries have traditionally had a reputation of being nation-states, that 
is, societies where the national community and the political unit, the state, are 
congruent. There are differences between them, though. Sweden and Den-
mark belong to older European states where the nation-building process has 
been state-led. Norway and Finland are, in turn, countries that gained full 
independence in the early 20th century. The 19th-century nation formation 
took place at the same time as a state-seeking process was going on. In com-
parison with many Eastern European nations that belonged to the Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, or Ottoman empires, in both cases there was nevertheless 
an autonomous unit before independence within which the consolidation of 
the state-nation relation could develop: the personal union between Norway 
and Sweden since 1814 and the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland since 
1809.
These four Nordic countries never had completely homogeneous  populations – 
that is, there have always been ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural minorities.2 
The Sámi, speaking many different languages, are considered an indigenous peo-
ple with age-old origins in the region. The Roma diaspora was also established 
in Scandinavia centuries ago. In larger cities, there was often a Jewish community 
and other minorities and ethnic or national groups. At the end of the 19th cen-
tury, many Tatars moved to Finland thereby forming one of the oldest Muslim 
communities in Western Europe.
In literature concerning nationalism and the treatment of minorities, it has 
often been mentioned that the state-led (often Western European) version of 
nation-building has been more benign towards minorities, whereas in the state-
seeking (often Eastern European) countries there has more often been hostil-
ity and even persecution. Assimilation has been a frequently applied model of 
integration in both cases, but in the more radical nationalism, it has often been 
carried out with clearly oppressive means.3
If we look at these Nordic countries from the perspective of minority rights, 
the picture is, however, more complicated. In the first half of the 20th century, 
minority rights were best guaranteed in Finland. Finland became an officially 
bilingual state right from the beginning of independence and the state church 
system was abandoned in the 1860s. Denmark recognized the cultural rights of 
Germans in South Jylland after the plebiscite in 1920, but otherwise minorities 
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had few rights before the second half of the 20th century. Norway also became 
bilingual, with two variations of the Norwegian language, nynorsk and bok-
mål. Sweden was characterized by what has been called folkhem-nationalism in 
which the basic idea was that it would be better for the members of minor-
ity groups and communities to assimilate into the majority, ethnically and 
culturally.4
Generally speaking, there was positive development in the position of 
minorities and in the provision of individual and collective rights for members 
of minority communities after the Second World War. Especially since the 
mid-1960s, a kind of general mental or theoretical framework was developed 
within which the recognition of minority rights was combined with the con-
cession made by many minorities not to challenge state integrity. Instead of 
full independence, the objective became different kinds of autonomy solutions, 
either territorial or non-territorial, or at least the provision of cultural rights for 
the representatives of minorities.5 In Norway, Sweden and Finland, the position 
of the Sámi, in particular, started improving in this period.6
At the same time, ethnic and cultural structures have undergone significant 
changes. Europe had been a continent of emigration for centuries, and in the 
last decades of the 19th century vast numbers of people from the Nordic coun-
tries left their places of origin to search for a new life and opportunities else-
where, mainly in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. After 
the Second World War, as a result of the collapse of colonial empires and of 
the post-war reconstruction and rapid economic development, many European 
countries started either receiving immigrants from former colonies or recruit-
ing a foreign labour force and sometimes both.
With regard to post-war immigration, there are again some important dif-
ferences between the Nordic countries. The most obvious exception is Finland 
that remained a country of emigration until the 1970s, much longer than the 
other three Scandinavian states. The main country of destination for Finnish 
emigrants was Sweden that, in turn, has received more newcomers than any 
other Nordic country. In 2000, the percentage of that population that were 
foreign-born was in Finland only 2.6 per cent, and Finns constituted the larg-
est group of immigrants in Sweden. At that time, there were about one mil-
lion foreign-born people in Sweden (11.3%). In Denmark and Norway, the 
foreign-born population stood at 5.6 and 6.8 per cent, and in absolute num-
bers, the size of the immigrant population was similar (about 300.000), too.
Since the turn of the millennium, the Nordic countries have also followed 
different paths in immigration and immigration policy. Denmark started 
restricting its immigration policy, especially concerning those seeking inter-
national protection. Sweden, in turn, remained an important destination of 
international mobility until the political turnover in 2015, and the share of 
those with a refugee background of all immigrants is high in international 
comparison. Finland became a country of immigration in the early 1990s, and 
immigration from Estonia, Russia and other countries continued to diversify 
the population rapidly in the 2000s. Norway also has recently received many 
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asylum seekers. In addition, the country has become an important destination 
of labour migrants from countries that joined the European Union in 2004 
such as Poland and Lithuania. In terms of the share of migrants in population, 
Norway has approached Sweden, whereas Finland has come closer to Den-
mark (Table 9.1). If we would include those born in the country of residence 
to parents born abroad (the so-called second generation), the figures would 
be much higher, and the gap between Finland and the other countries signifi-
cantly wider.7
This development means that the Nordic countries of today are unquestion-
ably ethnically and culturally diverse. There are hundreds of languages spoken, 
privately and publicly, especially in the metropolitan areas. All major world 
religions with their belief systems and ceremonies are present in Nordic spir-
itual life. A vast number of cultural traditions are reproduced in smaller and 
larger circles. Lots of people have some kind of combined, mixed or hyphen-
ated identity, many individuals also feel like living in a third space outside of all 
ethno-cultural or national categories. Calling these countries nation-states in 
the meaning stated here is no longer correct.
Nordic multiculturalism
Before analysing the cultural policy development in Denmark, Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden more closely, it is worthwhile to take a more detailed look 
at different approaches to ethnic and cultural diversity in these four coun-
tries. Nationalism was, after the Second World War, discredited as an ideology, 
especially in its most extreme, fascist forms. However, there are significant 
Table 9.1 Top ten foreign-born populations by country of birth in 2017.
Denmark   Finland   Norway   Sweden  
Poland 39.400 Former 56.476 Poland 97.553 Finland 153.620
USSR
Germany 35.660 Estonia 45.659 Sweden 48.316 Syria 149.418
Syria 33.530 Sweden 32.147 Lithuania 37.686 Iraq 135.129
Turkey 32.45 Iraq 13.825 Somalia 28.720 Poland 88.704
Romania 24.42 Russia 13.668 Germany 27.965 Iran 70.637
Sweden 22.85 Somalia 11.102 Denmark 24.762 Former 66.539
Yugoslavia
Iraq 21.22 China 10.447 Iraq 22.524 Somalia 63.853
Norway 20.19 Thailand 10.184 Philippines 22.211 Bosnia and 58.181
Herzegovina
United Kingdom 19.54 Viet Nam 7.468 Syria 20.833 Germany 50.189
Bosnia and 17.14 Former 7.307 Pakistan 20.138 Turkey 47.060
Herzegovina Yugoslavia
Foreign-born 641.3   357.541   799.797   1784.497
population, N
Foreign-born 11.2   6.5   15.1   18.0
population, %
Source: OECD.
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differences between states with regard to the cultural rights of minorities and 
newcomers even within the relatively homogeneous group of Nordic coun-
tries. Some Nordic countries have been more nationalist and less multicultural-
ist than others.8
In literature concerning minority rights and immigrant integration, there 
is usually a distinction made between assimilationist countries and multicul-
turalist countries.9 In an assimilationist strategy, historical minorities are hardly 
recognized, and immigrants are supposed to leave behind their old identity and 
cultural traditions and markers. Multiculturalism, in turn, recognizes different 
forms of ethnic and cultural diversity. The state regards this diversity positively, 
or at least neutrally, and feels obligated to support at least some minorities in 
the realization of cultural rights.
The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) developed at Queens Univer-
sity in Canada is helpful in comparing the Nordic countries with regard to 
the cultural rights of national minorities, indigenous people and immigrant 
groups. The MCP Index monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies 
in 21 Western democracies. It has been designed to provide information about 
multiculturalism policies in a standardized format concerning the three types 
of minorities mentioned previously. Each policy indicator captures a policy 
dimension where liberal-democratic states face a choice about whether or not 
to take a multicultural turn and to become more accommodating and support-
ive of minorities.10
The Swedish post-war approach was assimilationist until the late 1960s after 
which the country took a conspicuous multiculturalist turn concerning both 
more traditional and more recent minorities (Table 9.2). Instead of assimilation, 
the key words of the new policy became equality, co-operation and freedom of 
choice. The last point referred to the right of newcomers and their descendants 
to choose whether they would like to become Swedish or to maintain their 
previous identity and culture. Nowadays, it is the most multiculturalist country 
regarding immigrant groups in Europe.
When it comes to the total score, Finland comes first. This is because the MCP 
Index does not recognize Nordic minorities other than the Swedish-speakers in 
Table 9.2 Multiculturalism policies in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
  Total score for immigrant Total score for Total score for national
minorities indigenous people  minorities
  1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 2000 2010 1980 2000 2010
Denmark 0 0 0 0 6 7 7 N.B. N.B. N.B.
Finland 0 0 1.5 6 3.5 3.5 4 4 4.5 4.5
Norway 0 0 0 3.5 0.5 4 5 N.B. N.B. N.B.
Sweden 3 3.5 5 7 1 2 3 N.B. N.B. N.B.
Source: Multiculturalism Policy Index.
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Finland as a national minority.11 The Sámi policy is most advanced in Norway, 
but the Danish policy with regard to the rights of the population of Greenland 
is even better assessed. Denmark turns out to be the least multiculturalist. In 
relation to immigrant integration, there has been multiculturalist development 
between 2000 and 2010 in Finland, Norway and Sweden, whereas the Danish 
approach has remained strictly assimilationist.12
Cultural policy development
The development of modern Nordic cultural policy has taken place in the gen-
eral context of the construction of the Nordic welfare state.13 The autonomy of 
the field of the arts has occupied a central position, and the arm’s length princi-
ple in making many policy decisions has been guaranteed. Cultural policy, arts 
policy in particular, has been regarded as a means to promote aesthetic values 
in a society according to a humanistic rationality that emphasizes artistic quality 
as the most important assessment criteria. Under the slogan or cultural democ-
ratization, arts of high quality were made accessible to all citizens regardless of 
their social status or geographical location.
Together with the expansion of financing of culture and the arts by public 
authorities, other aims, objectives, rationalities and discourses have emerged. 
Dorte Skot-Hansen14 has in the Danish context and from the point of view 
of local cultural policy written about a social rationality emphasizing social 
and cultural emancipation, and the Swedish scholar Jenni Johannisson15 has 
written about welfare discourse enhancing citizenship participation. Cultural 
democracy became, especially in the 1970s, one of the keywords of cultural 
policy, denoting an increasing recognition of group-based cultural activities and 
of different forms or artistic and cultural expressions. Local cultural initiatives 
were increasingly stimulated, and everyday culture was given more credit. In 
this heyday of Nordic welfare states, cultural policy was also legitimized as an 
important instrument in the fight against the negative impacts of commerciali-
zation and cultural industry.16
Nordic scholars also seem to be quite unanimous in their judgments that 
in the last few decades, since the 1980s, the instrumentalization of cultural 
policies has become all the more prominent.17 Instead of having an intrin-
sic value, arts and culture are increasingly seen as assets that can be used for 
social, economic and even political purposes. The role of markets has become 
stronger and international visibility is appreciated more than before. Commer-
cial culture is not shunned any more. Quite the contrary, economic success is 
increasingly taken as a sign of high quality. As a result, different rationalities and 
discourses are now overlapping in Nordic cultural policies making these poli-
cies quite multifaceted.
Despite of these similarities in overall cultural policy development, based 
on the differences between the four Nordic countries with regard to minority 
rights and the integration of immigrants, we can expect that there should also 
be clear differences between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden when it 
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comes to the adaptation of arts policy and cultural policy to the more diverse 
societal realities. In the following, I  shall briefly look at the development in 
each of these four countries separately. I will mainly concentrate on the policy 
principles and policy implementation concerning immigrants and new ethnic 
groups.18
Sweden: from celebration of diversity to mainstreaming
In the Swedish Government Bill on Culture in 1974, immigrants and mem-
bers of minority groups  – together with children, handicapped people and 
other marginalized people  – were regarded as disadvantaged groups whose 
position should be improved. Immigrants and minorities were also thought to 
give inspiration to Swedish society if they had a chance to maintain their own 
culture and identity. State institutions were expected to give groups and com-
munities as much autonomy as possible in managing their own affairs.19
This reasoning was in line with the changes in the overall approach of Swed-
ish society towards minorities and immigrants. In practice, however, concrete 
action remained quite modest, and for the most part, located outside official 
cultural policy. Swedish schools started giving native language instruction to 
immigrants and to members of minority groups. Newcomers and members 
of minority groups were also encouraged to form their own associations and 
media organizations and to apply for public funding. Immigrant and minority 
cultural activities were supposed to take place mainly within these organiza-
tional frameworks.
In the 1990s, Swedish integration policy and cultural policy were almost 
simultaneously reformed. Immigrants and minorities were now regarded as an 
intrinsic part of Sweden, and diversity (mångfald) became a key concept.20 The 
emphasis of policy moved from a group-based to an individual-based approach. 
The national cultural policy reform also introduced a new concept, world cul-
ture (världskultur), which took a central place in diversity-related cultural policy 
and mainly referred to non-Western cultures.21 Furthermore, there was a pro-
posal to establish regional world culture consultants.22
The commission report that preceded the government’s 1997 proposition 
on integration policy urged the Swedish cultural policy and cultural landscape 
to better reflect society’s diversity. Swedish cultural arenas and institutions were 
challenged to broaden their operational framework and offerings. Specific state 
allowances to promote the cultural activities of ethnic or linguistic groups were 
also suggested. In the final proposition, concrete ideas were, nevertheless, either 
omitted or profoundly reformulated.23
The next major step was taken in 2004 when the Swedish Government 
decided to proclaim 2006 a specific Year of Cultural Diversity (Mångkulturåret 
2006). The main idea was that publicly funded cultural institutions and organi-
zations have a responsibility to address and include the whole Swedish popula-
tion.24 Studies conducted as preparatory work for the special year had shown 
that there was a wide gap between those people who were regularly involved in 
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publicly financed cultural activities as practitioners or audiences and those who 
were rarely or never involved.25
In the final report regarding the accomplishments during Mångkulturåret, 
the national coordinator, Yvonne Rock, found it promising that there exists a 
strong and growing will to promote ethnic and cultural diversity in the pub-
licly financed cultural sector.26 However, the Year of Cultural Diversity was 
also treated with criticism in the Swedish media and among artists and cultural 
workers. For example, instead of the original aim of generating long-lasting, 
structural changes, the year was often considered something special and tem-
porary, sometimes even as something that disturbed already existing activities 
and development.27
Swedish cultural policy was once again reformed in 2009. According to 
the Government Bill on cultural policy, culture in Sweden should now be a 
dynamic, challenging and independent force based on freedom of expression. 
Everyone should be able to participate in cultural life, and creativity, diversity 
and artistic quality should mark society’s development. Under the heading, 
‘diversity and inter-cultural co-operation’, the bill discusses discrimination, 
participation in culture and the arts, gender equality, national minorities and 
other forms of diversity. Cultural policy should contribute to increasing diver-
sity and to a multifaceted cultural supply and thus to everyone’s increased free-
dom of choice.28
So close to Mångkulturåret, references to ethnic and cultural diversity are 
strikingly short, superficial and ambiguous. Jenny Johannisson has also pointed 
out that there is a clear rank order in the Swedish cultural policy that also 
reflects the tensions between particularism and universalism and between dem-
ocratic and aesthetic values, favouring the latter.29 Nina Edström and Charlotte 
Hyltén-Cavallius, in turn, argue that integration policy and cultural policy have 
moved further away from each other.30 At the same time, integration policy 
initiatives have since been, at least rhetorically, included in the cultural policy. 
An illustration of this might be that the Swedish Arts Council (Kulturrådet), 
which allocates state funding to many arts and cultural institutions, now points 
at promoting the cultural diversity perspective as one of their central tasks.
Finland: multiculturalism in principle with little  
concrete impact
Finnish cultural policy adapted to the societal change quite swiftly when immi-
gration started to increase in the early 1990s. The first policy guidelines of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture concerning immigration were published in 
2003. In this document, cultural services and the support mechanisms in the 
field of culture and the arts were considered important means to advance inte-
gration. The needs of minority cultures should be better taken into account in 
the general system for supporting arts and culture and in the functioning of cul-
tural and art institutions. Furthermore, the cultural needs of immigrants should 
be taken care of by increasing the financial means for supporting minority 
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cultures to correspond with the changes caused by immigration. Finally, sys-
tems for supporting professional artists that belong to ethnic minorities and 
their organizations should be developed.
These guidelines can be seen as a key document that has laid the general 
framework for Finnish cultural policy regarding cultural diversity. Other strate-
gic documents have also displayed a positive view to ethnic and cultural diver-
sity and to the cultural rights of immigrants. For example, the national strategy 
for cultural policy that was published in 2009 clearly affirms the positive atti-
tude towards diversity and multiculturalism:
Finland is a multicultural country with a strong cultural identity. The cul-
tural diversity springs from a wealth of diverse regions, languages, indig-
enous cultures and cultural heritage  – diverse cultural expressions and 
mores. . . . Immigrants are a new creativity and talent resource, and the 
positive effects of multiculturalism add to the vitality of Finnish culture.31
There have been concrete instruments to achieve the stated policy goals in the 
2003 guidelines. At the national level, the main channel to financially support 
the maintenance of language, culture and identity has been the state grants for 
supporting multiculturalism and combating racism. Another important meas-
ure has been the establishment of the Helsinki City Library to function as the 
national Multilingual Library. The cultural needs of immigrants and cultural 
minorities have also been included into general efforts to secure everyone’s 
equal opportunity to participate in culture and to express creativity. In order 
to achieve this task, the Ministry of Education started financing Culture for 
All Service in 2003. An independent association later took over this service. 
The state-funded Cultura Foundation supports the maintenance and develop-
ment of the linguistic and cultural identity of the Russian-speaking population 
in Finland and also otherwise promotes bidirectional and multi-dimensional 
integration.
In 2009, The Arts Council of Finland (later the Arts Promotion Centre) 
started distributing grants for art projects promoting multiculturalism in Fin-
land. The overall aims were, on the one hand, to strengthen the opportunities 
for immigrant artists and for artists belonging to national ethnic minorities to 
engage in artistic activities and to take part on an equal basis in Finnish artistic 
life. On the other hand, the objective was to support the multicultural work 
of other artists and working groups and art projects promoting intercultural 
interaction in Finland.32 The Arts Promotion Centre also later distributed the 
grants for supporting multiculturalism and combating racism.
It would thus be unfair to say that multiculturalism in Finnish cultural policy 
would be mere rhetoric. However, similar to the Swedish situation, a closer 
look reveals some qualifications to the general picture. For example, we can 
observe a discrepancy between the general and specific level of cultural policy 
documents. Immigration, minorities and the overall ethnic and cultural diver-
sity, and the new challenges that these changes pose for national cultural policy, 
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were easily discernible in the general cultural policy documents, such as the 
cultural policy strategy. In policy documents closer to the implementation of 
cultural policy and arts policy, such as policy plans and programs for music, 
visual arts and performing arts, these questions were much weaker and far less 
systematically answered.33
This observation is also in line with the results of a survey carried out in 2007 
in which arts and cultural institutions in the Helsinki region were asked how 
they take immigration and the ethnic and cultural diversification of Finland 
into account.34 The survey revealed that there undoubtedly was much goodwill 
in the Finnish arts and cultural institutions to do something. However, there 
were very few examples of concrete action. In many cases, these activities were 
considered something additional that one can start implementing if there is 
extra funding available.35
It is also relevant to ask how much money there has been in the Finnish cul-
tural policy to achieve the stated policy objectives regarding cultural diversity. 
Based on the available sources, one can conclude that the amount of money 
for the maintenance of language and culture and for multicultural arts projects 
has been relatively small. Public funding has mainly been sufficient to relatively 
small-scale and project-like activities only.36
Norway: slow acceptance of the change
According to Trevor Davies37 (2007), Norwegian cultural policy started paying 
more attention to the ethnic and cultural diversification of the society at the 
end of the 1990s. Before that, activities had usually been limited to separate, 
often short-term, projects and initiatives without sufficient funding. In 1996, it 
was officially acknowledged that Norwegian society has always been culturally 
diverse and will also increasingly be so in the future. As in Sweden and Finland, 
diversity was then in Norway generally seen as an enriching element and an 
asset in society.
An important specific investment was the Mosaikk programme from 1998 
to 2000. The main purpose of this programme was to promote multicultural 
and intercultural expressions in the established arts and cultural policy arrange-
ments and in the daily operations in culture and the arts. Furthermore, the pro-
gramme strived for improving minority groups’ opportunities for self-defined 
creativity and for enhancing the participation of members of minority groups 
in the arts as artists and as audience.
As a whole, Mosaikk was considered a success. However, the incorporation 
of diversity issues into the ordinary operations of arts institutions proved to be 
difficult also in Norway. In addition, the aims and objectives of the programme 
were criticized for being not clear enough and the scope of the programme for 
being too large. The demarcation of multicultural projects into a category of 
its own, in which rules different from the rest of the arts world and arts policy 
would apply, was also criticized.38
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Furthermore, inspired by the Swedish Year of Cultural Diversity and the 
European Union Year of Intercultural Dialogue, Norway decided to celebrate 
2008 as a specific Year of Cultural Diversity (Mangfaldsår). The aim of this the-
matic year was to stimulate both traditional and new cultural actors to work for 
the sake of cultural diversity and to strengthen the cooperation of established 
institutions with artists and audiences with a minority background. In addition, 
there was an effort to incorporate a multicultural perspective into different 
operations and to institutionalize arenas in which people representing different 
views could challenge each other. Similar to the Swedish Mångkulturåret, cul-
tural diversity was supposed to have sustainable impact on Norwegian cultural 
policy.
However, also in this case, the development has been slow and cumber-
some. In 2013, an extensive cultural policy report examined the role of cul-
tural policy in the Norwegian nation-building process, analysed contemporary 
challenges and proposed recommendations. According to this Kulturutrednin-
gen, cultural diversity has become an important characteristic in Norwegian 
society. However, this demographic fact is not properly reflected in culture 
and the arts, in the professional and institutionalized part of cultural life, in 
particular. People belonging to minority groups are clearly underrepresented 
in culture and the arts. The authors of the report point out that in the future it 
would be essential to enhance the accessibility of cultural services and to give 
support to such forms of arts and culture that different groups find interesting 
and meaningful.39
Denmark: ignorance of diversity issues
Knowing the general anti-multiculturalist approach of Denmark to the cul-
tural rights of immigrants, it is not surprising to notice that issues related to 
the diversification of Danish society have largely been ignored in Danish cul-
tural policy.40 Not completely, though. In the 1970s, at the same time cultural 
democracy (the equality of different forms of cultural creativity and expres-
sions) and cultural democratization (increased equality in the participation in 
‘high culture’) were important catchwords in cultural policy, cultural activities 
of ethnic and cultural minorities, and the intrinsic value of these activities, were 
also increasingly recognized.
However, Dorte Skot-Hansen41 has remarked that this recognition-in-
principle had little practical impact. The promotion of cultural democracy was 
mostly delegated to Danish municipalities. In some cases, local communities 
incorporated activities by immigrant or minority groups or by immigrant art-
ists to the operations of local cultural centres or community houses. At the 
national level, ‘multiculturalist’ cultural policy activities were located into the 
social sector or into humanitarian organizations that, in the final instance, 
aimed at a one-way integration of newcomers into society. Of these activities, 
many remained separate from other operations and of short duration.
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At the end of the 1990s, there was a short period when the general attitude 
seemed to be changing. Minister of Culture Jytte Hilden felt the need to better 
recognize the existence of different subcultures, including those of immigrant 
groups. A series of publications on cultural policy (Kulturens politik) included 
a subchapter on culturally diverse Denmark. The authors of this chapter sug-
gested that the national government should initiate concrete action to benefit 
immigrants. The Hilden’s successor, Ebbe Lundgaard, also pointed out that 
Danish cultural policy should ‘provide possibilities for the new Danes to culti-
vate their cultures, preferably in a form which invites other Danes to gain more 
familiarity with them’.42
These suggestions did not receive much positive response nor did they lead 
to concrete implementation. In addition to small-scale activities, one can notice 
the mentioning of ethnic and cross-cultural art among the two focus areas of 
a specific development fund (Kulturministeriets Udviklingsfond) established in 
1998. Its role, however, remained modest. According to Skot-Hansen, this was 
partly a result of the lack of goals clear enough to promote concrete action.43 
Furthermore, there were difficulties in combining the traditional notion of 
quality emphasizing universalist and aesthetic values and a more group-based 
notion of quality that recognizes different cultural contexts in making value 
judgments.
Neo-nationalism and cultural policy
The brief analysis of cultural policy development in the four Nordic countries 
here reveals, on the one hand, that there are differences between Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. Accommodation to new and more diverse 
demographic realities is traceable especially in Finland and Sweden and to a 
growing extent also in Norway whereas in Denmark societal change caused 
by immigration has been approached with hesitation if not reluctance. On the 
other hand, however, even in the more multiculturalist countries, the inclusion 
of diversity issues into mainstream cultural policy has been cumbersome.
During the last 25 years or so, the Nordic political landscape has been com-
plemented with new parties and movements that have sometimes been labelled 
right-wing populist parties, radical right parties, or xenophobic politics.44 In 
this context, I will call these actors neo-nationalist because of the importance 
of restrictions to immigration, critique of multiculturalism and the empha-
sis on traditional ‘national’ culture on their political agenda.45 Can we trace 
any impact of neo-nationalism in Nordic cultural policy during the last few 
decades?
In Sweden, the electoral support of neo-nationalism, in the shape of Swe-
den Democrats, long remained at a low level, but it has recently started rising. 
In the 2014 parliamentary election, the party received almost 13 per cent of 
the vote, and in 2018, the electoral support rose to 17.5 per cent. Until now, 
the established parties have refused to co-operate with them, thus isolating the 
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party from decision-making. Therefore, we can, at least for the time being, 
notice that Swedish cultural policy has had a rather anti-populist and anti-
nationalist character even though there have not been any notable new open-
ings towards the incorporation of diversity into cultural policy or arts policy 
either.
The Finnish nationalist-populist party, the True Finns (later the Finns Party) 
received a big victory in the 2011 national elections and was able to main-
tain its level of support in the 2015 and 2019 elections. In 2015, the party 
also joined the government coalition together with the moderate conservatives 
(National Coalition) and the Center Party. A representative of the party, Sampo 
Terho, was nominated as the minister of culture in May  2017.46 In public, 
Terho was frequently interpreted as a conservative willing to support culture 
with a national or traditional character. This possibility to exercise power has 
not, however, caused major repercussions to national cultural policy. When the 
law for the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company was reformed, the tasks of 
the company were slightly modified to a more nationalist and less multicultural 
direction.47
The Norwegian Progress Party, which represents Nordic nationalist pop-
ulism in Norway, has been a partner in two consecutive governments since 
2013. This has not, however, led into dramatic changes in the Norwegian cul-
tural policy from the point of view of ethnic and cultural diversity. According 
to Per Mangset and Bård Kleppe, the main reason behind the fact that there are 
now fewer programmes emphasizing multiculturalism in the arts is the growing 
emphasis on the autonomy or the arts. Guidelines promoting multiculturalism, 
for example, have been abolished from the funding agreements of national 
cultural organizations.48
The most obvious impact can be discovered in Denmark where, after the 
2001 election, a ten-year period of Centre-Right minority governments lean-
ing on the support of the nationalist and populist Danish People’s Party started. 
This led to cuts in the state cultural budget, including the closing down of the 
development fund mentioned earlier. Danish language and traditional Danish 
culture were emphasized in culture policy, the launch of the Danish cultural 
canon as the most concrete indication of this approach. None of the works of 
art included in the canon was made by an immigrant artist or reflected immi-
grant experiences in Danish society.49
In 2011–2015, two left-wing cabinets led by the Social Democratic prime 
minister governed Denmark. According to Dorte Skot-Hansen,50 a more lib-
eral attitude towards diversity prevailed and there was an explicit wish to depart 
from a strict division between the Danish ‘us’ and the foreign ‘them’. However, 
these ideas never resulted as major concrete action. In 2015–2019, two right-
wing governments again strongly emphasized national values and traditions in 
cultural policy. According to the Government Declaration of the third govern-
ment of Lars Løkke Rasmussen: ‘Culture is a decisive element of our identity 
as a nation and as a people.’
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Conclusion
Nordic countries have often been classified as states where the political unit and 
the national community are congruent, but this nation-state characterization is 
no longer correct. All four countries are ethnically and culturally diverse and 
continue to be ever more so. The largest cities, in particular, are home to lots of 
ethnic, national, linguistic and religious groups and communities from all over 
the world. Majority-minority situations where the native population no longer 
exceeds the 50 per cent threshold are increasingly common.
No unified Nordic model exists to respond to this ethno-cultural diversifica-
tion. Sweden embraced multiculturalism in the late 1960s whereas Denmark 
has until today been reluctant to accept this societal change and to provide 
immigrants with group-related cultural rights. When immigration to Finland 
started increasing, this country also took a positive view towards multicul-
tural solutions. Norway has also gradually started delivering more rights and 
freedoms to newcomers and their communities, getting closer to Sweden and 
Finland and further away from Denmark.
Focussing on cultural policy development, we can also trace differences 
between the Nordic countries. There has been more cultural policy multi-
culturalism in Sweden and in Finland whereas Danish cultural policy has not 
accommodated cultural policy in an increasingly diverse society. In contrast, 
the governments have often explicitly expected newcomers to assimilate to 
Danish values. The Norwegian development has again taken a position in 
between, gradually approaching the Swedish and Finnish recognition of the 
need for policy adjustment.
However, it is also important to notice that the implementation of multi-
culturalist cultural policy has often turned out to be slow and problematic. In 
particular, it has been difficult to incorporate diversity issues into regular arts 
policy and cultural policy. Even though mainstreaming has been the explicit 
target, special arrangements have been the most frequently applied solution. 
Resources allocated to diversity programmes and practices have been modest, 
fragmented and usually short-lived. Therefore, the difference between Den-
mark and the rest of the Nordic countries appears wider at the level of policy 
principles than policy practices. Sweden and Finland have never been as mul-
ticulturalist as it might seem if we made judgments based solely on policy 
discourse.
It also seems that the climax (at least so far) of cultural policy multiculturalism 
was at the end of the 1990s and during the first years of the new millennium. 
During the last 10–15 years, we have witnessed far less noteworthy initiatives 
or openings than in the years preceding this period. Neo-nationalism has also 
been growing in popularity, but its influence to cultural policy development 
has, again with Denmark as an exception, been quite modest. Therefore, it 
seems that there has been a general change of atmosphere towards diversity 
in general and multiculturalism in particular. Instead of celebration, ethno-
cultural differences are nowadays treated with hesitation if not suspicion.
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Both ethno-cultural diversification in society and the strengthening of neo-
nationalism are challenging traditional self-understanding and national iden-
tity in the Nordic countries. Multicultural diversity renders the assumption of 
demographic homogeneity problematic, and many Nordics look to the future 
with anxiety when they see their society drifting further away from the old 
nationalist ideal. In contrast, there also are a lot of inhabitants in the Nordic 
countries that experience nationalist and radical right parties and politicians 
threatening the pluralistic values of openness, tolerance and mutual trust. In 
these circumstances where gloomy future visions prevail, it is not easy to make 
progressive cultural policy that also would be properly implemented.
A previous version of this chapter has appeared in Swedish in Kulturanalys 
Norden 2017. I am thankful to Linnéa Lindsköld, Per Mangset and Dorte Skot-
Hansen for their valuable comments regarding the recent development in Swe-
den, Norway and Denmark.
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10 Managing moods
Media, politicians, and anxiety 
over public debate
Anu Koivunen
The notion of interregnum captures a mood: a sense of change and an anxi-
ety regarding what will come and when. Interregnum is a state of waiting and 
anticipating, as it, in the Gramscian sense, denotes a period that lies between 
an old, declining system and an emerging new one. In the words of Wolf-
gang Streeck, interregnum is ‘a period of tremendous insecurity in which the 
accustomed chains of cause and effect are no longer in force, and unexpected, 
dangerous and grotesquely abnormal events may occur at any moment’.1 In 
Streeck’s analysis, this illustrates the contemporary crisis of neoliberalism and 
global capitalism, as evidenced by the world-wide rise of populisms. However, 
it also serves to depict what Andrew Chadwick calls ‘a time of fundamental 
change’ and ‘a chaotic transition period’ caused by the increased influence of 
digital media in how political life is lived and mediated.2 Digital technologies 
have profoundly altered how political actors, publics, and media interact. In 
the context of hybrid media and networked publics, politicians and journal-
ists have been repositioned and now face new challenges.3 Competing with 
the amplified influence of social media and PR, journalists have lost much of 
their power as agenda-setters and gatekeepers. Politicians are both benefiting 
from and agonising over the multitude of public arenas. While ‘the disrupted 
public sphere’4 allows them to bypass journalistic gatekeeping and to address 
different audiences in distinct and direct ways, the disintegration of a national 
public sphere challenges any attempt to mobilise a national sense of a ‘we’. 
With the weakening of mass communication, the media as an institution and 
a key facility of national imagination is changing, which in turn affects the use 
and the force of nationalism as a principle of legitimation.5 Characteristic of an 
interregnum is the absence of given interpretive frames: the waning of the old 
order entails not only an epistemological crisis but also an ontological one. If 
not imagination, what holds a nation together?
In this chapter, the notion of interregnum is invoked to identify a language 
of concern among Swedish and Finnish politicians and journalists and to inter-
pret it as a response to the disintegration of national public spheres in the wake 
of globalised, digital media. It is the context of digital disruption, the chapter 
at hand suggests, that frames the recurrent debates in Sweden and Finland 
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regarding the problems of public debate and concerns over the tone. Whereas 
fear as an emotion has an object, anxiety as an affective state does not; rather, 
it connotes ‘an approach to objects’.6 In the context of the disrupted public 
sphere and networked publics, this chapter suggests that politicians and jour-
nalists have sought new identities and increasingly positioned themselves as 
analysts and managers of the nation’s mood.
The 2010s entailed recurrent debates regarding debates, with a special focus 
on the tone and the attitudes of the participants. In 2016, Dagens Nyheter con-
tended that the tone in Swedish politics was harsher than during what is known 
as ‘hatred for Palme’, referring to the strong feelings aroused by the late Social 
Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme.7 According to political scientist Stig-
Björn Ljunggren, there was now a double political polarisation: on the one 
hand, between extreme positions in the public debate and, on the other hand, 
between those who enjoyed the harsh tone and those who disliked it and left 
the debate. He described the following historic change: whereas the conflicts 
in the Palme era, namely the 1970s and the 1980s, existed between political 
parties, they now were ‘among people out in reality’, with the parties trying 
to ‘dampen the atmosphere’.8 A similar diagnosis of the present public discus-
sion as exceptionally polarised was proposed in Finland, where a think tank 
reported that over 90 per cent of Finns witnessed an increase of ‘deliberate 
provocations’ in public debate and 50 per cent disliked the polarisation to the 
extent of withdrawing from the public debate.9 In addition, while both Sweden 
and Finland are countries where trust in democratic institutions is tradition-
ally high, both countries have seen a debate concerning growing media dis-
trust, with the legacy media increasingly being accused of violating social trust 
through partisanship, political bias, or a polarising media logic. At the same 
time, after having been a horizon of enhancing democracy, social media has 
increasingly been discussed in negative terms in relation to polarisation, filter 
bubbles, echo chambers, hate speech, and disinformation.10
Analysing a set of Swedish and Finnish media texts ( journalism, opinion 
pieces, and a documentary), parliamentary debates, and speeches by govern-
ment members, party leaders, and heads of state from 2014 through 2017, 
this chapter focuses on three key figurations capturing an anxiety over the 
public sphere.11 After discussing the Swedish debate on ‘corridor of opinion’ 
(åsiktskorridor) as a case of media distrust and democratic challenge, the chapter 
then analyses the Finnish debate on ‘the extremes’ (ääripäät) and ‘the sensi-
ble folk’ (tolkun ihmiset) as threats to the national security. While different as 
metaphors, the Swedish one pointing to a lack of diversity and the Finnish 
one calling for a middle ground, all the metaphors capture an anxiety over the 
national public sphere. They highlight the interdependencies of media and 
politics, placing media at the centre and calling it out as an agent of power and 
politics. Responding to a diminishing trust in the media in both countries, the 
journalistic media has refashioned itself as an arena for curing the ills of polari-
sation and as an agent of affective pedagogy in the service of national cohesion. 
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This attitude is summarised by the Swedish notion of improving the quality of 
public debate by having ‘more adults in the room’ (fler vuxna i rummet).
The anxiety over the national public sphere, the chapter finally suggests, is 
linked to the key importance of trust at the heart of both Swedish and Finn-
ish national imaginaries and of the Nordic model as a transnational identity 
narrative. The erosion of social and political trust is a threat to both, and the 
metaphors discussed not only articulate new roles and sources of legitimacy for 
politicians and journalists in the age of interregnum but also point to attempts 
to maintain and reinstate trust and to reproduce the national imagination.12
The corridor of opinion: media power called out
In December of 2013, Professor of Political Science Henrik Ekengren Oscars-
son coined a term that would become a key metaphor in Swedish politics 
and media: he described the Swedish public debate as a ‘corridor of opinion’ 
(åsiktskorridor) that is narrowing to the extent of marginalising classic social 
democratic, liberal, and conservative positions as a ‘danger to the public’ (sam-
hällsfarlig) or as twisted ideologies. In a blog post describing how election stud-
ies scholars treat all voting behaviour as intelligible, he lamented that Swedish 
public debate instead lacked the intellectual curiosity and desire to understand 
political opponents; conversely, ‘categorical rejection, often in seconds, of 
divergent descriptions of reality and deviant opinions is becoming a norm’. 
He described the contemporary public debate as ‘a corridor of opinion’ in 
which ‘the sore toes’ are many, and leeway for expressing deviant opinions has 
diminished.13 Ekengren Oscarsson noted that annual surveys of Swedish public 
opinion have clearly shown that voters hold an array of opinions concerning, 
for example, abortion, asylum seekers, animal rights, gay adoption, death pen-
alty, wolves, or school ceremonies in churches, which are rarely voiced in the 
public sphere. Arguing for a classic liberal notion of a rational public sphere, he 
called for ‘a more moderate and respectful’ public debate.
In a context where the support for the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokra-
terna) was steadily growing, while excluded from political collaboration with 
other parties, the corridor metaphor caught immediate attention. It was 
adopted by both critics of the Swedish political status quo (those criticising 
Swedish refugee policies or those advancing religious arguments in public 
debates) and those questioning the actual existence of a ‘corridor of opinion’.14 
Indeed, the Language Council of Sweden included it in its list of neologisms of 
the year. It was widely circulated and commented on by journalists. The public 
service Swedish Radio responded quickly by asking, in a prestigious actualities 
programme, whether a corridor of opinions actually exists and what it entails. 
The editor-in-chief of Expressen announced that his tabloid would start pub-
lishing more ‘counter-voices’, introducing the tagline ‘Expressen is wrong!’ to 
encourage improving the quality of public debate and to celebrate the diversity 
of opinions.15 The editor-in-chief of Dagens Nyheter also acknowledged that in 
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the age of hybrid media, established news outlets shoulder an important role in 
defining the debate climate and ensuring access to information in a country.16 
In his assessment,
trust in the established media requires that we resist the trend to mainly 
publish that which gets our readers to click the like-button. The market-
place of ideas must be as broad as possible, and also contain what hurts in 
the society.17
Whereas some journalists adopted a notion of ‘opinion elite’ to describe the 
existence of ‘a corridor’, others refuted the idea, highlighting the power of 
Twitter to turn ‘ordinary people to rulers’.18 Debates regarding the ‘corridor 
of opinion’ have also encouraged several prominent Swedish journalists in press 
and television to make penitence and engage in public self-criticism.19
The metaphor captured and gave expression to media distrust, which in the 
2010s became a topic of public discussion both in Sweden and in Finland; in 
both countries, this was propelled by the rise of populist parties. Whereas overall 
trust in the media concerning many topics – issues of health care, for instance – 
remained high in Sweden, mainstream media coverage of immigration and 
crime was increasingly questioned by populist parties and anti-immigration 
groups establishing ‘alternative’ or ‘counter-media’ outlets. Media trust in both 
countries correlated strongly with political ideology: in Sweden, the distrust in 
the media did not characterise all citizens, but instead, surveys showed that a 
high percentage of Swedes continued to have trust in radio, television, and daily 
press. Those with low trust were generally more right-wing, and in Sweden, the 
Sweden Democrats were overrepresented among those with mistrust.20 In 2018, 
according to the Pew Research Center, populist divides in media attitudes were 
strong in Sweden: 49 per cent of people with populist views stated that they trust 
the news media, compared with 74 per cent of those without populist views.21
The ‘corridor of opinion’ metaphor demonstrated the power of social media 
to challenge the agenda and news values of professional journalism. How-
ever, while offering a tool for calling out ideological bias and politicising news 
media, thereby shattering the role of professional journalism, the metaphor 
simultaneously offered support to the old structures of political information. It 
materialised the inseparability of media and politics, reproducing a sense of the 
public sphere as one place, as opposed to a complex, unruly, and unstructured 
network. Calling out the power of journalists and addressing them as gatekeep-
ers, the metaphor reproduced the agenda-setting power, suggesting its contin-
ued relevance, placing the old architecture of public discussion in the centre, 
and reproducing a position not self-evidently owned anymore.
The extremes: invoking ‘the sensible folk’ as a civic ideal
‘Eat shit, racists and fascists!’ ‘Traitors, why don’t you eat shit! You defend rapists, 
killers, and bestiality!’ Elina Hirvonen’s documentary feature film Kiehumispiste/
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Boiling Point (Elina Hirvonen 2017) depicted Finland in the mid-2010s as a 
pressure cooker. The film opens with scenes from a demonstration in central 
Helsinki, where the heavily armed riot police control anti-immigration groups 
and counterdemonstrators slandering one another. Offered as a diagnosis of the 
present, the film provided a snapshot of a nation’s mood, transitioning between 
northern and southern Finland, between the city and suburbs of Helsinki and 
the small towns of Kemi, Tornio, Kajaani, Rovaniemi, Forssa, and Petäjävesi. It 
depicted activists from various anti-immigration groups (Suomi ensin!/Finland 
First!, Rajat kiinni!/Close the Borders!) protesting outside reception centres and 
in suburbs with notable immigrant communities. In the film’s narration, these 
groups’ battle cries against ‘diseases of tolerance’ as an ‘epidemic’ that ‘is about 
to destroy whole nations’ clashed with counterdemonstrators’ interference and 
cries of ‘Shame on you! Shame on you!’. As a counterpoint to these scenes, 
with relatively few participants but fierce rhetoric, the film featured footage 
from Peli poikki! (Game Over!) and other mass demonstrations against racism 
and fascism filling the streets of central Helsinki. Interjected in between the 
crowd scenes, the film’s protagonists – a young male anti-immigration activist, 
a retired female teacher assisting asylum seekers, and two men debating immi-
gration in a public sauna in Helsinki – provide their perspectives, as talking 
heads, on what is happening in Finland.
In its narration, Boiling Point employed the cinematic technique of montage 
to create a sense of a nation’s mood, mapping different parts of the country and 
representing recurring confrontations between opposing views and clashing 
perspectives. Documenting the different reactions to the 2015 migration cri-
sis, the film depicted a drama of accelerating affective intensity, disagreements 
and passions, fear, disappointment, resentment, and outright rage. Interpret-
ing the conflict as a symptom of social polarisation wherein one disenfran-
chised group (marginalised Finns) attacked another one (refugees) and wherein 
the conflict becomes one between different Finnish citizens, it dramatised a 
national narrative in dissolution. At the same time, it used drone images scan-
ning empty landscapes to suggest a third position: one beyond or outside the 
intense polarisation.
In identifying the public debate as a social and political problem, the film 
echoed a broader concern over polarised opinions weakening national coher-
ence. In the Finnish public debate, concern regarding political and social 
polarisation has been captured by the figure of the extremes (ääripäät) – in 
plural, implying two opposing ends – and the related figure of ‘the sensible folk’ 
(tolkun ihmiset).22 As a metaphor for political life, the image of the two extremes 
implies a fugitive point or an outsider’s view. When using it, the speaker or 
writer posits him- or herself as being beyond the political debate, without an 
opinion, and as someone who has a full grasp of ‘the big picture’. This position 
as an outsider, a moral judge of the tone of the debate, has been highly idealised 
and positively valued. In the Finnish context, it reads as a figure of the anxi-
ety over polarisation and the dissolution of national consensus that is rooted in 
both contemporary security politics and history.
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The figure of the sensible folk was coined as a political metaphor in early 
2016, when President of the Republic Sauli Niinistö shared on Twitter a 
column published in a small local newspaper which celebrated the idea of 
the silent majority of Finns as ‘the sensible folk’ who are alienated by ‘the 
extremes’ in discussions of the refugee crisis.23 The presidential embrace meant 
that the notion of ‘the sensible folk’ stuck and became a counter-image to ‘the 
extremes’. Public service broadcasting news media asked its audience to help 
the ‘silent sensible majority’ to get more airtime, but the figure also became 
an object of political struggle and contestation.24 ‘We Finns are the people of 
sense and restraint’, said the then Prime Minister Juha Sipilä (Centre Party) in 
2015, endorsing the notion as a civic ideal and claiming it as a national virtue. 
It was employed by the then Minister of Justice Jari Lindström to frame vot-
ers of the populist Finns Party not as racist but as ‘ordinary sensible folk’. It 
was also invoked by MP Pekka Haavisto (Green Party), who made an effort to 
resignify the term as connoting not passivity but activism and a will to interfere 
in social wrongs.25 In the lively public debate, the figure of the ‘sensible folk’ 
was criticised as a slogan of political cynicism and an attempt to co-opt right-
wing populism and anti-immigration sentiment. It was, furthermore, critiqued 
for evading political responsibility and envisioning ideal citizens as onlook-
ers, rather than participants, in a political struggle.26 In the discussion, some 
debaters attempted to go beyond the polarising metaphors: ‘There are not two 
extremes. There are sensible persons and only one extreme: the criminals.’27
Throughout the 2010s, mounting polarisation was discussed as an increasing 
internal security risk in government reports.28 In parliamentary debates, the 
figure of ‘the extremes’ was repeatedly invoked as a threat. ‘It is better that we 
are all ordinary average Finns rather than polarise and divide ourselves to the 
extremes’, stated a Social Democratic MP in a discussion of internal security.29 
Political affect was explicitly securitised by President Niinistö, as he, after the 
Russian overtaking of Crimea and Donbass, regularly described conflicts of 
opinion as threats to trust and as sites of hybrid warfare. Today, he warned, 
the war does not start with guns and troops marching but with information, 
infiltration, and hate-mongering. ‘If we would ward off all this, we would all 
be members of national defence’, he stated.30
In his televised New Year speech of 2016, President Niinistö contended 
the following: ‘It is my idea that Finland should not meet the spring in the 
spirit of internal quarrelling and disagreement. I want to remind again that 
social cohesion is our best resource.’31 Addressing the parliament a month later, 
he returned to the topic of public discussion, stating that Finns had over the 
past months learnt to tell each other off: ‘The men have been told off, the 
women likewise. The tolerant and the intolerant have been told off, and then 
as, a conclusion, the police. We have thoroughly told off ourselves.’32 He again 
characterised affective discipline as an act of national defence: ‘The challenge 
of migration cannot be met so that we are internally out of order.’33 In his 
New Year speech of 2018, President Niinistö repeated the message, quoting 
Seitsemän veljestä/Seven Brothers (1870) by Aleksis Kivi (2005), the first Finnish 
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novel and a foundational narrative for national imagination: ‘all will go well, if 
everyone strives for peace and harmony. But if we look for a fight, there will 
always be a reason for neckhairs to bristle.’34
The danger of polarisation was a recurrent theme in 2018, when Finland 
commemorated the civil war of 1918. The centenary served as a frame for discus-
sions of where extreme polarisation and hate in the public sphere may lead, thus 
drawing from and adding to a rich narrative legacy, given the centrality of 1918 
for the Finnish national imagination.35 This was the recurrent topic in the many 
speeches of both President Niinistö and the then Prime Minister Juha Sipilä. In 
the words of President Niinistö, ‘The lesson of 1918 is that the most important 
task for a nation is to take care of its cohesion and stability.’ Beyond serving as 
a warning, the memory of the civil war served to underline the importance 
of democracy in managing different and conflicting ideological positions and 
political goals: ‘Even if there are differences, and while people have divergent 
backgrounds, convictions and goals, they nevertheless have the right to disa-
gree. And this must be respected, no matter how differently oneself thinks.’36
Similar rhetoric was practised by the editor-in-chief of Ilta-Sanomat, a major 
Finnish tabloid, in equating the critics of the notion of ‘the sensible person’ 
with ‘extremists’, describing ‘hatemongers’ as a security threat and critiquing 
anti-fascist demonstrations as ‘narcissistic projects’ for the organisers.37 Address-
ing her readers in an obliging tone, she adopted the position of ‘the sensible 
person’ beyond the political disagreements. Invoking the civil war as a discipli-
nary fiction two years before the centenary, she described an anti-fascist dem-
onstration as an ‘agitation of ordinary people into a polarisation’:
One would hope that each of us would pause for thinking what we do and 
what we participate in. Do you by any chance, without intending it, throw 
gas into flames, or do you attempt to scold your rage? Do you press like on 
writings agitating to polarisation or do you support objectivity? Do you 
generalise? Do you blame those who are not to be blamed? Do you distort? 
Do you scream with others or do you scream stop?’38
While the President’s concern was related to national security, the editor-in-
chief fought a moral war: beyond defending ‘the sensible person’ as a civic 
ideal, she was engaged in framing the critics of the ideal as immoral.
Whereas the Swedish debate on ‘the corridor of opinion’ problematised 
the power over agenda-setting and questioned the gate-keeping power of the 
journalists, in Finland, concern over ‘the extremes’ read as concern over too 
much debate, idealising the position of a distant, if morally invested, onlooker.39 
While ‘the extremes’ as a figure articulated a concern over polarisation, it simul-
taneously suggested a disbelief in the value of public debate. In the narrative 
of the extremes, the ‘silent majority’ was imagined as a non-political middle 
ground, whose thoughts and values the speaker nevertheless alledgedly knew. 
As a model citizen, paradoxically, ‘the sensible person’ invoked an idealistic 
figure whose major characteristic was its lack of any characteristics. It read as 
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a figure of consensus, but not political consensus in the sense of supporting 
negotiations between different interests.40 In the 2010s, it rather issued a moral 
obligation and, drawing from history lessons (the legacy of 1918), made a call 
not to disagree.
The adults in the room: affective pedagogy in the media
Both ‘the corridor of opinion’ and ‘the extremes’ were outspokenly critical 
figures of speech, and both placed the media and the mediatised debate at the 
centre of political life. Both metaphors plotted politicians and journalists as 
protagonists of the national imagination, casting them as gatekeepers or guard-
ians of the tone of the debate. The tone became a political slogan in 2017, 
when Ulf Kristersson, appointed as the chair of the Swedish Moderate Party, 
made a call for ‘more adults in the room’ to improve the quality of the public 
discussions.41 Cautious not to express a desire to police the subjects of the pub-
lic debate, Kristersson – and other politicians in both Sweden and Finland – 
emphasised instead a desire to police and discipline the tone.
In the media, the concern over tone transformed into active measures of 
affective pedagogy. The Finnish documentary feature Boiling Point serves as an 
example, as its release was accompanied with a civic education project, flag-
shipped as offering a means to engage in a constructive dialogue, to enhance 
respect and prevent the incitement of hatred. For this project, the production 
company Mouka Filmi had prestigious collaborators: the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, the Finnish Innovation 
Fund Sitra, the Finnish Red Cross, and Aalto University.42 On the one hand, 
the different protagonists in the documentary offered a range of perspectives, 
complicating any one narrative viewpoint. On the other hand, the film offered, 
through high-angle drone images, a momentary respite from the cacophony 
of opinions on the soundtrack. As a pedagogical project, first and foremost, 
the documentary underlined the importance of respectful dialogue, inviting its 
viewers to engage in one and even issuing an obligation to do so. The sauna 
discussions between Tapio Salminen and Oula Silvennoinen were offered (and 
also hailed in the film’s appreciative reception) as exemplary: two men who 
have strongly opposing views on immigration but are committed to continuing 
their dialogue, respecting one another.43
In the 2010s, dialogue as an ethical and political form was offered as a rec-
ipe for enhanced democracy, but it was also reinvented as a legitimising dis-
course in the press and in television.44 As a concrete sign of a ‘disrupted public 
sphere’ in both Sweden and Finland, public service television struggled to find 
a format for its debate programmes to meet the demands of their remit to 
serve democracy. In Finland, the long-term YLE concept of A2-theme nights 
was terminated in 2017, after fierce public debates regarding its dramaturgical 
choices and casting: while founded on the idea of multiple voices and a demo-
cratic marketplace, the programme had for long been criticised for increasing 
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rather than alleviating conflicts and polarised opinions. In the fall of 2015, 
A2 Pakolaisilta (A2 Refugee Night) was structured around a strong opposition 
between ‘us’ (Finns) and ‘them’ (the refugees); in 2016, for A2 Turvattomuusilta 
(A2 Insecurity Night) the chair of the Finnish Defence League was invited as a 
discussant in a debate where ‘the extremes’ were supposed to meet each other.45 
In Sweden, the debate programmes SVT Debatt and Opinion Live were simi-
larly criticised for confrontational setups – for fostering polarisation rather than 
encouraging dialogue.46
Responding to the criticisms, the Swedish Public Broadcasting Company 
SVT closed its weekly debate programme in 2019, and as a new gesture, it 
adopted a concept developed by Die ZeitOnline for assembling persons with 
different views on topical, divisive issues. In the process, the media outlet first 
invites its readers and viewers to sign up for live meetings, answering a series 
of test questions, and then being coupled through an algorithm with someone 
holding different opinions and finally meeting in person.47 ‘When was the last 
time you met someone who does not think like you’, SVT asked its view-
ers and was met with enthusiasm.48 The series Sverige möts (Sweden meets) was 
broadcast in the spring of 2020. In Finland, Die ZeitOnline’s concept – ironically 
called Political Tinder – was adopted in the spring of 2019 by Helsingin Sano-
mat, the largest national newspaper. With Suomi puhuu (Finland talks), Helsingin 
Sanomat wanted to ‘bring disagreeing Finns together so that we would better 
understand each other’.49 In the managing editor’s words, ‘The opponent is not 
evil, even if he or she disagrees – welcome to the outside of your bubble!’50
Reacting to the weakening of gatekeeping and agenda-setting power, hence, 
traditional news media has reinvented itself as a manager of the disrupted public 
sphere. While accused of increasing polarisation due to media logic focusing on 
confrontations, legacy media has cast itself as offering a remedy to the problem 
it is deeply implicated in. At the core of this affective national pedagogy is the 
moral obligation to engage in dialogue and to break one’s ‘bubble’ – the filter 
bubble being a pejorative metaphor for the company of the like-minded. In 
2018, the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company YLE launched its project on 
Kuplat (Bubbles), staging encounters between ‘two persons living in different 
worlds’: a right-wing MP meets an unemployed person, two persons with 
opposing views on immigration; a person living in Helsinki meets someone 
living in a remote countryside; a priest meets an atheist; a vegan meets a pig 
farmer; and a downshifter meets a career-oriented leader.51
A similar notion of speaking across a divide informed a series of articles pub-
lished by Svenska Dagbladet in Sweden: playwright and pundit Stina Oscarson 
was to meet ‘persons who in different ways divide Sweden with their state-
ments and actions’.52 The ensuing series of dialogues aroused a range of media 
commentary. Some celebrated it – ‘more people should step outside their filter 
bubbles’ – whereas others wondered whether ‘the dream of the open dialogue 
can be fulfilled’, whether there is ‘an exaggerated reliance on dialogue with 
right-wing extremists’, or whether ‘dialogue activism’ is merely another meta-
debate about debate.53
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The public sphere, trust, and the (trans)national 
imagination
The 2010s debates about debates were more than metacommentary. At stake 
in them was a concern over not only the national public sphere or the roles of 
politicians and journalists in the new hybrid media context of political life but, 
importantly, trust as a key element in both the Swedish and the Finnish national 
imaginary and in the transnational narrative of the Nordic model.
While the Nordic model is claimed to have lost its distinctiveness as a con-
sequence of various social policy and labour market reforms, it nevertheless 
continues to be exceptional in one sense. In the European Social Survey and 
other studies of public opinion, the Nordic countries are associated with a high 
level of trust, making them distinctive and comparable to no other region in 
the world.54 Despite the narrative battle in Sweden about the country ‘becom-
ing broken’ or ‘systems collapse’, annual surveys showed ‘no signs of weakened 
social cohesion’.55 Trust is often described in rational terms, and a 2017 report 
by the Nordic Council of Ministers called trust the ‘Nordic gold’, summaris-
ing its perceived worth.56 In the narrative of the Nordic model, trust is valued 
for both its economic and social effects and is described as what connects 
them: ‘Underpinning this virtuous interaction of security and flexibility is the 
widespread feeling of trust – among citizens and in public institutions – and a 
sense of fairness related to the egalitarian ambitions of the welfare state (edu-
cation, social policy).’57 On the one hand, trust is described as ‘a lubricant for 
the economy’, increasing efficiency and economic growth. On the other hand, 
trust is valued as an ingredient of social capital, increasing individual happiness, 
simplifying collaboration, promoting political engagement, stimulating dem-
ocratic development, counteracting corruption, and reducing criminality.58 
While striving for political consensus has often been criticised as an obstacle to 
social and economic reforms or even a sign of undemocratic corporatism, in 
the Nordic countries, the ability to survive and stabilise changes and to main-
tain continuity remains key to national imaginaries and to the narrative about 
the Nordic model.59
All of the metaphors of the ‘corridor of opinion’, ‘the extremes’, and ‘the 
sensible folk’ operated within the historical legacy of engendering cohesion and 
inviting consensus. It is the work of the national and, in the context of Nordic 
countries, transnational imagination to reproduce a sense of being, in some 
sense, ‘in the same boat’ that is crucial to cohesion and trust.60 In the context 
of global, networked media, the discourse of concern among politicians and 
journalists over the public discussion articulated a concern over the future of 
imagination and hence what international relations scholars term ‘ontological 
security’. As narrative analyses of state policies posit, states are as much con-
cerned about their ontological security, ‘the security of a consistent self ’, as 
they are about material, physical security, and the necessity of a narrative is 
particularly acute in contexts of crisis.61
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In debating the tone of debates, Swedish and Finnish politicians and journal-
ists responded to the disrupted public sphere by offering constructive solutions, 
while simultaneously establishing new roles and new grounds of legitimation 
for themselves. Casting themselves as managers of a nation’s mood, they placed 
themselves in the centre as guardians of social cohesion and as pedagogues of 
proper affect, thus reimagining the future beyond interregnum not as a new 
world but rather as an upgrade of the old order. In so doing, they also repro-
duced the key ‘ontological’ or ‘foundational’ narrative of the Nordic model 
which over the decades has offered stability beyond policy changes, providing 
a sense of past and a direction for the future.
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 19 Neuding 2014, Marteus 2015.
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 22 Hämäläinen 2016, Huhta 2015, Ranta 2016a.
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 24 Pöntinen 2016.
 25 Sipilä 2015, Suomen Eduskunta 2016b.
 26 Raatikainen 2017, Kovalainen 2017, Ranta 2016b.
 27 Appelsin 2017, Martela 2016.
 28 Sisäministeriö (Ministry of Interior Affairs) 2017.
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11 Persistent paradoxes, 
turbulent times
Gender equality policies in the 
Nordics in the 2010s
Johanna Kantola
The Nordic countries are internationally known for their high levels of gender 
equality. ‘Gender equality’ has indeed become both a central component of the 
countries’ national identities and even an export item, especially for Sweden, 
which has been seen to offer its good practices and policies to other countries. 
The Nordic model of welfare states is intrinsically connected to the issue of 
gender equality and the Nordic states have both promoted gender equality and 
benefited from it. The extensive public sector has offered jobs for women and 
care for their children, thus enabling women’s participation in the labour mar-
ket. The ideas about what gender equality consists of – the so-called Nordic 
discourse on gender equality – are firmly intertwined with the policies and 
institutional practices of the welfare states.1 Ideologically, the discourse has pro-
moted equality of outcome as opposed to more liberal notions of equality of 
opportunity. This sets the Nordic ideas about gender equality apart from many 
other European countries and the European Union (EU).
At the same time, gender scholars within Nordic countries have long worked 
to expose the remaining gender inequalities and the paradoxes of the Nor-
dic model: high levels of violence against women, gender-segregated labour 
markets, gender pay gaps, and masculine domination in politics. Paradoxi-
cally, despite high levels of gender equality, Finland, Sweden and Denmark top 
European domestic violence rates.2 Gender pay gaps are at a comparatively high 
level too, around 16 per cent in Finland in 2019, compared to 10.7 per cent in 
Sweden in 2018.3 In politics, gendered practices devalue women’s expertise in, 
for instance, economics and foreign policy. Women find it difficult to combine 
motherhood and a political career. Moreover, hate speech has made the posi-
tions of young women politicians particularly vulnerable.4 Outright misogyny 
has been revealed, although not thoroughly discussed, in Finnish and Swedish 
politics by the #MeToo campaign against sexual harassment.5 Gender schol-
ars have worked together with the women’s movement and femocrats within 
the state to develop gender policies and policy making tools to tackle gender 
inequalities.
Feminist scholars have turned their attention to the Nordic countries to ana-
lyse the effects of neoliberalism on gender equality and policies.6 In the Nor-
dic countries, neoliberalism has questioned some of the basic tenets of gender 
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equality policy including: the central role played by the welfare state in provid-
ing jobs and universal services; state institutions advancing gender equality and 
not outsourcing these jobs to projects and third sector actors; and the very defi-
nition of equality as a political value.7 Each of these has been evaluated in terms 
of efficiency: markets, third sector and competition are easily deemed more 
efficient than state-based services and structures. With this trend, paralleling the 
debates on the crises of the welfare states, notions of ‘equality’ more generally, 
and ‘gender equality’ more specifically, have been challenged. With the rise of 
neoliberalism and New Public Management (NPM), ‘equality of outcome’, 
which the Nordic framework has been based on, appears old-fashioned, a drag 
on an otherwise dynamic economic system, and demanding too much focus 
on structures of inequality and placing too little emphasis on individual merit.8
The changes in the equalities framework have been accompanied by the 
widening of categories of inequality from gender and class to cover multi-
ple inequalities including, most commonly, race and ethnicity, religion and 
belief, sexual orientation, age and disability. For gender equality, this signifies 
that gender as a category can no longer be considered in isolation from other 
bases of inequality. Feminist theory employs the concept of intersectionality9 
to highlight the ways different inequalities intersect, leading to unique forms 
of discrimination, for example, for ethnic minority women. The challenges 
posed to the Nordic discourse of gender equality by multiculturalism have been 
discussed in scholarly debates drawing attention to the extent to which it has 
mainly benefited majority women and men.10
The objective of this chapter is to explore a central paradox: how the model 
countries for gender equality fail to increase levels of gender equality. A persistent 
challenge has been that gender equality has been characterized by good policies 
on paper, which suffer from an implementation gap in practice.11 In the 2010s, 
in Sweden, the impact of neoliberal discourse and policies, and, in Finland, the 
impact of the economic crisis and austerity politics, have been argued to be 
detrimental to gender equality policies.12 This chapter explores how – when 
combined with the influence of populism, nationalism, and  conservatism – the 
limitations and vulnerabilities of the Nordic model become visible.
The Nordic model for gender equality: does it exist or 
did it ever?
The Nordic model of women-friendly welfare states
Gender equality has been argued to be ‘one of the most prominent hallmarks’ 
of the Nordic welfare model and its distinctive welfare state character.13 In 
feminist debates, the countries have been described as ‘women-friendly welfare 
states’, a term coined by Helga Maria Hernes (1987). The term sets Nordic 
feminist perspectives on the state apart from the more Anglo-American femi-
nist theories about the state. A central dynamic of friendliness towards women 
was, according to Hernes, the interplay between a broad political mobilization 
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of women ‘from below’ and responses ‘from above’ in terms of state feminism 
and institutionalization of gender equality. This interplay differed considerably, 
however, Sweden was the most institutionalized and Denmark was the most 
bottom-up-oriented gender model, whereas Norway and Finland have taken a 
middle position.14 Another central feature was the fact that the male breadwin-
ner model was abandoned, and Nordic women gained economic autonomy 
relatively early compared to women in other Western countries. It happened 
first in Finland in the 1950s, in Denmark and Sweden in the 1970s and in Nor-
way in the 1980s.15 Hence, the benchmark for women’s employment at 60 per 
cent in 2010 in EU’s Lisbon Strategy was already reached in the late 1970s and 
1980s in the Nordic countries. Furthermore, Nordic women gained a voice, 
and the political representation of women was for many years ranked among 
the top five in the world.
In more recent research, the concept of the women-friendly welfare 
state has been theorized as a powerful discourse that silences issues such 
as domestic violence or sexuality and promotes certain subject positions 
for women and men.16 As a discourse, the women-friendly welfare state 
has fostered a belief in decision-makers and citizens alike that the state is 
‘good’: for instance, in case of serious societal problems such as domestic 
violence, it is believed to provide services to victims. However, this has not 
been the case in Finland where there has traditionally been a serious lack 
of services provided, and the country has been called a laggard and under-
performer with respect to services and legal change in relation to violence 
against women.17 The discourse on the women-friendly welfare state makes 
it harder to fight the problem as there is a belief that things are fine ‘in the 
model country of gender equality’ where gender equality has already been 
achieved. The concept of the women-friendly welfare state has also been 
studied as a particular normative notion based on Nordic values of equality 
that have been exported to the EU and its member states as well as to other 
parts of the world.18
The Nordic experience has exposed some paradoxes connected to the dom-
inant vision of gender equality. In this vision, the key aim has been to achieve 
equality through integration of women in the labour force. The Nordic labour 
markets are highly gender-segregated into public female-dominated and pri-
vate male-dominated sectors. A gender gap in wages and incomes that is closely 
related to this segregation and the division of care in the family has persisted. 
Despite many women having a high level of education, which has exceeded 
men’s, the share of female managers is restricted. Another example comes from 
the jobs provided by the women-friendly welfare state to women. Paula Koski-
nen Sandberg argues that jobs in the government sector have deeply insti-
tutionalized lower pay and position for women.19 The struggles around, for 
example, increasing nurses wages in Finland illustrate the difficulties of achiev-
ing higher pay levels for women in low-paid public sector jobs and in a cor-
poratist system where wages are negotiated between male-dominated labour 
market organizations.20
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Nordic models differ in many ways from other European and EU ways of 
promoting gender equality. The EU traditionally used anti-discrimination law 
to advance gender equality, for example, in relation to equal pay, social security 
and labour markets.21 Unlike in the EU, in the Nordic countries, the tradition 
of promoting gender equality is in many ways connected to welfare state poli-
cies and corporatist procedures discussed previously.22 Equality is understood as 
a social concept connected to social justice rather than to the liberal individu-
alist framework. This means that a number of issues that have been elsewhere 
seen as inequalities that need to be outlawed with anti-discrimination measures 
(such as equal pay in the EU) have been treated with welfare policies or positive 
measures and discussed as labour market issues in corporatist working groups 
in Nordic countries. These ideas about gender equality and its promotion have 
been firmly intertwined with each country’s institutions and policies. Gender 
equality there has been established as a labour market and social welfare issue 
rather than as an inalienable right to non-discrimination.23
In such a setting, anti-discrimination law was not seen as a primary tool for 
enhancing equality. As a result, gender equality policy has traditionally relied 
on positive measures.24 Anti-discrimination law aims at creating a level playing 
field and equal opportunities by outlawing discriminatory practices. In cases 
of discrimination, however, it places the responsibility on the individual that 
has been discriminated against to pursue the case, for example, by taking it to 
court. Positive measures, by contrast, aim at correcting initial disadvantages and 
embody a different notion of gender equality. Instead of aiming at equal oppor-
tunities, positive measures aim at substantive equality and equality of outcome. 
Such notions of equality are based on the idea that it is appropriate to deviate 
from formal equality (equal opportunity) in order to make the position of the 
underrepresented group better.25
Concrete positive measures used in the Nordic countries include quotas, for 
example, for company boards, especially in Norway.26 In addition, states have 
relied on gender mainstreaming and different responsibilities placed on employ-
ers and public authorities to promote gender equality in workplaces, in pay, or 
in education.27 Positive measures then operate on the basis of a fundamentally 
different logic. They remove the responsibility from the individual and make it 
the employers’ duty to change certain structures (e.g. working hours) that may 
put the underrepresented group at disadvantage (e.g. late meetings being diffi-
cult to attend due to childcare responsibilities). At the same time, gender action 
plans have been vulnerable to attempts to make states and governments more 
efficient. For example, gender action plans under conservative governments in 
Finland have been reduced in style and form to a narrow range of bullet points, 
and the political character of gender equality questions has disappeared.28
Despite these similarities, Nordic countries have distinct gender profiles 
in relation to the institutionalization of gender policy, women’s movement 
organization, and ideological emphases placed on motherhood or liberty.29 For 
instance, in Denmark, gender equality policies have been thinner than in other 
Nordic countries and liberalism has informed both the women’s movement 
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and state activities to a greater extent than in other Nordic countries.30 In 
Norway, the ideology of motherhood has been prominent. In Finland too, the 
state-funded Home Care Allowance has resulted in mothers staying at home to 
a greater extent than in other Nordic countries with children under the age of 
three. In Sweden, the impact of feminism and the willingness to analyse gen-
dered power structures, for instance, when implementing gender mainstream-
ing, has been stronger than in other Nordic countries.31
Shortcomings and blindspots
Notwithstanding the differences, the Nordic gender equality discourse has 
been argued to suffer from similar shortcomings. The consequences of the 
ideational constructions of gender equality and its institutionalizations have 
been extensively explored. It has been argued that the highly developed social 
policies for parents have in fact reproduced gender segregation and inequality 
in the family and the labour market, among other things, because more women 
than men tend to take parental and childcare leaves.32 The emphasis placed on 
social rights and welfare policy has resulted in women’s bodily rights, for exam-
ple, in relation to violence against women, receiving less attention.33
While the idea of friendliness towards women of Nordic welfare states has 
been based on the premise of an idea of women’s common and collective 
interests,34 it has become evident that Nordic gender policies have been only 
directed at some women (and men) and may, in fact, increase inequalities 
between women. Postcolonial feminists have challenged the grand vision of 
women-friendly welfare states, arguing that this vision has been based on the 
situation of white, middle-class women.35 Gender equality is at the centre of 
the debates on immigration and multiculturalism in these countries and helps 
to define who belongs to the welfare states.36 In this process, the Nordic dis-
course on gender equality is constructed in opposition to these ‘others’.37 For 
example, in Denmark, there has been a turn towards discussing gender inequal-
ity as a cultural problem prominent among immigrant minorities as opposed to 
majority Danes among whom it has already been achieved.38
In this way, ‘the passion of equality’ has been questioned, also because the 
Nordic countries in international comparisons fare relatively worse in reduc-
ing inequalities between ethnic majorities and minorities, compared to their 
achievements in relation to class and gender.39 Postcolonial critiques of Nordic 
welfare states and Nordic feminist practices and scholarship problematize the 
ways in which discourses on nationhood, belonging and welfare states con-
struct categories such as immigrants.40 They can, for example, be constructed 
as in need of special education about gender equality or as the likely perpetra-
tors of violence.
In relation to outlawing discrimination on bases other than gender – race, 
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation – the impact of the European Union’s 
anti-discrimination law becomes significant. Since the Lisbon Treaty and 
new directives in the 2000s, EU anti-discrimination directives have outlawed 
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discrimination on the basis of not only gender but also race, ethnicity, religion 
and belief, age and sexual orientation.41 For example, in Finland, the need 
to transpose EU directives resulted in the country’s first non-discrimination 
law which outlawed discrimination on the basis of these other categories of 
inequality and not just gender.42
Both European soft and hard laws have shaped national policies and dis-
courses in the Nordic countries, and have been used in different ways by 
domestic actors. Overall, the EU directives have moved the countries towards 
stronger provisions against discrimination.43 The EU frameworks have also 
changed the gender equality discourse in these countries. Some of the subtle 
trends that have been identified in scholarly debates in the gender equality 
discourse include becoming more technical, managerial and individual based,44 
focusing more on protecting motherhood45 and moving away from the univer-
sality of welfare services because of EU-funded local workplace-specific gender 
equality projects.46 These shifts are subtle and uneven, yet, may result in more 
fundamental changes in discourse and practices over time.
Current challenges to gender equality in Finland: 
neoliberalism, conservatism, nationalism
By way of example, the case of Finland illuminates some of the current chal-
lenges to the type of equality regime described previously. I recently studied 
the issue with Anna Elomäki exploring the impact of the right-conservative-
populist government in power since 2015 and how it has significantly inten-
sified austerity politics, weakened gender equality policy and harshened 
immigration policy. The Finnish political context and the government’s poli-
cies are underpinned by three political projects: neoliberalism, conservatism 
and nationalism.47 These gendered projects converge in public policies and 
discourses in a manner that poses particular challenges for gender equality and 
feminism. Much of the feminist literature on the relationships between these 
three projects has focused on the combined effect of neoliberalism and con-
servatism.48 Notably, various policies in Finland draw on not only neoliberalism 
and conservatism but also nationalism to ensure their success. In other words, 
Finland recently faced a political moment where the three political projects of 
neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism came together to form a ‘triangle’ 
informing public politics.49 While the focus of this section is on Finland and the 
unique impact of the conservative-right-populist government 2015–2019 and 
its impact of gender equality policies, neoliberalism, conservatism and national-
ism pose challenges to the other Nordic countries too, even if the effects and 
timings are likely to vary across the countries.
The figure of a triangle as an analytical tool illustrates the particular challenges 
that the convergence of neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism poses to 
feminism.50 When looking at the traditions of women and feminist mobiliza-
tion, it is evident that Finland has a strong feminist tradition in areas where 
the women’s movement has cooperated closely with the state (manifested in 
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patterns of state-based funding, practices of consultation and hearings on legis-
lative and policy proposals, and close personal networks between actors).51 Parts 
of the women’s movement have furthermore become increasingly professional 
and specialized. Finland has an established set of women’s organizations that 
work on their specific niche issues: mainstream gender equality policy, minor-
ity women, sexual equality, or human rights. Each organization has specialized 
in advancing certain forms of equality or challenging particular inequalities. In 
such a context, austerity politics and increased visibility of conservative values 
and anti-immigration stances created the new dynamics.52
Of the three political projects that became so visible, the detrimental impacts 
of neoliberalism – marketization of public services, transferring of costs and 
risk from the state to individuals and families; employment and social poli-
cies that give responsibility to individuals; and governance reforms that extend 
private sector management practices to the public sector  – on the Finnish 
‘women-friendly’ welfare state have been extensively explored.53 As elsewhere, 
recent economic and financial crises have provided opportunities to advance 
the neoliberal project.54 The conservative-right-populist government of Juha 
Sipilä adopted significant cuts in public services and benefits, including the 
dismantling of the hallmark of the women-friendly welfare state, namely the 
statutory right to public childcare for all children. It has also proposed to cor-
poratize and marketize public social and healthcare provisions and transfer 
costs from employees to private employers in order to increase international 
competitiveness.55
The long-standing influence of conservatism, which we defined narrowly as 
a conservative stance on moral and ethical issues that involves the promotion 
of conventional family structures and gender roles,56 has meant that the Finn-
ish welfare state has been weaker and less ‘social-democratic’ than its Nordic 
counterparts. The influence of conservatism is visible in, among other things, 
the Finnish care regime that provides financial incentives for parents to care 
for their children at home as well as in the long-standing political neglect of 
intimate partner violence.57 The visibility of traditional views on gender and 
family has in the past years increased in political and public speech, and they 
now shape government’s gender equality policies through the Centre Party and 
The Finns. The 2015 government programme was the first in 20 years that did 
not mention gender equality as the goal of the government, and gender equal-
ity policy has been narrowed with regard to the long-standing goal of more 
equal division of care between women and men.58 The higher status given to 
family was manifested in that for the first time there was a designated govern-
ment minister for family affairs, but no designated minister for gender equality 
in 2015–2019. While the anti-abortion views of two of the three leaders of 
the coalition parties did not lead to new restrictions in the area of reproductive 
rights, the conservative agenda gained visibility through a citizen’s initiative to 
allow health care personnel to abstain from prescribing or performing abortions 
due to reasons of consciousness.59 Foreign Minister Timo Soini (The Finns/
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The Blue Future) participated in an anti-abortion march in Canada causing a 
vote of confidence in the parliament but no resignation.60
The third political project informing gender equality policy today is nation-
alism, which can be defined as exclusionary politics of closed borders and 
racialized distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ expressed in the growing support 
for far-right populist parties.61 Anti-immigration, anti-multicultural and racist 
arguments have become more visible and acceptable in public speech since the 
populist Finns Party became the third largest party in the parliamentary elec-
tions of 2011, entered the government in 2015, and illustrated its consolidated 
position despite an internal split by becoming the second-largest party after the 
2019 parliamentary elections.62 While strict immigration policy has been char-
acteristic of Finnish policy for decades, the policies were hardened since the 
Finns Party entered the government in 2015 and were able to set the political 
agenda and dominate the political discourse about immigration and multicul-
turalism in the face of the increasing numbers of refugees to Europe. The party 
worked to ensure Finland would not be an attractive country for refugees by 
reducing benefits, legislating stricter rules for family reunification63 and shap-
ing Finland’s EU relationship by refusing to agree to the common compulsory 
refugee allocation policy and quota mechanism. The anti-immigration policies 
and the racist rhetoric have been gendered: Finnish women were to be pro-
tected from the violence of another culture’s men.64
As evident from the Finnish case, gender plays a central role in all three polit-
ical projects and each of them poses challenges for gender equality and femi-
nism.65 While neoliberal discourses and policies portray both women and men 
as rational economic actors and push women to the labour market, policies that 
dismantle the welfare state and re-privatize and informalize care rely on and 
intensify women’s unpaid or poorly compensated work, increasing class-based 
and racialized inequalities among women.66 Conservatism, in turn, can be seen 
as an explicitly anti-feminist force that relies on and promotes traditional views 
on gender and the family and resists changes in these areas.67 Gender relations 
play a crucial role in all nationalist projects,68 and racializing nationalist projects 
appropriate notions of gender equality and gendered violence for their own 
purposes and are closely connected to anti-feminism, misogyny and views that 
‘gender equality has gone too far’.69
Although neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism are gendered in dif-
ferent ways and pose distinct challenges to gender equality and feminism, they 
may work against gender equality in mutually reinforcing ways. Feminist theo-
rists have conceptualized the relationships between the three political projects 
mainly in pairs, focusing on the relationship between neoliberalism and con-
servatism.70 One of the most well-known accounts is Wendy Brown’s analysis 
of the convergence of the ‘economic-political rationality’ of neoliberalism and 
‘moral-political rationality’ of conservatism.71 In different national contexts, 
the coalition between neoliberalism and conservatism has been seen lead to 
doubly unfavourable conditions for the women’s movement.72 It has also been 
220 Johanna Kantola
suggested that due to the convergence of neoliberalism and conservatism, it has 
become difficult for feminists to reject one without embracing another.73 The 
relationship between conservatism and nationalism and its significance for fem-
inism has been addressed mainly in research on right-wing populism, in which 
conservative views on gender and the family meet a harsh anti-immigration 
stance and racism.74 The links between neoliberalism and nationalism have 
been explored in research on the connection of ‘welfare chauvinism’ targeting 
migrants to the neoliberal restructuring of the state,75 but the significance of 
these links for gender equality and feminism remains to be analysed. Theoreti-
cal debates that would bring the three political projects together are scarce.76
In particular, traditional women’s organizations have difficulties in address-
ing the joint impact of neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism on gender 
equality.77 Their close relationships to political parties that advance these politi-
cal projects make voicing a strong critique impossible and lead to co-optation 
and silences that can be interpreted as support for these policies. However, at 
the same time, the political context shaped by the triangle of neoliberalism, 
conservatism and nationalism has also provided fertile ground for new feminist 
actors that do not shy away from directly opposing the three political projects 
and are also more interested in resisting the combined effects of neoliberalism, 
conservatism and nationalism.78 Feminist actors who take the intersectional 
approach seriously are more likely than organizations focusing on women or 
gender equality to treat nationalism and racism as core feminist concerns and 
engage with the intersections of the three political projects.79
Conclusions
While there are differences between the Nordic countries, it is possible to dis-
cern a Nordic discourse on gender equality. This discourse has been tradition-
ally based on a notion of gender equality that is advanced in public life with 
the help of welfare policies and positive measures. It has foregrounded gender 
as a binary relationship between women and men and paid less attention to 
tackling inequalities in relation to the other axis of difference and power such 
as race and ethnicity. The position of anti-discrimination law has been weaker 
in the Nordic countries, and has been strongly influenced by the European 
Union. The second part of the chapter explored the case of Finland and the 
ways in which feminism and gender equality policies have been shaped by the 
forces of neoliberalism, conservatism and nationalism. The challenges may be 
similar to other Nordic countries as well given the strong role played by radical-
right populists and anti-feminist and anti-gender-equality groups across the 
region. The Nordic model faces challenges from multiple directions: neoliber-
alism questions the governance and bureaucratic structures of gender equality 
policies, the very trademark of the Nordic gender equality model; conserva-
tism questions the universality of the model to a new extent; and national-
ism constructs gender equality as a differentiating value (between majorities 
and minorities), not a value that unites. At the same time, however, different 
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challenges may foster new forms of feminist activism that support development 
of Nordic gender equality policies and models.
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12  Adapting the Nordic welfare 
state model to the challenges 
of automation
Heikki Hiilamo
The inclusive Nordic welfare model has facilitated economic growth, stable 
business environments and excellent living conditions as demonstrated by a 
number of scholars.1 The Nordic ‘happy democracies’ have been characterised 
by consensual decision-making procedures, corporatism, relatively high voter 
turnout, wide representation of various social groups, active membership in 
social organisations and remarkable levels of both institutional and social trust. 
These qualities have contributed to the development of exceptionally strong 
public institutions, which in turn are justifiably connected to remarkable social 
outcomes in terms of well-being. However, as all investment prospectuses for 
private financial investors tend to emphasise, past performance is no guarantee 
of future results. The Nordic model was born under the lucky stars of regulated 
financial markets. It seems to have survived the earlier challenges of economic 
globalisation, but what will happen in the future and what kind of changes are 
to be expected if the model is to live up to its promise of producing equitable 
outcomes? From the start, a key feature of the inclusive Nordic model has been 
a high labour force participation rate. During the last 25 years the countries 
have shied away from the target of full employment but still aim to sustain a 
high rate of employment. Will it be possible to sustain this goal in the future?
Ever since the seminal study by C. B. Frey and M. A. Osbourne,2 there has 
been a lively debate on the future of work (see further discussion in the chap-
ter by Holmén). The primary issue discussed in these debates is the expected 
impact of technological change, which includes broad and vague concepts 
such as automation, robotisation, ever-increasing computing power, Big Data, 
the penetration of the Internet, the Internet-of-Things, online platforms and 
artificial intelligence. Irrespective of the term used, one school of thought 
claims that machines will displace human labour – not just blue-collar tasks 
but white-collar ones as well – which will consequently result in labour market 
disruptions, while another school emphasises job polarisation in terms of both 
wages and employment vulnerability between routine middle-skilled workers 
and non-routine low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The debate has focused 
mainly on the role of technology, while other factors, such as societal institu-
tions, have gained less attention. At present, the question of how to find mean-
ingful employment for those at the margins of the labour market has urgent 
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relevance throughout the Western world. As globalisation and technology are 
feared to eliminate more jobs, an increasing number of people may be unable 
to make ends meet with earnings from employment.
According to Pulkka, the expected effects of technological changes on future 
labour markets can be studied with two possible trajectories. With reference to 
effects of previous technology-induced disruptions, the ‘this time is different’ 
scenario suggests that progression in digital technologies and artificial intelli-
gence is exponential and stable. Therefore, it is difficult to foresee the dynamics 
of the new demand for labour, harder for current workers to adjust to it with 
education and almost impossible for educational institutions to provide future 
workers with the type of skills needed. The scenario implies that without a 
major overhaul in policies, the digital economy will cause mass unemployment 
in the short and long term. The biggest losers will be people with low educa-
tion, but the highly-educated are also harmed.3
The opposing ‘this time is no different’ scenario maintains that in wake of 
technological changes people have always been able to re-educate themselves 
for new jobs and that technological change has always created new jobs. This 
Neo-Schumpeterian scenario acknowledges the fact that while technological 
change has destructive effects on labour markets, it also has positive effects. 
Technology changes people’s lifestyles and creates a demand for jobs that do not 
exist today or that currently play a very minor role. However, even this view 
comes with the prediction that, depending on time lag effects, automation will 
lead to more evolution of job tasks and short-term unemployment.4
For both scenarios, the time lag effect between the displacement of tasks 
and the creation of new tasks (reinstatement effects) due to automation is an 
important factor. Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo highlight the fact that 
the degree of labour market disruption depends on new tasks and new skills:
New tasks tend to require new skills. But to the extent that the workforce 
does not possess those skills, the adjustment process will be hampered. 
Even more ominously, if the educational system is not up to providing 
those skills (and if we are not even aware of the types of new skills that will 
be required so as to enable investments in them), the adjustment will be 
greatly impeded.5
Another factor that has an effect on inequality deals with changes in skill pre-
miums and the associated inequality in wages and employment security. Pulkka 
maintains that even in the best-case scenario, the expected effects of techno-
logical changes will increase uncertainty in the labour market, while in the 
worst case they may induce disruption to the paid employment model.6
From the social justice point of view of John Rawls, it can be argued that 
the situation of the worst-off in a society is a powerful indicator of how suc-
cessful the entire society is. When it comes to two vulnerable groups, children 
and the elderly, the Nordic countries have exhibited very low levels of poverty. 
These achievements are closely related to extensive investments in the Nordic 
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countries to ensure that all children have equal rights to participate in educa-
tion, health care and so on, and that they should be entitled to the necessary 
nutrition and housing resources so they can take full advantage of these rights. 
As small and open economies, the Nordic countries are forced to adopt tech-
nology as capital investments to better compete in the global markets. A high 
rate of employment is needed to collect taxes for these public investments. 
Highly developed public institutions demand a high level of taxes. Therefore, 
the question of technologically induced unemployment is crucial for the fiscal 
sustainability of the Nordic model.7
The eradication of poverty is not merely a matter of expenditures and com-
pensation. Rather, as illustrated by Jon Kvist et al., it is primarily a question of 
investing in human capital especially among children and the youth. Children 
and the youth will utilise the human capital when they enter the labour market. 
The unique feature of the Nordic model is that it capitalises on the promotion 
of human capital accumulation among the less privileged. That has also boosted 
intergenerational mobility, which allows all talents to be utilised for the benefit 
of the societies and their people.8
This chapter studies the agility of the Nordic welfare and labour market 
model to adapt to the expected challenges of technological change and the 
specific focus areas that ensure equality of labour market outcomes in the wake 
of automatisation. We pay attention to both challenges and solutions adopted 
in the Nordic countries. The focal point of the analysis is on three dimensions 
of the Nordic model: namely social trust, human capital investment and labour 
markets. In connection to human capital investment, there is a separate review 
of young people’s situation (the NEET – Not in Education, Employment or 
Training – debate). The chapter on labour markets includes a review on the 
universal basic income debate. The discussion is based on a review of literature 
on the Nordic welfare state model and the budding literature in the field of 
technological change and the welfare state.
Social trust
A convincing body of literature demonstrates that the level of trust in a society 
has consequences for economic performance as well as for individual well-
being. The fact that Nordic countries display a high degree of trust in all 
dimensions has deep historical roots. The state bureaucracies have functioned 
well since King Gustaf Vasa (1521–1560), founder of the Swedish Kingdom, 
paid special attention to the administration of his country. Swedish states-
man Axel Oxenstierna (1583–1654) went to great lengths to develop the state 
bureaucracy in the Swedish Kingdom.
In contrast to many other countries, the state and the municipalities in Scan-
dinavia grew to be strong and powerful enough not to be harnessed as mere 
vehicles of some particular interest. One indication of this is that in Scandina-
via the word ‘state’ is often used synonymously with ‘society’. The population 
records of the Swedish Kingdom kept mainly for military conscriptions created 
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a basis for effective taxation, which in turn was a crucial precondition for the 
independence of the state vis-à-vis other societal actors, and later for the con-
struction of the welfare state.9
Robert Putnam has identified two dimensions of social capital: bridging 
or inclusive, and bonding or exclusive social capital. These two dimensions 
create different kinds of solidarity. The bridging form of social capital gener-
ates broader identities (a broad usness) and brings larger sections of society 
together by unifying them, whereas bonding social capital pertains to specific, 
group-based solidarity. The bonding form of social capital generates closer ties. 
However, because of its in-group solidarity, it may create strong out-group 
antagonism. Welfare state functions are more than simply distribution: who 
gets what and how much. The institutional set-ups of welfare state policy 
 programmes unify and divide people and social groups.10
Throughout its history, social policy has had bridging and bonding func-
tions. In the Nordic countries, the emphasis has been on the bridging side – 
the basic principle in social policy schemes has been universalism, as expressed 
through people’s insurances and the public education system. The policy goal 
of full employment and the solidarity enforced through a collective bargaining 
system have emphasised the bridging function of social capital.11 However, the 
balance may shift towards the bonding side of social capital if technological 
change increases differences in productivity across labour markets and if these 
differences are no longer equalised either through a collective bargaining sys-
tem or by social policy programs.
An important part of the Nordic model is the established and well-
functioning collective bargaining system. The role of social partners, employer 
federations and trade unions reflects a high degree of institutional trust, which 
has been crucial in the construction of social policy programmes. There has 
been a cross-class alliance behind many of the core welfare reforms and both 
the employee and employer organisations participated in these mutual pacts. 
The collective bargaining system has promoted solidarity through broad-based 
wage agreements where low-productivity and female-dominated sectors have 
gained at the expense of male-dominated export industry sectors.12
Labour union membership has declined in Nordic countries with new forms 
of contracted work and other types of non-standard employment contracts. It is 
quite likely that technological change will bring about and promote new forms 
of employment such as micro-jobs with very short durations, self-employment 
and outsourcing. That may, in turn, weaken the role of labour unions and 
reduce their influence in policy-making. The downside is that the weakest 
members of the labour force might not be able to collectively defend their 
interests. That may not only reduce institutional trust endowed in a collective 
bargaining system but also have a negative effect more generally on social trust.
Social trust is also important for the development of remedies against pos-
sible disruptions in the labour market. If we implement, for example, universal 
basic income as a safeguard against the risks of automation and give govern-
ment grants with no strings attached to the people, it should be a sign of and be 
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based on trust. In turn, the recipients’ trust in society is reinforced by the fact 
that society is prepared to entrust them to use the money for good purposes. 
The relationship between society and the recipients is thus based on reciprocal 
trust.
Human capital investment
Today, perhaps more than ever before, a nation’s economic success is dependent 
on its human capital and innovations. The Nordic social investment strategy 
recognises the inputs or social investment policies and the outputs or the returns 
of social investment policies. The endeavour to establish universal access to 
education was a prominent feature in the conception of the education systems 
of the Nordic countries and grassroots level educational systems were harnessed 
to accomplish the task. Comprehensive schools were directed to provide the 
same basic education for all.13
With the emergence of the knowledge-based economy, the focal points of 
public policies are cognitive and non-cognitive skills developed in early child-
hood according to James Heckman and Dimitriy V. Masterov. In early child-
hood, publicly provided child day care and preschool education make up an 
important part of the social investment, as succeeding policies rest on the cog-
nitive skills learned in these formative years. Early childhood education and 
care (ECEC) involves elements of both physical care and education (socialisa-
tion as well as cognitive stimulation). Though the comprehensiveness and levels 
vary, all Western European countries have direct income transfers to families 
with children, but few other countries have as extensive ECEC policies for 
families with children as the Nordic countries do, as illustrated by Hiilamo and 
Kangas. Sweden and Denmark have the highest share of children (from birth to 
two years old) in public day care. The share is the lowest in Finland despite the 
fact that there is a day care guarantee. The reason is a cash-for-care programme 
(CFC) called the ‘child home care allowance’.14
Cash-for-care programmes are relatively low, flat-rate benefits paid to parents 
after paid parental leave. The benefits do not fully compensate for wage losses; 
hence they are fundamentally different from the paid parental leave payments. 
These benefits may impede access to the labour market for mothers with small 
children and hamper their ability to adapt to changes in the labour market. The 
first CFC was enacted in Finland in 1985 in order to offer alternative support 
to families who did not take advantage of ECEC services while their youngest 
child was under the age of three. The scheme is an important part of Finnish 
care policies. More than 50 per cent of eligible mothers receive CFC. Mothers 
with lower education levels are overrepresented among the recipients. Accord-
ing to Guðný Björk Eydal et al., a similar scheme was enacted in Norway in 
1998, but participation has gradually decreased. In Sweden, the idea of CFC 
has been highly contentious politically. In Sweden, a CFC scheme has been 
enacted twice, in 1994–1995 and 2008–2016, but in 2016 a new centre-left 
government decided to abolish the legislation. In Denmark, it is possible to 
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receive CFC, but it is used by very few parents, since the Danish care policies 
emphasise ECEC services for children from the age of one year. In Iceland, 
CFC has not been legislated.15
The dynamic nature of the social investment strategy entails that skills 
acquired in one stage of life should provide the foundation for the formation of 
further skills or their use in the next stage of life. Early cognitive skills establish 
the foundation for learning throughout a person’s life. This is ever more impor-
tant with the view of expected need to adopt new skills and tasks in the future. 
The cognitive and formal qualifications acquired during childhood and youth 
are intended to meet the skill demands of the labour market, where returns are 
also given a monetary form in terms of revenue to the exchequer and various 
insurance and saving schemes. Even now, the CFC system poses a considerable 
risk to Nordic mothers lacking higher education who are stuck long-term with 
a low-level benefit without contact to labour markets. There is evidence that 
choosing CFC instead of ECEC will lead to poorer educational outcomes for 
Finnish children and for Norwegian children.16 This risk will be aggravated if 
technological change increases uncertainty in the labour markets.
The reforms in Nordic school systems were accomplished by involving 
schools in the realisation of social goals such as equal opportunity and com-
munity fellowship. The Nordic vision of child education is that children from 
less privileged backgrounds should be enabled to receive an education on par 
with children from more privileged backgrounds. As Eva Österbacka shows, 
the educational system is crucial for explaining to what degree the parental 
background is inherited. Students’ performance in the Nordic countries is less 
dependent upon family background than in most other countries.17 Maintain-
ing educational equality is a challenging task given the important role of private 
schools in Denmark and the effects of the Swedish liberalisations of the 1990s, 
which facilitated the foundation of private schools and encouraged students to 
actively choose schools, thereby concentrating students from educated families 
to the schools with the best reputations. In contrast, the private school system 
plays a minor role in Finland and Norway. Technological change may require 
more fiscal inputs as well as policy reforms in the future to guarantee equal 
opportunity in education.
The NEET debate
The quest for social investment can be also expressed by a shift from decom-
modification to recommodification, as Natalie Morel et al. point out. Accord-
ing to K. Albæk et al., the shift is particularly important for young people, as 
research indicates that unemployment has a ‘scarring effect’ and affects future 
labour market opportunities. For technical reasons, Nordic youth unemploy-
ment figures include large numbers of students who, besides studying, are also 
looking for work. Youth unemployment rates are much higher in Finland and 
Sweden than they are in Norway and Denmark, a difference which may be 
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largely explained by how pupils in the school-based vocational training systems 
in Sweden and Finland are classified as outside the labour force, or as unem-
ployed if they are looking for a job, whilst apprentices in the apprenticeship-
based vocational training systems in Norway and Denmark are classified as 
employed. For this reason, NEET rates, that is young people between the ages 
of 18 and 24 who are not employed, or in education or training programmes, 
can be posited as a more relevant indicator of youth disengagement.18
Nearly all young people start upper-secondary educations in the Nordic 
countries in academic or vocational tracks. According to the OECD,19 a signifi-
cant proportion of Nordic students do not complete upper-secondary educa-
tion, and large proportions of these young people are in NEET situations for 
certain periods of time. The situation is clearly worst in Finland. In all Nordic 
countries besides Iceland, boys are far more likely to experience NEET status 
than girls. Young people, and especially young men, in vocational tracks are 
overrepresented among those who do not complete their three- or four-year 
courses within five years. The worryingly high non-completion rates are often 
attributed to the fact that young people have not acquired basic skills in read-
ing, writing and mathematics in primary education. This problem is expected 
to worsen with digitalisation if new policies are not implemented.
The discourse on NEET young people in the Nordic countries is closely 
tied to the welfare state orientation. As the OECD shows, low birth rates and 
ageing populations are shifting the dependency ratios of young and older adults 
to people of working age across the Nordic countries. As a consequence, the 
long-term sustainability of the welfare state is under pressure and the impor-
tance of integrating young people into the labour markets should be empha-
sised. The consensus is that young people with education should be employed 
as quickly as possible and that those without education should start toward 
one as soon as possible – provided they are able to do so. Against this back-
drop, young people who are neither working nor participating in education or 
training are perceived as a problem, as neither contributing to the welfare state 
in the present nor gaining qualifications and experience to contribute in the 
future.20
The NEET young people are a heterogeneous group with a variety of 
subgroups such as young people with low levels of education, young peo-
ple whose parents have low levels of education, and those with an immigrant 
background. The NEET young people face a heightened risk of falling outside 
the labour market and ‘society’ the longer their NEET status lasts. This implies 
that increased likelihood of future social exclusion, rather than the ongoing 
situation, is the most important problem for NEET young people. However, 
it is important to note that the future-orientation and probabilistic concep-
tualisations in this type of youth research do not necessarily correspond well 
with the experiences of the people it concerns. In any case, there is an urgent 
need to develop policies to reduce the number of long-term NEET young 
people. This emphasis will be heightened should technological change increase 
234 Heikki Hiilamo
unemployment more among less educated youth as a number of scholars have 
predicted.21
Labour markets
In the beginning of the 1990s, Denmark implemented a series of labour market 
reforms denoting a shift from passive to active labour market policies. These 
policies were later coined as ‘flexicurity’ and gave Denmark a reputation of 
being a forerunner among all the OECD countries in tackling unemployment 
among those at the margins of the labour market. While departing from the 
original ideas of the Nordic model, the Danish reforms tightened the eligi-
bility for unemployment benefits, decreased benefit periods, and introduced 
workfare elements into unemployment insurances and other social policies. 
The reforms were legitimised by emphasising reciprocity between the citizens 
and society. This was called a ‘right and duty principle’. The reasoning was 
that individuals had a right to income support as long as they were willing to 
work and actively searched for jobs. In return, society was obliged to assist job-
seekers in improving their job prospects. The reform labour market regulation 
was dismantled making it easier to ‘fire and hire’, which became the trade-
mark of the Danish model that gained international recognition. Other Nordic 
countries have followed suit, but to a lesser degree.22
In terms of labour market institutions, the Nordic countries are classified 
among the so-called coordinated market economy countries as opposed to 
liberal market economy countries.23 This is the model in which production 
is more coordinated than in the liberal market model: employers and labour 
unions are both represented in collective bargaining organisations and educa-
tion provides vocational and skills-based training rather than general education, 
and has guaranteed historically more stable employment careers. Nordic labour 
market institutions encourage long-term employment through comprehensive 
employment protection legislation. With the exception of Denmark, the Nor-
dic labour market institutions with a high degree of inertia might not allow 
easy and quick adoption of policies to tackle major changes.24
According to M. R. Busemeyer, in the wake of technological change, the 
types of skills workers possess may determine their range of exit options as 
much as their general education levels. M. Estevez-Abe et al. claim that work-
ers in the Nordic coordinated market regimes may be less mobile across dif-
ferent occupations relative to workers in liberal market regimes. For these 
reasons technological change would arguably have a substantial impact on 
workers’ employment prospects and economic security in the Nordic coun-
tries where workers have vocational and skills-based training with the least 
cross-occupational mobility, at least in the short-term since the learning and 
updating of skills takes time.25
As part of the project to ensure full employment and comprehensive utilisa-
tion of talents, the Nordic welfare state model has certainly helped women to 
enter the labour market. The policies also appear to have lowered the income 
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differentials between males and females. However, gender relations are perhaps 
not as equal as they seem at first glance.26 The other side of the coin is that 
Nordic women are predominantly working in the welfare sector, which leads 
to a high degree of occupational segregation by gender. This occupational seg-
regation has a triple effect upon gender equality. Firstly, women may be stuck 
low-paying public-sector occupations. Secondly, their representation in high-
paying occupations may be lower than in countries with smaller public sectors. 
Thirdly, women are overrepresented in part-time jobs that may be more easily 
replaced when technological change takes place. Were technological change to 
hit the public service sector hard, it would harm gender equality and increase 
the gender pay gap. However, on average, females have higher educational 
attainment than males. Currently, public-sector workers are more likely to be 
cushioned from the displacement effects of technological change than private 
sector workers, but the situation might change if the public service outsourcing 
trend continues.27
Critics of the Nordic model claim that providing generous benefits destroys 
incentives to work. Also, within the Nordic area, there are vociferous politi-
cal calls for income inequality in order to increase the incentives for work and 
thereby enhance economic growth. Empirical findings suggest it is very hard 
to empirically justify social inequalities by referring to their beneficial effects 
on employment and economic growth.28 However, it is still an open question 
if earning-related unemployment benefits with high replacement rates, typical 
in Nordic countries, lock in unemployed workers who previously worked in 
sunset industries.
The deep economic crisis in the 1990s showed that the universal and 
advanced Nordic welfare states were able to absorb macro-economic shocks 
and stabilise living conditions when needed. Despite skyrocketing unemploy-
ment and rising income differences, differences in disposable incomes and pov-
erty did not change that dramatically. Imagine what could happen in another 
welfare state if within a three year period unemployment rose from 4 to 18 per 
cent and the GDP fell by 13 per cent as was the case in Finland between 1991 
and 1993.29 With the previously proven antidotes, the Nordic labour markets 
rebounded quite well after the global economic crises in 2008. The scenario 
could be different if technological change induced a continuous decline in paid 
employment.
Migration also needs to be considered in analysing the effect of technologi-
cal change on the Nordic model. Migrants, especially women, have generally 
lower labour market participation rates, in part, due to the skill composition 
of migrants entering advanced West European economies. Much of the recent 
active labour market policies in the Nordic countries have aimed at integrating 
such groups into the labour market.30
Increasing ethnic diversity does not constitute a threat to the Nordic welfare 
state as such, but given the high level of unemployment among immigrants, 
the in-group and out-group distinction has already started to play a greater role 
(most notably in Denmark). As shown by W. van Oorschot, in all European 
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countries people perceive immigrants as less deserving than, for example, the 
unemployed.31 The nationalist-populist parties using anti-immigration ban-
derols are receiving a substantial share of votes in the Nordic countries by 
claiming that the universal, generous benefits will attract people from other 
countries interested in such benefits. In Finland, unemployment protection for 
migrants was weakened in 2016.
Ideally, there should be no wedge between the well-off payers and the worse-
off beneficiaries in the Nordic model. As Nelson highlights, there would be 
no room for ‘welfare backlash’, since everybody contributes to and everybody 
benefits from the system. However, the in-group and out-group distinction 
and related political debates might become even more destructive if the tech-
nological change increases unemployment among less educated populations 
who are more likely to vote for populist parties.32
The rise of populist parties has coincided with decreased support for Social 
Democratic parties to whose political ambitions the Nordic model is some-
times attributed to. The Nordic policies are generally not the result of par-
ticular political movements, but rather endorsed by a wide spectrum within 
the political field.33 However, party-based political division on migration issues 
might undermine universalism, which is one of the most important trademarks 
of the Nordic welfare state. In principle, social and health benefits are for all. 
They are neither targeted to the needs of some specific vulnerable groups, nor 
are they exclusive benefits for privileged occupational groups or immigrant 
populations. At the core of universalism is a sense of commonality; it is an 
expression of human rights.
The pension policies in the Nordic countries have aimed to increase par-
ticipation of aged workers, for example, through built-in incentives to delay 
labour market exit and part-time pension schemes. In the wake of automa-
tion, these policies may prove insufficient if older workers are also required to 
quickly learn new skills and adapt to new modes of work.
Basic income debate
Societal disruptions create windows of opportunity. After the economic col-
lapse of 2008, new radical ideas were emerging and were considered more 
realistic because the context had changed suddenly and completely. Universal 
basic income as a solution to expected uncertainties in the labour market has 
gained traction in a number of countries. Also, politicians and business elites 
have taken an interest in basic income. As a result, a number of countries have 
embarked on experiments with basic income. Between 2017 and 2018, the 
Finnish state ran an experiment with basic income. There are ongoing, planned 
and interrupted basic income experiments in also in Kenya, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Scotland, Uganda, and the United States.34
In the 1970s, the concept of basic income gathered interest from legislators 
and governments in the United States and Canada resulting in local experi-
ments.35 The four negative income tax experiments in five US states between 
Adapting the Nordic welfare state model 237
1968 and 1980 and in the Canadian province of Manitoba between 1974 and 
1979 were deemed a success in terms of informing the decision-makers on the 
effects of experimental interventions but disappointing for the basic income 
advocates. In the 1970s and 1980s, basic income was debated in Sweden as a 
response to ideas put forward by scholars such as Milton Friedman and André 
Gorz as well as experiments conducted in the United States and Canada. Later, 
both Swedish and Danish debates focused on freedom from work and criticised 
the full employment ideology. However, among the Nordic countries, only 
Finland has shown more than academic interest in the topic.36
Since the mid-1990s, Finnish public discourse promoted the idea of a short 
form of workfare coined as ‘activation’ with the catch phrase ‘work is the 
best social security’. The policies emphasised unemployed persons’ skills and 
motivation and they justify activation through reciprocity, making participation 
in activation measures a norm and a moral responsibility. In 2001, the Reha-
bilitative Work Act was introduced as an effort to re-integrate the long-term 
unemployed into the labour market and to improve their life management skills 
through forced employment.37
The Finnish basic income experiment was based on a completely differ-
ent ideology. In this experiment, a randomly selected group of two thousand 
unemployed Finns were paid €560 per month for a study period of two years 
regardless of employment status, a much different system than Finland and 
neighbouring countries had been used to. The preliminary results released in 
2019 by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health indicate no positive employ-
ment effects in the experiment group. The final results of the experiment 
released in 2020 pointed to the same direction. Early government responses 
signal that basic income will not become mainstream in reforming social secu-
rity in Finland.38
Workfare policies otherwise applied in Finland as well as in other Nordic 
and Western countries focus on conditionality. Should there be conditions for 
benefits or can we trust people and just give them money? In exchange for 
access to benefits, there are conditions as well as social services such as training 
programmes, job-seeking assistance, or other care services. There is a fear that 
if there are no conditions, people will just run away and turn their backs on 
society. Social workers will be left with no way of providing support in their 
professional capacities. The new set of policies to support those in the margins 
of the labour market needs to find a balance between employment promotion 
services and income guarantee programmes.
Conclusions
The sustainability of the Nordic model requires that the Nordic countries 
quickly adopt new technology to compete in global markets. Highly devel-
oped public institutions demand a high rate of employment and a reasonably 
high level of taxes. The question of technologically induced unemployment is 
of paramount interest for the fiscal sustainability of the Nordic model.
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Social trust is undeniably an important element in the development of rem-
edies against possible disruptions in the labour market. This means that there 
is a two-way connection between successful employment outcomes and strong 
public institutions. A high rate of employment with a considerably high rate 
of taxation is needed to support and develop public institutions, while strong 
public institutions with emphasis on early-life social investments are needed to 
support employment outcomes.
With new forms of contracted work and other types of non-standard employ-
ment contracts, such as micro-jobs, labour union membership has declined in 
the Nordic countries. That may not only weaken the role of labour unions in 
policy-making but also reduce institutional trust endowed in collective bar-
gaining. If any country were to implement, for example, universal basic income 
as a safeguard against the risks of automation, it should be a sign of social trust 
in the individual.
Ensuring gender equality in the labour market in the wake of automation 
calls for education and employment policies that would reduce occupational 
segregation by gender. There is also an ever more important argument for 
a stronger role of the state in guaranteeing employment among those who 
are vulnerable to employment shocks created by technological change. Possi-
ble areas for supported employment include education and care where human 
labour is more difficult to replace with machines. There is also an urgent need 
to develop policies to reduce the number of long-term NEET young people.
The comprehensive Nordic welfare state policies are responsible for the equal 
social outcomes in the Nordic countries. Generally they have been endorsed by 
a large spectrum of the political field. However, party-based political division 
on migration issues and emergency of discriminatory policies against migrants 
may undermine universalism, which is one of the most important trademarks 
of the Nordic welfare state.
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Nordic long-term planning and 
educational policies in the fourth 
industrial revolution
Janne Holmén
In the last two centuries, the world has experienced rapid technological devel-
opment, often described as a series of industrial revolutions. These revolutions 
have not only increased productivity but also disrupted older industries and 
caused unemployment among their former employees. One of the main strate-
gies for avoiding polarization between workers displaced from older industries 
and the beneficiaries of change has been education: primarily trying to adapt 
the skill levels of workers to the new demands of the economy. For a long 
time, these attempts seemed successful. In the early 1970s, on the cusp of the 
third industrial revolution, advanced economies still enjoyed full employment, 
despite centuries of labor-saving technological progress. However, the third 
industrial revolution, characterized by the creation of an information society, 
has deviated from the former in respect that unemployment and employment 
in low-salary jobs have remained high, despite decades of attempts to alleviate 
the situation through educational and other means.
In the 2010s, many observers believe that the information society has evolved 
to such an extent that we are at a qualitative tipping point; it is time to talk 
about a fourth industrial revolution. Although the exact nature and even exist-
ence of the fourth industrial revolution are subjects of discussions, it is generally 
characterized by increased automation through robotics and artificial intelli-
gence (AI). This would further reduce the demand for human labor in manual 
jobs and in white-collar jobs previously untouched by automation. In addition, 
the rapidly decreasing costs of renewable energy production are believed to 
have a disruptive influence on the fossil fuel industry. Concerns are raised that 
this might lead to mass unemployment on a scale not experienced before and 
cause polarization between a few highly skilled individuals, who are essential 
to the new economy and who cannot be replaced by robots, and everyone else.
The phrase ‘industrial revolution’ was coined in 1799 in France as an attempt 
to describe the country’s efforts to catch up with England’s industrialization.1 
Thus, the concept did not originate among economic historians describing 
technological and economic changes that had already taken place but was 
invented by actors intent on bringing about change. Also, in the case of the 
fourth industrial revolution, reform-oriented actors are the pioneers in the use 
of the concept. In a revolution, old truths are invalidated and the path towards 
DOI: 10.4324/9780429026690-13
Education 4.0. 243
the future can be remapped. The idea of an impending, inevitable revolution is 
therefore useful for reformers seeking to legitimize their descriptions of current 
problems and proposals for future solutions.
According to a study conducted by the OECD in 2013, Sweden and Fin-
land were the two countries in the world where employees have experienced 
the greatest technological and organizational changes in the workplace, while 
Norway was number six.2 In addition, a traditional part of the Nordic model 
has been to use education to reduce inequality. Thus, it is particularly fruitful 
to study strategies for combating the polarizing effects of technological changes 
in these three countries: the technological pressure for change is imminent and 
the motivation to find a solution can be expected to be comparatively high. 
Adding to the general challenge that technological development provides to 
the Nordic model, Norway, Sweden, and Finland all face particular threats, 
which are paradoxically imbedded in the specific nature of each nation’s suc-
cess. Swedes fear that their long period of strong economic development is 
threatened by the poor basic skills of school leavers. Finland has struggled eco-
nomically for a decade, and claims are made that its position as an educational 
model country makes necessary school reforms difficult. Meanwhile, in Nor-
way, it is feared that wealth from the petroleum industry has hampered innova-
tion and education.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze how government planning in Sweden, 
Finland, and Norway perceives the challenges caused by rapid technological 
and societal change, and its recommendations for how the educational system 
should adapt to these challenges. Long-term forecasts and plans for economic 
and social development will be investigated to determine whether they pre-
dict a future in which technological advancement will continue at the current 
pace, or whether they foresee an imminent dramatic increase in the pace of 
innovation and technological advancement. The role long-term plans prescribe 
for education in meeting these scenarios will also be explored. In addition, it 
is investigated how the conclusions from the long-term forecasts affect plans 
for the education system and curricula directly regulating the present school 
system.
Optimists and pessimists
The hopes connected to technological development, as well as the fears that 
it will cause mass unemployment, are based on the belief that productivity 
will rise as a consequence of labor-saving innovations. However, Erik Bryn-
jolfsson, Daniel Rock, and Chad Syverson have pointed out a paradox in this 
regard. While technology optimists, such as technologists and venture capital-
ists, foresee imminent productivity gains from AI, robotics, and other emerging 
technologies, pessimists  – economists, sociologists, statisticians, and govern-
ment officials – notice that measured productivity growth is actually declining. 
Brynjolfsson, Rock, and Syverson claim that both optimists and pessimists may 
be right: for example, while AI is a general-purpose technology (GPT) that has 
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great potential to raise productivity, it takes time and additional investments to 
reach that point. Since the increased amount of time and resources spent on AI 
innovation has not yet resulted in any significant output, productivity seems to 
be falling. A similar decline in productivity has been observed during periods 
of investment in earlier GPTs, such as portable power (electricity and the com-
bustion engine) in the 1910s and information and communication technology 
(ICT) in the early 1990s, after which productivity accelerated from 1915 to 
1924 and from 1995 to 2004.3
The discussion regarding skill-biased technological change is rooted firmly 
within the pessimist paradigm: it is an academic discussion among economists 
based on forward projections of historical data. On the other hand, the dis-
course on the fourth industrial revolution is rooted in an optimist paradigm, 
propagated by technologists who predict an imminent technological and social 
transformation. In effect, proponents of the fourth industrial revolution are 
also using a historical argument to support their view. However, rather than 
extrapolating from the recent trajectory of the development curve, they look at 
historical inflection points in the curve – the first three industrial revolutions – 
and predict that we are now approaching yet another such event, which might 
be more rapid and disruptive than the previous ones.
Wolfgang Streeck bases his prediction that the current interregnum will con-
tinue indefinitely on the absence of a practically possible vision of a progressive 
future.4 Among technology optimists, progressive visions do undoubtedly exist. 
However, their practicality remains to be proven.
Skill-biased technological change and education
A common explanation for the rise of income inequalities since the 1970s is 
skill-biased technological change. According to this theory, some technologies 
are so demanding of skill that only the most skilled individuals benefit from 
them, thereby elevating their incomes and leaving the rest of the workforce 
behind. However, the topic is hotly contested. Among the controversial issues 
are the questions of why earlier technological changes have not caused the 
same effect, how the phenomenon is related to globalization, and whether it 
can be observed outside the United States, which has been the object of most 
research. Another central question is whether there is a deterministic relation-
ship between current technological change and inequality, or if the outcomes 
can be affected by, for example, educational policies.
In recent decades, the number of workers employed in high- and low-wage 
jobs has increased, while it has decreased in middling jobs. David Autor, Laura 
Katz, and Melissa Kearney claim that computerization has replaced middling 
routine tasks but has raised the productivity of low-wage manual work as well 
as of high-wage abstract work. As a result, wages for abstract work are elevated, 
while wages for manual work either rise through increased productivity or 
sink due to increased competition from displaced routine workers relocating 
to manual tasks.5
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According to Daron Acemoglu, the last 200  years of US and European 
history suggest that unemployment and low wages caused by technological 
change are temporary. However, he stresses that this time around it might be 
different. If earlier technological changes increased the demand for labor and 
increased wages, and the present combination of technology and abundant 
labor supply does not, we may today face technology-driven unemployment 
despite the historical record.6
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz claim that skill-biased technological 
change cannot explain the growing polarization of the last decades, since skill-
biased technological change has occurred at a fairly continuous rate since the 
late 19th century, a rate that was only slightly elevated during the years 1979–
1999. Instead, they argue that the widening gaps are attributable to a reverse in 
the trend of increased education that took place in the 1970s. Their interpreta-
tion is that although skill-biased technological change increased the demand 
for skilled workers from the late 19th century until the 1970s, the supply of 
educated workers increased even faster, reducing the wage premium for educa-
tion and thereby curbing income inequality. Since 1980, the demand for skilled 
workers has increased faster than the supply, which has been hampered by, for 
example, rising costs of college education in the United States. As a result, 
wages for skilled workers have gone up and income inequality increased.7
According to Goldin and Katz, widespread secondary education contributed 
to enhanced economic growth and income equality in the United States from 
the late 19th century. They even suggest that ‘it was mass secondary school 
education that checked the more extreme forms of socialism later embraced by 
Europe’.8 Thus, the United States experienced less polarization than Europe in 
the early 20th century because of its uniquely advanced and egalitarian educa-
tional policies, while in the 21st century it has lagged behind countries such as 
Sweden, Finland, and Norway in educational and thereby also economic and 
social equality.
However, job polarization is present also in the Nordic countries. From 
1993 to 2006, Norway and Sweden experienced classical polarization with an 
increase in high- and low-wage jobs and a decrease in middling jobs, while 
Finland experienced a downgrade with an increase in low-wage jobs and a 
decrease in both middling and high-wage jobs.9
The fourth industrial revolution and education
One of the earliest iterations of the fourth industrial revolution was the 
German Industrie 4.0, launched in 2011 by the federal government. It was 
hoped that technologies such as the Internet and improvements in robotics 
would allow for production that is tailor-made to the customers’ individual 
preferences.10 In contrast to earlier factories that have produced large quan-
tities of identical products, Industrie 4.0 tracks each individual product at 
every step, implementing adaptations according to the specifications of the 
consumer.
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The most visible advocate of the idea that we are approaching a fourth indus-
trial revolution is Klaus Schwab, executive chairman of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF). According to the WEF, the fourth industrial revolution ‘is char-
acterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the 
physical, digital, and biological spheres’.11 The WEF made the fourth indus-
trial revolution widely known through its 2016 world forum and has proposed 
strategies for closing the inequality gap in the fourth industrial  revolution, 
acknowledging the importance of education.12
Michael Peters argues that in order to adapt to the fourth industrial  revolution, 
education must become an open ecosystem by utilizing new technology. For 
example, massive open online courses (MOOCs) could mitigate the adverse 
effects of rising college fees, which hinder people from acquiring skills needed 
in the transformed, knowledge-intensive labor market.13 Similarly, Carl Ben-
edikt Frey and Michael Osborne claim that MOOCs can mitigate constraints 
set up by economy, geography, or lack of time. According to them, traditional 
education with rigid programs spanning a specific period of time represents 
an outdated factory-based education that emerged during the 19th-century 
industrial revolution.14
Also Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee see improved education, such 
as MOOCs, as a way of combating the ‘spread’ of incomes that technological 
change can produce, but they do not believe that technology will solve the 
problem by itself. On the contrary, since some highly motivated self-starters 
take part in university courses through MOOCs at the ages of 12–14, originally 
small knowledge gaps are enlarged. They claim that digitization of education 
will only reduce the spread if serious efforts are made in that direction.15
Forecasting the future
In Finland, Sweden, and Norway, long-term governmental forecasting gener-
ally recognizes that technological change will transform society and that the 
schools need to adapt. However, in these three countries there are also impor-
tant differences in the descriptions of how, and to what extent, these changes 
will affect society and its educational system.
Norwegian planners foresee that the country’s wealth based on hydro-
carbon fuels will decrease. They also fear that the oil incomes have caused 
imbalances in several important sectors of Norwegian society. Produktivitets-
kommisjonen notes in its final report of 2016 that productivity growth had 
dropped alarmingly since 2005. Petroleum revenues had fed the growth of the 
service sector, where productivity remained low. The commission blames 
the resource-based economy for the low efficiency and completion rates in 
the Norwegian education system, and the low innovation level in the business 
sector. It concludes that the general level of education is the most important 
factor for productivity and predicts that future industries will increasingly be 
knowledge-based. Therefore, it is problematic that the number of masters and 
doctoral students in Norway are low, especially in the sciences. According to 
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the commission, there is not a single world-class university in Norway, while 
its research system is ‘subject to extensive political skewing towards broad 
social objectives’.16
The technologies associated with the fourth industrial revolution are seen 
as a solution to these problems. However, compared to Sweden and, particu-
larly, Finland, Norwegian planners put relatively little emphasis on the need for 
becoming a technological leader and exporter of high-tech industrial products. 
Instead, they consider it of great importance that Norway is able to benefit 
from innovations originating elsewhere in order to raise productivity in its 
large service sector.17 Focusing on use rather than invention of technology has, 
according to technology historian David Edgerton, made sense historically, 
since countries that have mainly copied innovations made elsewhere, such as 
Italy, have managed to achieve similar growth figures as centers of innovation, 
such as Britain.18
Although Swedish Långtidsutredningen discusses the future impact of nano-, 
bio-, and information technology, fields into which Sweden has invested heav-
ily, the report envisions a relatively undramatic development. It foresees that 
the industrial restructuring that has been going on for decades will continue 
at the current pace. In addition, the report considers Sweden well adapted 
for the challenges to come because of its high-functioning systems of higher 
and adult education. However, the comprehensive schools’ ability to provide 
coming generations with basic skills is a concern.19 The report also notices a 
significant difference in labor participation between native and foreign-born 
residents. Since the report concludes that the gap can be explained entirely by 
differences in education and skills, it recommends raising the educational level 
of immigrants.20
Referring to economic research on skill-biased technological change, 
Långtidsutredningen believes that with education the Swedish labor market can 
upgrade instead of polarize. This is already happening among women, and in 
order for men to follow, they might need to be educated in occupations tradi-
tionally filled by women.21 Digitaliseringskommissionen predicted more disrup-
tion, quoting estimates that 35–53 percent of jobs will be lost to digitalization 
within two decades. Since digitalization is skill-biased, it benefits those with 
high education over those with low. Routine work would be replaced, causing 
a middle job squeeze, which will increase competition among manual work-
ers. This can cause a rift between people with different educational levels, a 
development that society counteracts by, for example, life-long learning and a 
competence insurance that enables individuals to reeducate in the middle of 
their careers.22
Digitaliseringskommissionen’s report also contains a radical vision of Sweden 
in 2030, written by the consultancy firm Exponential Holding AB. There, 
teachers are transformed into tutors, as students learn to search for relevant 
information online and collaborate digitally with peers across national bor-
ders. Teaching has become optimized as schools have improved their ability 
to collect and interpret data. By emphasizing interdisciplinary thinking and 
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entrepreneurial skills in schools, humans are prepared for niches where they can 
still compete with computers in the labor market.23
Technology’s role for raising productivity in the public sector receives little 
attention in Sweden. Långtidsutredningen discusses the public sector at length, but 
its suggestions for handling increasing stress on public welfare services are  limited 
to redistribution of existing productive capacity through raised  retirement age, 
raised taxes, or changed priorities between public commitments.24
It is in Finland that we find the most dramatic visions about technology-
driven transformation of society and the most revolutionary ideas about educa-
tion. The 2015 report Finland – The Silicon Valley of Industrial Internet claimed 
that Finland could follow one of three development paths. As ‘the Silicon Val-
ley of industrial internet’, Finland would gain 48,000 jobs by 2023. However, 
this was only possible if the executive management and boards of companies 
as well as the public sector commit to this goal. This development path was 
described as the best possible future, where the industrial internet is the ‘New 
Nokia’. If Finland did not achieve this but still managed to become an ‘agile 
applier’ of the industrial internet, 16,000 new jobs would be created by 2019. 
However, if Finland instead became a ‘sluggish follower’, 16,000 jobs would 
be lost by 2019.25
The report suggested 15 measures that would help Finland become the ‘Sili-
con Valley of industrial internet’. They included improved adult education 
at different organizational levels, reformed university programs emphasizing 
phenomenon-based education and software skills, utilizing digital learning 
materials and online courses, learning from best practices between companies, 
and tax breaks for individuals seeking to educate themselves at their own initia-
tive. In addition, it suggested that 5 percent of public procurements should be 
earmarked for innovative solutions. This would improve productivity in the 
public sector and support tech companies.26 The report Suomi osaamisen kasvu-
uralle claimed that since the labor force in Finland is not growing, it is vital to 
utilize digitalization and technology in the service sector in order to maintain 
social and health-care services.27
The emphasis on Finnish companies learning from each other, rather than 
competing against each other as in a liberal market model, is not surprising 
considering that Finland displays the highest degree of corporatist enterprise 
cooperation among the Nordic countries.28
In 2013/2014, the report 100 Opportunities for Finland and the World launched 
a devastating attack on the present Finnish educational system. Among its 
drawbacks were inefficient centralization to physical school buildings, half a 
billion yearly trips to school, and internalization of the ‘out-dated teaching 
content’ of teachers. This led to an increasing deficit of know-how despite 
educational investments, which was mirrored throughout the economy. How-
ever, the report contained a vision of how technology could help alleviate these 
problems:
The lectures of the best experts are attended independently online, the 
exercises are performed on the computer or with the help of remote 
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controllable robots and simulators, and the instructor supervises the per-
formance and directs it, if required. Gaming is applied to teaching. Discus-
sions and peer learning take place in shared projects online or by meeting 
in person. Virtual glasses and remote controlled robots are used in on-the-
job learning. The robots give examples of the work to be performed, and 
with their help the instructor can supervise and guide the learner with-
out being physically present. Know-how is proven and evaluated inde-
pendently from the teaching, and in rapidly changing areas the proof of 
know-how is temporary.29
Unfortunately, ‘[p]olitical decision-making, interests of trade unions, and 
habitual values and reverences’ slowed down necessary change.30
A follow-up report in 2018 reiterated that one of the greatest threats against 
a future-oriented learning process was the teaching profession’s aversion to 
change and lack of knowledge. The great power of the teachers and university 
professors and their organizations was slowing down change.31
The ferocity of the report reflects that it is taking on a formidable adversary, 
the strong Finnish teaching profession. Other reports support an alternative 
vision of the future of Finnish education, which values the competence of the 
nation’s teachers and portrays it as an asset that Finland can market and sell 
internationally. So far, Finnish educational exports have focused on traditional 
teacher competencies rather than technology. However, also reports that show 
strong support for Finnish teachers stress the need for technological innovation. 
There, Finnish teachers are not described as reactionary but as ‘generators of 
change’.32
Signs of problem have been visible in Finnish higher education for a while 
but have only recently been taken seriously in government reports. In 2015, a 
report from the Ministry of Education and culture mentioned that entry rates 
for tertiary education had declined from 77 percent to 63 percent from 2005 to 
2012, making Finland drop from sixth to tenth place among OECD countries. 
This development was apparently not considered to be of pressing concern, 
since it was not addressed in the final recommendations of the report.33
In the Ministry of Education’s Visio2030 report of 2017, the fact that the 
share of 25- to 34-year-olds with higher education (41 percent) had shrunk 
beyond the OECD average was indeed considered problematic, although the 
problem was attributed to slow throughput rather than low entry rates. Since 
Finland’s public spending as a share of GDP for higher education is the highest 
among OECD countries, the system was described as inefficient. The report 
aimed to combine know-how with equality and efficiency, and claimed that 
small nations need to focus their resources on niches where they can be inter-
nationally competitive. By 2030, higher education should be available for all 
and at least 50 per-cent of 25- to 34-year-olds would have a higher educa-
tion. The vision also embraced flexible and individual educational tracks and 
a renewal of education through digitalization.34 The report did not attempt to 
resolve the apparent contradiction between an individualized, flexible, student-
centered education and the perceived need for a national focus.
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Planning education and adapting curricula
Educational planning in Sweden, Norway, and Finland highlights the need for 
the school system to adapt to technological development. The Finnish report 
Uusi oppiminen (2013) was ambivalent towards the country’s success in the PISA 
tests.35 It should not be a source of contentment but ‘obliges us to develop 
teaching by investing in new environments and models for learning’. The suc-
cess proved that Finland had high-quality teacher education, but it was still 
necessary to renew pedagogical practices and integrate technology in everyday 
education. Such a development could in time form the foundation of a signifi-
cant educational export. Finland might educate the teachers and children of the 
world, the report claimed.36
The Swedish educational strategy (2017) for growth and equality claims that 
technology and digitalization will change society and the labor market. The 
school must adapt by acquiring technical infrastructure and raising the teachers’ 
digital competence. For example, programming should become an ingredient 
of many subjects in comprehensive schools.37
The Norwegian Fremtidens skole claims that digital competencies are crucial 
for future innovation and technological development in the private and pub-
lic sectors. Technological development and complex problem-solving demand 
creativity and inventiveness, which will be of great importance to Norway’s 
economic development and competitiveness.38
The guidelines in recent national curricula on how to prepare students for 
the future labor market are strikingly similar. The current Finnish curriculum 
for the comprehensive school (2014) emphasize digital aids and competen-
cies. The general part mentions seven competencies, of which ‘digital com-
petencies’ are number five and ‘work life competencies and entrepreneurship’ 
number six. Innovation is mentioned as part of competency one, ‘ability to 
think and learn’. In the subject-specific part of the curriculum, innovation is 
only mentioned in connection to traditional handicrafts, sloyd, where it occurs 
no less than seven times.39 Apparently, proponents of sloyd, which disappeared 
from US schools in the early 1900s but still lives on in the Nordic countries, 
have embraced innovation in order to legitimize the subject’s future existence. 
However, the Finnish comprehensive school curriculum is dominated by digi-
talization, which is mentioned in connection with all subjects except physical 
education, 162 times in total.
At the time of writing, the Swedish curricula for the comprehensive schools 
and upper secondary schools date from 2011. However, as of July  1, 2018, 
these curricula were revised to include digital competencies. The revisions 
concerned the general aims of education as well as the particular goals of indi-
vidual subjects such as mathematics, history, languages, and technology. The 
word ‘digital’ was inserted 13 times in the general curriculum for the upper 
secondary school, seven in a single paragraph. This paragraph, which stresses 
the importance of entrepreneurship and innovation for the students’ future 
in the labor market, was significantly expanded. While digitalization was not 
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mentioned at all in the original paragraph, the revision made digitalization 
its main theme.40 Thereby, the curricula clearly states that the key to future 
employment is digital competencies.
In Norway, a major revision of national curricula is currently pursued. The 
general goals of education were revised in 2017, but, unlike Sweden and Fin-
land, none of them are directly related to the demands of the labor market. 
However, the core elements of each subject are developed by work groups, 
which should include persons having experience with digital tools, entrepre-
neurship, and innovation.41 The new curricula were gradually introduced from 
August 2020.
Thus, in all three countries, students are expected to find future employment 
by mastering entrepreneurship, innovation, and, primarily, digitalization. The 
focus on digitalization in the late 2010s turned out to be timely, as the corona 
virus outbreak in 2020 led the three countries to temporarily replace traditional 
schooling with distance education.
Conclusions
The term ‘the fourth industrial revolution’ is found only in sources dating from 
after its breakthrough at the 2016 WEF. It was used by Norway’s minister of 
finance in 2016 and in the Finnish Visio2030 report of 2017.42 It is associated 
with a belief in an imminent radical shift in technological development, and this 
technology optimism is prominent also in earlier Finnish reports, especially 100 
Opportunities for Finland and the World. The Swedish Långtidsutredningen, which 
sees future development as a continuation of present trends at the current pace, 
does not use the concept but is instead referring to skill-biased technological 
change. Technology-pessimist circles also dominate the Norwegian Produktiv-
itetskommisjonen. Optimists and pessimists alike are trying to predict the future, 
but with different research methods and narrative traditions. While the pessi-
mists write in academic style and rely on mathematics and statistical extrapola-
tion from current trends, the optimists write in management-literature style 
and produce lists of innovations that they claim are on the brink of causing a 
revolution. Although 100 Opportunities for Finland and the World (2013/2014) 
is unusually long with a hundred items, it is similar to WEF’s list of 23 tech-
nologies from 2016 or Citibank’s six from 2015.43 In Sweden, Stefan Fölster at 
the market-oriented think tank Reforminstitutet has written two technology 
optimist books that include lists of technologies.44 Digitaliseringskommissionen 
partly based its assumption of 35–53 percent job loss in two decades on Fölster’s 
research.45 Although technology optimism is an international discourse with 
similar manifestations all over the world, Finland stands out in the degree of 
influence that optimists assert over government long-term planning.
This might be explained in part by the institutional framework of govern-
ment planning. Traditionally, in all three Nordic countries public planning was 
done by government-appointed committees that published reports in official 
series.46 This practice still exists in Sweden and Norway, while in Finland the 
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committee report system was abandoned in 2002. The continuity is especially 
apparent in Sweden, where Långtidsutredningen (2015) is the twentieth report 
by that name since 1948. Such deep institutional roots lend a historical per-
spective to forecasting, which might contribute to a more gradual image of 
future development. In Finland, since no central committee report series exist, 
smaller reports are written by ministries, or, as 100 Opportunities for Finland and 
the World, by the Committee for the Future, appointed directly by parliament. 
The rupture with the traditional committee system might have made it easier 
for new groups to assert influence over the planning process.
A decade of economic recession in Finland has made successive governments 
suggest a number of reforms intended to improve Finland’s economic com-
petitiveness. However, they have met strong resistance from certain professions, 
civil servants, the academic community, and labor unions. Traditionally, these 
groups were represented in the committees responsible for long-term planning. 
By circumventing broad interest groups and putting planning in the hands of 
a small group of technology optimists, hopes are that a faster planning process 
not bogged down by vested interests can be achieved. However, the inclusion 
of interest groups in committees meant that when a report was finally published 
they were more likely to support the proposed reforms, since they had been 
able to influence them. Today, the most extreme technology optimist visions 
of the Finnish school are destined to meet fierce resistance from the teaching 
profession.
In Norway, technological development is seen as a way to counteract struc-
tural problems caused by the resource-based economy. Hopes are tied to raising 
productivity in the service sector, which has swelled due to petroleum rev-
enues. Thus, Norway put more emphasis on adapting and utilizing technology 
than on developing and selling it. Use of technology in the public sector is dis-
cussed in Finland, but as a means of stimulating tech companies or overcoming 
labor shortages, while the idea is not discussed at all in Swedish reports.
The main focus in Sweden and Finland is on developing and exporting 
high-tech products. All three countries encourage the use of technology in 
education, modes of learning that stimulate creativity and adaptability, as well 
as life-long learning. These ideas are not new and have circulated for at least 
half a century.
However, there are also important differences between the countries’ 
description of educational challenges. While Norway fears that its system of 
higher education lacks international competitiveness, Swedish reports are con-
tent with the system of higher education but are concerned with the basic skills 
of non-graduates, which have been highlighted by poor results in international 
comparisons. The erosion of basic skills is perceived as a threat to the positive 
economic development that Sweden has experienced for decades. Finland’s 
comprehensive school system is renowned for a good and egalitarian distri-
bution of skills, but since Finland, in spite of its well-functioning traditional 
education system, has experienced a long recession, good basic skills cannot be 
prescribed as a recipe for future success. This has opened the field for visions 
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about a high-tech revolution of the Finnish educational system, where no edu-
cational traditions or institutions are taken for granted. Perhaps it is not surpris-
ing that hopes of a future revolutionary transformation are highest in societies 
where current economic development is least satisfactory. The problems in 
Finland’s system of higher education have only recently caught the attention of 
government reports.
While technological change is mainly seen as an opportunity in Finland and 
Norway, in Sweden the threat of skill-biased technological change is discussed 
more thoroughly. However, it is believed that Sweden can avoid skill-biased 
polarization and instead achieve upgrading, for example by raising the educa-
tional level of immigrants and reeducating males for traditionally female work.
The school system has been described as modeled on the factory of the 
first industrial revolution: a mass production facility for uniform knowledge 
transmission. In theory, a school modeled on the tailor-made manufacturing 
of the fourth industrial revolution should be able to achieve the individual-
ized learning that has been long dreamt of among educationalists. However, 
although such a fundamental transformation of the school organization is envi-
sioned by some long-term future forecasts, especially in Finland, it is absent 
from direct educational planning. Recent curricula are focused on transmitting 
digital competencies through the old educational structure rather than on using 
digitalization to reform it.
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